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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NST$ 22206, Instructions
for P_ep_at_on of FMEA and CIL. i0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital
Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power
distribution and control (EPD&C), generating draft failure modes
and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results
were then compared to the proposed post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL
baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison
for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD&C systems.
The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of two hundred
eighty-four (284) hardware and six hundred sixty-seven (667)
EPD&C failure mode worksheets that resulted in one hundred sixty
(160) hardware and two hundred sixteen (216) EPD&C potential
critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of
the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline as of 23 December
1987 which consisted of one hundred one (i01) hardware and one
hundred forty-two (142) EPD&C FMEAs, and sixty-eight (68)
hardware and forty-nine (49) EPD&C CIL items. In order to
facilitate comparison, additional IOA analysis worksheets were
generated as required. IOA mapped one hundred thirty-eight
(138) hardware and one hundred forty-seven (147) EPD&C FMEAs, and
ninety-three (93) hardware and forty-seven (47) EPD&C CILs and
PCIs into the NASA FMEAs and CILs. The IOA and NASA FMEA/CIL
baselines were compared and discussions were held with the NASA
subsystem managers in an effort to resolve the identified issues.
A majority of the initial hardware issues were resolved, however,
forty-seven (47) hardware issues, twenty-nine (29) of which
concern CIL items or PCIs, and seventy (70) EPD&C issues, thirty-
one (31) of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved.
Many of the unresolved EPD&C issues result because of differences
in interpretation of NSTS 22206. The NASA/RI definition of
redundancy allowed the selection of specific unrelated failures
which were required to cause known problems, e.g., failures
required to cause continuous power to a valve. The IOA
redundancy string included only items that were capable of
performing the specific function of the item being analyzed. IOA
considers many NASA/RI redundancy strings to include multiple
unrelated failures.
m
1
A number of the unresolved hardware and EPD&C issues involve
failure modes identified by IOA which are not currently addressed
on the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. IOA considers each of these
failure modes to be credible, and recommends that they be added.
The remaining unresolved OMShardware and EPD&C issues result
because of differences between the IOA and NASA/RI analyses of
the OMSsubsystem which resulted in criticality, redundancy
screen, or failure effect differences.
IOA recommends that the unresolved issues presented in this report
be considered for incorporation into the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline.
Figures 1 and 2 present comparisons of the proposed post 51-L
NASA OMShardware and EPD&Cbaselines with the IOA recommended
OMShardware and EPD&Cbaselines, respectiveiy, and associated
issues.
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Figure 1 - OMS HARDWARE OVERVIEW
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, EPD&C, functions, internal and external
interfaces, and operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz-
ing as-built drawings to divide the respective subsystem into
components and low-level hardware items. Hardware and
EPD&C items are evaluated for failure mode, effects, and
criticality. These data are documented in the respective
subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the NASA and
Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA analysis
approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0.
Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEAs/CILs which is documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarizatio n
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
m 5
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 OMS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The OMS-specific ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA
analysis are presented in Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Orbital Maneuvering System (Figure 3) provides propulsive
thrust for orbit insertion, on-orbit translations, and deorbit.
The OMS is housed with the aft RCS in two pods on either side of
the tail. The OMS utilizes the hypergolic propellants, monomethyl
hydrazine (MMH, fuel) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO, oxidizer), to
provide a total delta V capability of up to i000 ft/s. The OMS
is also used during aborts to dump OMS propellants. Figures 4
and 5 present an overview of the OMS breakdown hierarchy and
Figure 6 presents the OMS schematic.
The IOA analysis has defined the OMS as being comprised of the
following subsystems.
o Helium Pressurization
o Propellant Storage and Distribution
o Orbital Maneuvering Engine
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control
3.1.1 Helium Pressurization Subsystem
The helium pressurization subsystem is used to maintain
pressure in the propellant tanks to feed propellants to the
OMS engines. The subsystem consists of a helium tank, two
helium pressurization valves, two dual pressure regulator
assemblies, two parallel vapor isolation valves, a dual
series-parallel check valve assembly, and couplings. A
schematic diagram of the OMS helium pressurization subsystem
is shown in Figure 7.
3.1.l.a Helium Tanks
Each pod contains one helium supply tank for the
purpose of pressurizing the oxidizer and fuel tanks.
The helium supply tank is a spherical pressure vessel
consisting of a titanium liner with a Fiberglas
structural overwrap. The maximum diameter of the tank
is 40.2 inches producing a usable volume of 17.03 cubic
feet. The tank operating pressure ranges from a low of
460 psia to a maximum of 4800 psia.
3.1.l.b Helium Isolation Valves
The helium isolation valves (Figure 8) are continuous-
duty solenoid-operated valves. The valves are
energized open and spring-loaded closed. The OMS HE
PRESS/VAPOR ISOL switches on Panel 08 permit automatic
or manual control of the valves. With the switches in
the General Purpose Computer (GPC) position, the valves
are automatically controlled by the GPC during an
engine firing sequence. The valves are controlled
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manually by placing the switches in the OPEN or CLOSE
position. Each valve contains a position feedback that
is sent to the GPC for display on the Cathode Ray Tubes
(CRTs).
3.1.I.c Helium Pressure Regulator Assemblies
Pressure regulation is accomplished by two pressure-
regulating assemblies, one downstream of each helium
tank isolation valve. Each assembly contains a primary
and secondary regulator in series, and a flow limiter
(Figure 9). The primary regulator is normally the
controlling regulator. The secondary regulator is
normally open and will not become the controlling
regulator until the primary regulator allows a higher
pressure than normal. The flow limiter allows a
minimum of 104 scfm and a maximum of 304 scfm. All
regulator pressures are in reference to a bellows
assembly that is vented to ambient (Figure 9).
Outlet press primary Secondary
o Normal flow (0 to 265 scfm) 255+/-4 psig 262+/-4 psig
o High flow (304 scfm) 245 psig min. 252 psig min.
o Lockup 264 psig 271 psig
3.1.l.d Vapor Isolation Valves
These valves are low-pr@ssure, two-position, two-way,
solenoid-operated valves (Figure i0). The valves are
energized open and spring-loaded closed. These valves
are used to isolate the helium system and fuel tank
from the oxidizer tank.
These valves can be commanded manually or by the GPC
depending on the position of the HE PRESS/VAPOR ISOL
switches on Panel 08. Either of the two (A or B)
switches in the OPEN position energize both VAPOR ISOL
valves to the open position. With the switches in GPC
or CLOSE positions the GPC is allowed to open or close
the valves automatically.
3.1.l.e Quad Check Valve
The check valve unit is mounted between the regulators
and the propellant tank to pass ullage pressure demand
flow downstream and to preclude upstream backflow of
helium and propellant vapors, or liquids. Each unit
consists of four check valve elements arranged as two
parallel assemblies of two series check valve elements
(Figure ii). External test/checkout ports allow
functional checkout without disassembly of the unit.
Filter elements are located at unit's inlet and test
ports.
14
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3.1.2 Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
This subsystem consists of one fuel and one oxidizer tank,
tank and crossfeed isolation valves, pressure relief
assembly, manual isolation valve, corresponding feedlines,
and couplings. The subsystem is capable of several
propellant feed configurations. These include nominal OMS
feed, OMS crossfeed, OMS/RCS interconnect and mixed
crossfeed. The OMS engines can be operated individually
using propellant from either pod. All valves can be
controlled manually by switches located in the forward
flight deck, with GPC software sequences or GPC memory write
procedures. A schematic of the OMS propellant storage and
distribution subsystem is shown in Figure 12.
3.1.2.a Propellant Tanks
The propellant supply is contained in domed, cylindrical
titanium tanks within the OMS pod. The forward and aft
sections of each tank has a fluid volume of 63 and 27
cubic feet, respectively.
The tank operating pressure is 250 psia with a maximum
operating pressure of 313 psia. The propellant tanks
contain the propellant gaging and the propellant
acquisition and retention assemblies.
3.1.2.a.I Propellant Acquisition and Retention Assembly
Each propellant tank is divided into two compartments:
forward and aft. The propellant acquisition and
retention assembly (Figure 13) is located in the aft
compartment and consists of a communication screen and
a trap reservoir.
The communication screen allows propellant flow while
preventing helium gas from crossing through the screen,
and retains propellant in the aft compartment during
zero g.
The trap reservoir contains four stub galleries and a
collector manifold. The stub galleries acquire
wallbound propellant at OMS startup. The stub
galleries also have screens which allow propellant flow
while preventing gas ingestion. The collector manifold
is connected to the four stub ga!!eries and contains a
gas arrester screen to further prevent gas ingestion.
3.1.2.a.2 OMS Gaging
A capacitance system is used to measure the amount of
propellant in the OMS tanks. The system consists of
forward and aft capacitance probes and an electronic
18
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totalizer. Propellant quantities are updated only
during 0MS burns. Figure 13 shows an overview of the
OMS gaging system.
The design of the probes uses the electrical properties
of the propellant to measure the height of propellant
between two concentric tubes. Fuel is a conductor and
forms one capacitor plate; the other plate is the inner
tube of the probe, which is a glass tube with a
metalized silver coating on the imside. The oxidizer
is dielectric, and the capacitor plates are the outer
and inner nickel tubes of the probe.
An ungageable region exists between the top of the
bulkhead screen and the bottom of the forward probe.
This represents the-_ank--quantity between 30 percent
and 44 percent. An integration routine using burn time
and a preset flowrate is used by the totalizer to
update the quantity of this region.
Forward Probe - The forward probe measures the
propellant above the bulkhead screen. The forward
probe consists of the concentric capacitance probes,
probe electronics, helium pressurization gas inlet, and
the gas inlet diffuser screen.
A_t Probe - The aft probe measures the propellant below
the bulkhead screen. The aft probe consists of the
concentric capacitance probes and the probe
electronics.
Totalizer - The totalizer receives inputs from the
forward probe, aft probe, tank isolation valves,
crossfeed valves, engine control valves and outputs
total and aft quantities for each tank. A block diagram
of the totalizer logic flow is shown in Figure 13.
An OMS to RCS gaging program calculates the OMS
propellant used by the aft RCS from each pod during
interconnect operations.
3.1.2.b Pressure Relief Valves
The pressure relief valve is located upstream of the
propellant tanks but downstream of the helium quad
check valves. The pressure relief valve (Figure 14)
consists of a relief valve, burst diaphragm, and a
filter.
In the event excessive helium and/or propellant vapor
pressure ruptures the burst diaphragm, the relief valve
opens and vents the system. The relief valve will
close and reseal after the excessive pressure has
returned to the operating level.
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The burst diaphragm provides a more positive seal of
helium than a relief valve. The filter prevents any
fragments from the nonfragmentation type diaphragm from
entering the relief valve seat.
The diaphragm rupture pressure is 305+/-8 psig. The
relief valve will open at a minimum of 291 psig and a
maximum of 307 psig. The minimum reseat pressure is
285 psig.
3.1.2.c Propellant Feed and Interconnect Lines
The propellant feed lines connect each of the left and
right pod's propellant tanks to their corresponding
engine. The crossfeed lines are connected to the feed
lines to allow the crossfeeding of propellant from one
pod's propellant tanks to the other pod's engine.
Furthermore, the OMS propellant interconnect lines are
connected to the RCS crossfeed lines to feed propellant
from either OMS pod's tanks to the RCS aft jets.
3.1.2.d Tank Isolation and Crossfeed Valves
These valves are ac motor operated with bistable ball
type flow control (Figure 15). They serve to isolate
the propellant tank from the feed and crossfeed lines.
The TANK ISOLATION and the CROSSFEED switches on Panel
08 permit GPC or manual control of the valves. With
the switch in the GPC position, the valves can be
automatically controlled by the computers. The valves
are controlled manually by placing the switches in the
OPEN position allowing an electric signal to provide
power to the ac motors to open the valves. With the
switches in the CLOSE position a signal is sent to
allow power to the ac motor to drive the valves closed.
The ac motor valve operates on 115 volt ac, 400 Hz
three-phase power but will operate with only two phases
if required. The microswitch position indicators
utilize 28 volt dc power to generate the open and close
position discretes. The valves are activated by logic
circuits in the Orbiter Motor Control Assemblies (MCA).
Valves may be moved by manual or GPC command.
A valve will operate when ac power to the motor is
turned on by a set of relays in the MCA logic. The
high rpm input of the ac motor is stepped down by the
planetary gears to turn a semicircular gear sector (not
shown). The gear sector in turn drives the
brake/clutch (rocker assembly) on the top of the valve
assembly. The brake/clutch turns a torsion rod, which
is connected to an actuator finger. The actuator
finger is the device that moves the valve ball.
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When the valve drives to the command position, cams on
the bottom of the semicircular gear sector activate
microswitch position indicators. These discretes are
fed back to the MCA logic to remove power from the valve
within 50 msec after reaching the commanded position.
The actuation time for a valve is from I.I to 1.3
seconds for three-phase operation and approximately 1.5
seconds for two-phase operation. Propellant flow
through the valve is established within 0.5 seconds of
the first valve motion.
3.1.2.e Manual Isolation Valve
The ground manual isolation valve is used to isolate
the propellant tank from the helium pressurization
subsystem for ground operations. The nonpowered valve
can only be opened with a special tool which cannot be
detached with the valve in the closed position. Open
during all flight phases, the valve has redundant seals
to external leak paths (Figure 16).
3.1.3 Orbital Maneuvering Engine Subsystem
The OMS engine is a pressure fed, hypergolic reacting
bipropellant, regenerative-cooled, fixed thrust rocket
engine. The engine can be gimbaled to provide thrust vector
control (TVC). Major assemblies are the GN2 (pneumatic),
bipropellant ball valves, injector, combustion chamber,
nozzle extension, engine purge valve, fuel/oxidizer lines,
couplings, and gimbal system (Figure 17). Two OMS engines
are installed on the Orbiter vehicle, one per pod.
Engine operation is controlled via GPC software sequences.
Ignition is commanded only after specific crew system con-
figurations (switch positions and CRT inputs) have been
completed. However, shutdown can be commanded manually at
any time during a burn. Crew/flight controller insight into
engine operation is via pressure, temperature, and valve
position instrumentation provided with the engine.
3.1.3.a Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2) Assembly
The purpose of the OMS GN2 (pneumatic) assembly is to
store pressurized nitrogen gas and supply on command
regulated GN2 to actuate the bipropeiiant ball valves
and purge the fuel side of the injector assembly.
Also, sufficient regulated GN2 is stored in an
accumulator for a minimum of one engine start.
The GN2 assembly consists of a fill and vent valve,
storage tank, engine pressurization valve, check valve,
pressure regulator, relief valve, accumulator, and
associated instrumentation (Figures 18 and 19).
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3.1.3.a.i Fill and Vent Valve
The fill and vent valve is a two-way, high-pressure
coaxial, single solenoid-operated valve (Figure 20).
The valve is used only during ground operations to
pressurize or vent the GN2 (pneumatic) assembly. There
is no electrical power to the solenoid coil during
flight. The valve is designed to fail closed via an
internal spring. During fill operations the GN2 is
filtered through sintered stainless steel wire filters
at the inlet and outlet ports. The valve is bolted
directly to the GN2 storage tank. There is no
instrumentation on this valve.
3.1.3.a.2 Storage Tank
The GN2 storage tank is a fracture-critical component.
The tank is manufactured from titanium bar stock in two
halves, then welded together. One half incorporates
the mounting flange for the fill and vent valve. The
second half incorporates the mounting flanges and flow
passages for the remaining GN2 components. Initial GN2
loading is 0.43 pounds at 3000 psia and 70 degrees F.
Nominally, this loading will supply 17 engine
start/purge cycles. Instrumentation consists of two
strain gage-type pressure transducers, which can be
monitored on CRT display "GNC sYS SUMM 2" and the
cockpit dedicated meter "OMS PRESS N2/He" on Panel F7.
The tank pressure transducer designated P1 is hardwired
to this meter. The transducer outputs are limit sensed
in the PASS (OPS 2 and 8) and the BFS (OPS i, 3, and 6)
and will trigger an SM alarm (class 3) if one or both
go out of limits. These pressures are _Dcluded in the
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) downlist for
ground monitoring.
3.1.3.a.3 Engine Pressurization Valve
The OMS engine pressurization (PRESS) valve is a two-
way, high-pressure, dual solenoid-operated shutoff
valve. The purpose of this valve is to start and stop
the flow of GN2 in the pneumatic actuation system. The
valve will open with the application of electrical power
(23-28 V dc) and only one solenoid is required for
nominal operation. With the loss of electrical power
the valve is designed to fail closed via an internal
spring. During GN2 flow conditions, the gas is
filtered through a sintered stainless steel wire filter
at the inlet port. Instrumentation consists of a leaf
spring switch, which is activated by a push rod
integral to the valve poppet assembly. Closure of the
switch completes an electrlcal circuit to indicate an
open valve. Valve open/closed status can be monitored
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on CRT display "GNC SYS SUMM 2" in the PASS (OPS 2 and
8) and BFS (OPS i, 3, and 6). The switch's open/closed
status is in the GNC downlist and is available for
ground monitoring.
The engine pressurization valve is not controlled by
the GPC software. Activation of the valve can only be
accomplished by manual control of the "OMS ENG" switch
on cockpit Panel C3. Placing the "OMS ENG" switch in
the "ARM/PRESS" position will open the "ENG PRESS VLV"
and allow GPC software to activate the engine control
valves for a burn, open the purge valves at burn
completion, and repressurize the GN2 accumulator. With
the "OMS ENG" switch in the "ARM" position the software
will inhibit opening of the purge valves.
3.1.3.a.4 Pressure Regulator/Relief Valve
The GN2 pressure regulator is a modulating/:
pressure reducing, direct acting pressure-operated
mechanical regulator with an integral pressure operated
relief valve. The purpose of the regulator is to reduce
high upstream GN2 tank pressure (470 to 3000 psig) to
the downstream nominal on-orbit ball valve actuator
pressure (310 +/- I0 psig). If downstream pressure
does increase, (at 360 psig maximum) the regu!ator will
lock up stopping GN2 back-flow. If the regulator
fails open or if downstream pressure rises to 450 psig,
the integral relief valve will open to vent GN2. At
400 psig the relief valve will reseat to stop venting.
During active GN2"flow the gas is filtered through a
sintered stainless steel wire filter at the inlet port.
There is no instrumentation on this device. However,
actual operation can be inferred from the_GN2 _ storage
tank and reservoir outlet pressures. The operating
pressure levels of the regulator and relief valve may
be mechanically reset.
3.1.3.a.5 Check Valve
The GN2 check valve is a one-way flow, cartridge type
valve. The purpose of this valve is to prevent GN2
accumulator back flow from occurring if a leak occurs
upstream of the check valve. The valve is held close
by a mechanical spring and will open with a pressure 6
psig above the downstream level. Reseat pressure is 1
psig delta across the valve. There is no
instrumentation associated with this component.
3.1.3.a.6 GN2 Reservoir
The GN2 reservoir (accumulator) is a fracture-critical
component manufactured from_i_a_ium bar stock.
Manufacturing is done in two halves, which are welded
together. The assembly is then bolted to a mounting
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flange, which is part of the GN2 storage tank. The
reservoir nominally holds about 0.0008 pounds of GN2 at
320 psia ahd 70 degrees F. This qUantity is enough to
guarantee a minimum of one engine start. Instrumentation
consists of one strain gage-type pressure transducer
located between the check valve and the reservoir
inlet/outlet. This measurement is titled "GN2 REG P",
and is monitored on the CRT display "GNC SYS SUMM 2" in
the PASS (OPS 2 and 8) and BFS (OPS i, 3, and 6). This
pressure is also limit sensed and will trigger an SM
alert (class 3) if it goes out of limits. GNC downlist
of this pressure, for ground monitoring, is also
available.
3.1.3.a.7 Engine Control Valve
The engine control valve is a three-way, two-position,
dual solenoid-operated valve (Figure 21). The valve is
normally closed to the bipropellant valve pneumatic
actuator inlet port. Upon receipt of electrical power
(23-32 V dc) redundant solenoids in tandem will open
the valve allowing the flow of pressure regulated GN2
into the actuator, deflecting a piston and opening the
bipropellant valves. Removal of electric power will
close the valve. Closure is accomplished mechanically
by an internal spring. Under flow conditions the GN2
is filtered through a sintered stainless steel wire
filter located in the inlet port. The valve is bolted
to an integral attach flange on the actuator assembly.
Purge of pressurized GN2 from the valve and the
actuator cylinder is done during the close cycle.
Instrumentation for the control valve is a leaf spring
switch. Activation is by a push rod, which is an
integral part of the valve poppet assembly. Design and
operation of the switch is identical to the "ENG PRESS
VLV". However, this switch is not monitored in the
cockpit but is in the OI downlist for ground monitoring.
3.1.3.a.8 Actuator
The bipropeilant ball valve actuator is a pneumatically
operated rack for opening the fuel and oxidizer ball
valves (Figure 22). The actuator is mechanically
closed via internal spring forces. Comprising the
assembly are an actuation piston/cylinder, a toothed
rack for mating with the ball valve pinion, closure
springs, and a Linear Variable Differential Transformer
(LVDT). The LVDT is calibrated to show the percentage
of ball valve rotation as a function of the rack's
linear motion. Output of the LVDT can be monitored on
the "GNC SYS SUMM 2" in the PASS (OPS 2 and 8) and BFS
(OPS i, 3, and 6). The output is also in the GNC
downlist for ground monitoring.
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3.1.3.a.9 Bipropellant Ball Valve Assembly
The bipropellant ball valve was analyzed as part of the
OME assembly but is discussed here for continuity. The
OMS engine biprope!lant ball valve is a rotating open/
close flow valve used to control the flow of propellant
to the OMS engine. The assembly consists of four
valves; pairs of fuel and oxidizer valves in series.
Each pair is linked mechanically to its actuator via a
pinion that mates with the actuator rack. Valve pairs
are rotated simultaneously 90 degrees for I00 percent
open. There is no instrumentation on these valves.
However, nominal valve operation is inferred by engine
start, stop, and performance levels.
3.1.3.a.i0 Engine Purge Valve
The purpose of the engine purge valve is to allow, on
command, the flow of regulated GN2 into the engine's
fuel (MMH) cooling passages. The GN2 purge is done,
nominally after every burn, to minimize the possibility
of fuel freezing in the internal cooling and injector
flow passages. The assembly consists of two valves in
series, a check valve, and instrumentation for monitor-
ing the open-closed status of the purge valves.
The purge valve is a two-way solenoid-operated shutoff
valve (Figure 23). with the application of electrical
power (23-32 V dc), the valve will open to allow GN2
flow. With the removal of power, internal spring
forces will close the valve. During the active GN2
flow conditions the gas is filtered through a sintered
stainless steel wire filter at the valve inlet port.
Instrumentation consists of a leaf spring switch _. The
switch is activated by a push rod that is an integral
part of the poppet aSSembly. Closure of the switch
c0mpletes an elec£rical circuit to indicate an open
position. This signal is part of the GNC downlist for
monitoring the valve position by the ground. The purge
valve operation is not monitored in the cockpit;
however, a purge operation can be inferred by
monitoring the "GN2 T K P", "GNC REG P" on GNC SYS
SUMM 2, Pc, and injector temperature readings.
Integral to the second valve is a check valve of
identical design to the check valve of 3.1.3.a.5.
Purging of the OMS engine fuel lines, cooling passages,
and injector head is accomplished systematically by the
OMS GPC firing sequencer software. Nominally the OMS
ENG switch is placed in the "ARM/PRESS" position for a
burn. This action opens the ENG PRESS VLV, repressuriz-
ing the GN2 reservoir and allowing the GPC to issue the
open command to the purge valves following the burn.
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If the OMSENG switch is placed in the "ARM" position,
the open commands are inhibited by the GPC.
3.1.3.b OME Assembly
The OME assembly consists of an injector, combustion
chamber, nozzle extension, and plumbing. The assembly
feeds fuel and oxidizer at the design mixture ratio,
confines the combustion of the propellants, and provides
for the expansion of the combustion gases to produce
thrust. There is one OME assembly in each pod.
3. i. 3. b. 1 Injector _
The OMS engine injector meters, atomizes, and directs
fuel and oxidizer into the combustion chamber, at the
design mixture ratio. This produces efficient and
stable combustion that will provide the required thrust
without endangering hardware durability. The injector
consists of an oxidizer/fuel manifold, core, fuel
distribution ring, platelet injector, and manifold
covers (Figure 24). All fuel and oxidizer passages are
separated by parent metal or redundant metailurgical
joints.
All oxidizer and fuel manifold passages a;e machined_
into the stainless steel core billet. The distribution
ring mates with the combustion chamber regenerative
cooling passages and delivers fuel to the fuel .......
manifold. The injector is made up of six 8-mil thick
platelet disks (one external, one face, three metering,
and one orifice). Each platelet hole pattern is photo-
graphically etched to assure no metal chi_s or burns
remain in the electron beam welded stack. The injector
hole pattern consists of 16 concentric alternating
rings of oxidizer and fuel Orifices. Ring 16 sprays
fuel on the combustion chamber wall for film cooling.
The manifold covers incorporate attachment bosses for
installation of instrumentation (pressure and
temperature). All are sealed off except two, one for a
combustion chamber pressure transducer and the second
for a fuel injector inlet temperature thermocouple.
The fuel injector inlet temperature is on "PRPLT
THERMAL (DISP 89)" in the PASS (OPS 2) and on "GNC SYS
SUMM 2" in the BFS (OPS I, 3, and 6). The combustion
chamber pressure is hardwired to _'OMS PRESSPC" meter
on panel F7 (output in per6ent)._ parameters are
part of the GNC downlist for ground moni£oring. The
fuel injector temperature is limit sensed and will
trigger an SM alert (class 3) if it exceeds a high limit.
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3.1.3.b.2 Combustion Chamber
The OMS engine combustion chamber confines the hot
combustion gases in a fixed volume producing the
required pressure and temperature that provides the
design thrust. The combustion chamber consists of an
acoustic resonator, inner and outer walls, nozzle
throat, fuel inlet distribution ring, thrust-gimbal
ring mounting pads, clevis mounts for attachment of
other assemblies and a nozzle attachment flange (Figure
25). Fuel is used to cool the assembly during engine
burns by regenerative and film cooling methods.
One hundred twenty longitudinal grooves are machined
into the combustor's stainless steel inner wall. When
mated to the outer wall these grooves make up the
regenerative cooling passages. These passages are
aligned and mated to the injector assemblies' fuel
distribution ring during final chamber assembly. The
remaining part of the regenerative cooling system is
the fuel inlet-distribution ring, which is an integral
part welded to the outer wall. The nozzle attachment
flange is an integral part of the distribution ring.
The thrust-gimbal ring mounting pads are also welded to
the distribution ring while the hardware-subsystem
clevis mounts are welded to the outer chamber wall.
Integral to the inner wall of the combustion chamber is
the converging-throat-diverging (initial) section of
the engine's nozzle. The converging section has an
area ratio (Ac/At) of 1.934:1, which blends into the
throat area (approx. 26.5 square inches). The diverg-
ing section is the initial section of the engine's
bell-shaped exhaust nozzle. The area ratio of this
section is 5.866:1 with a mean divergence angle of
about 30.5 degrees.
3.1.3.b.3 Nozzle Extension
The nozzle extension, when bolted to the combustion
chamber, completes the engine's bell-shaped exhaust
nozzle (Figure 26). It is fabricated from a columbium
alloy sheet stock. Nominal thickness is 0.030 inch.
However, the attach flange is made from 0.i0 inch sheet
and the exhaust plane stiffener ring is from 0.0775
inch sheet. These two sections are tapered to match
the 0.030 sheet at the girth welds. The final assembly
is coated with a silicide compound as a corrosion
preventive. Attachment to the combustion chamber is by
a split retainer ring with a graphite gasket. Thirty-
six bolts hold the extension in place.
The nozzle exit plane area is about 1458 square inches,
resulting in an expansion ration (Ae/At) of 55:1. The
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exit plane divergent angle is 0.55 degrees, which gives
a radial thrust component of about 900 pounds
(symmetric). At steady state operation, the exhaust
gas exit velocity is approximately I0,i00 ft/sec.
3.1.3.b.4 Plumbing
Plumbing for the OMS engine is divided into GN2
(pneumatic), fuel, and oxidizer lines. These lines are
fabricated from titanium alloy tubing incorporating
integral end fittings.
The fuel and oxidizer inlet lines are fabricated from
1.50-in.-O.D. stainless steel tube. Fittings are
welded to the tube for attachment in the propellant
feed lines and the inlet side of the bipropellant ball
valve assembly. The inlet lines also incorporate
bellows to allow for line flexing during gimbal
operations and engine assembly. At the attachment to
the feed lines, a flow balancing orifice and filter are
fitted to each line.
Outlet lines for the fuel and oxidizer are made from
1.250-in. O.D. titanium alloy tubing. End fittings are
welded in place for mating to the bipropellant ball
valve assembly, the oxidizer inlet manifold, and the
fuel's inlet distribution ring. Bellows are
incorporated in the lines to allow for engine alignment
during vehicle/engine mating.
Instrumentation for the plumbing consists of strain
gage type pressure transducers and thermocouples on the
fuel and oxidizer inlet lines. The pressure
measurements can be monitored in the cockpit on "GNC
SYS SUMM 2" in the PASS (OPS 2 and 8) and in the BFS
(OPS I, 3, and 6). The temperatures can be monitored
in the cockpit on "PRPLT THERMAL (DISP 89)" in SM OPS
2. The pressures and temperatures are part of the
GNC/OI downlist for ground monitoring. The
temperatures are also limit sensed and will trigger an
SM alert (class 3) if the limits are exceeded.
3.1.3.c TVC (Gimbal) Assembly
Each OMS engine is attached to the Orbiter via a
pivoting mount, which can be gimbaled up-and-down
(pitch) and side-to-side (yaw) to provide 3-axis thrust
vector control (Figure 27). Gimbaling is driven by two
electromechanical actuators on each engine (Figure 28).
Gimbal travel in the pitch and yaw axes is approxi-
mately +/-7 degrees and +/-8 degrees, respectively,
about the null. Since the engines are mounted on
opposite sides of the Orbiter's centerline (X-axis),
pointing one engine up and one down produces a roll
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moment. With both engines firing, coordinated 2-axis
gimbaling of the two engines produces 3-axis Orbiter
flight control. The yaw gimbals control only yaw,
whereas the pitch gimbaling produces both a pitch and a
roll moment together. 3-axis TVC control is impossible
with only one engine. For a one-engine OMS burn, TVC
controls pitch and yaw and the RCS is used to control
roll. The crew can read the current engine gimbal
pitch and yaw angles on the CRT XXXX MNVR YYYY display.
The pitch and yaw angles are included in the OI down-
list for ground monitoring.
Each gimbal actuator has two channels: primary and
secondary. If the active channel stops running, the
other can take over. Both channels operate at the same
speed, taking four seconds to steer an engine through
its entire gimbal range at top speed. The crew can
select actuator drive via the CRT XXXX MNVR YYYY
display.
3.1.4 Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystems
3.1.4.a Thermal Control
Thermal control for the OMS is achieved by insulation
of propellant lines and walls that enclose OMS hardware
components, and by line-wraparound heaters and blanket-
type heaters. The heater system is divided into two
areas: the OMS/RCS pods, and the aft fuselage cross-
feed and bleed lines, Each of the heater systems has
two redundant heater systems, A and B, and are
controlled by switches on Panel AI4.
3.1.4.a.i Pod Thermal Control
The OMS/RCS pods use heater patches to provide thermal
control. Each heater patch consists of a redundant set
of wires, or elements, which have been formed into a
flat, tightly spiraled patch. The patch is then
mounted on existing hardware, and as electricity flows
through the highly resistant wires, the heat generated
warms the hardware as well as radiating into the
surrounding open areas. Each of the OMS/RCS pods are
divided into nine heater areas. Each of the heater
patches in the pods contain an A and a B element.
Each element has a thermostat which controls the
temperature from 55 degrees to 75 degrees, +/-5
degrees F. Temperature sensors are located throughout
the pods and supply temperature information to the
propellant thermal CRT display and to telemetry. The
crew can monitor this display only in SM OPS 2, whereas
the ground can monitor the temperature in all OPS.
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3.1.4.a.2 Crossfeed and Bleedline Thermal Control
The aft fuselage is divided into eleven heater areas.
Each area is heated in parallel by heater systems A and
B, and each areas has a control thermostat to maintain
temperature at 55 degrees to 75 degrees, +/-5 degrees
F. Temperature sensors are located on the control
thermostats and on the crossfeed and bleed lines. The
temperature sensors supply temperature to the
propellant thermal CRT display in SM OPS 2, and to
telemetry to all OPS.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The OMS engine interfaces with the Shuttle's Data Processing
System (DPS), Pulse Code Modulator Master Unit (PCMMU), Caution
and Warning System (C&W), Displays and Controls (D/C), and the
Electrical Power Distribution and Control System (EPDCS).
Data from the OMS engine consisting of pressures, temperatures,
actuator position, and valve position are sent to the DPS via the
Flight Critical (FC) Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDMs) for
processing by the GPCs. Display and annunciation of the health
and status of the engine is accomplished by the DPS via CRT
displays, cockpit meters, C&W, and telemetry. The DPS system in
turn provides the engine with commands for valve configurations,
engine ON/OFF, and Thrust Vector Control (TVC).
A subset of the engine data is sent to the PCMMU via the
Operational Instrumentation (OI) MDMs to be telemetered. The
PCMMU combines these data with other OMS parameters, output from
the GPCs as part of the downlist, and routes them to the onboard
recorders and to the S-band to be transmitted to the ground as
part of the downlink.
A carefully selected subset of OMS engine data is sent to the C&W
for fault determination and alarm annunciation. The C&W
processes these data against present limits to determine
anomalies in engine performance. When anomalies are found,
hardware C&W signals are issued that activate indicator lights in
the C&W panel and the master alarm pushbuttons and turn on the
C&W tone.
Dedicated cockpit meters in the D&C panels are used to display
engine data either sent directly from the engine or routed
through the GPCs. The D&C panels also have switches and circuit
breakers that are used for manual valve configuration and power
routing. In the manual TVC mode, crew deflection of the
Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) is routed through the GPC for
scaling and then to the engine gimbal actuators to provide TVC.
Electrical power is provided to the engine by the EPDCS. Logic
power and dc power is provided to valve relays and TVC servo-
actuators.
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The OMS also interfaces with the aft RCS through propellant
interconnect lines. OMS propellant can be fed to RCS jets for
attitude holds, maneuvers, and translations on-orbit, and during
aborts for more rapid OMS propellant dumping. RCS propellant is
not fed to the OMS.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the hierarchy of the OMS hardware and
EPD&C components, respectively. Figures 6 through 28 depict the
functional details of the 0MS subsystem components.
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the OMS hardware initially generated two
hundred eighty-four (284) failure mode worksheets and identified
one hundred sixty (160) potential critical items (PCIs) before
starting the assessment process. The EPD&C subsystem analysis
initially generated six hundred sixty-seven (667) worksheets with
two hundred sixteen (216) PCIs. These analysis results along
with additional analysis results generated during the assessment
(Appendix E) were compared to the proposed NASA baseline of one
hundred one (i01) hardware and one hundred forty-two (142) EPD&C
FMEAs, and sixty-eight (68) hardware and forty-nine (49) EPD&C
CIL items. IOA mapped one hundred thirty-eight (138) hardware
and one hundred forty-seven (147) EPD&C FMEAs, and ninety-three
(93) hardware and forty-seven (47) EPD&C CILs and PCIs into the
NASA FMEAS and CILs. Upon completion of the assessment, and
after discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, forty-seven
(47) hardware issues, twenty-nine (29) of which concern CIL items
or PCIs, and seventy (70) EPD&C issues, thirty-one (31) of which
concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Each of these
unresolved issues are presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2, as well
as in the detailed assessment worksheets (Appendix C). Any IOA
issues which were resolved with the NASA subsystem managers are
documented as such on the detailed assessment worksheets, and are
summarized in section 4.3.
Appendix C presents detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. These worksheets detail
the assessments of each failure mode and document unresolved
issues, resolved issues, plus any additional non-issue
recommendations and comments. Appendix D highlights the IOA
recommended critical items list and corresponding IOA worksheet
ID. Appendix E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA86001-21, Analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System,
January 12, 1987. Appendix F provides a cross reference between
the NASA FMEAs and corresponding IOA worksheet(s) along with IOA
recommendations and an issues "flag" to denote the FMEAs with
which IOA has unresolved issues.
Following the hierarchy breakdown shown in Figures 4 and 5, the
OMS assessment results are summarized in the tables below.
Tables I-A and I-B present summaries of the IOA FMEA assessments
for the OMS hardware and OMS EPD&C, respectively. The IOA INTL
column is the initial number of IOA failure modes for each OMS
component. The recommended IOA FMEA baseline (IOA MAP) versus
the NASA FMEA baseline, and resulting unresolved issues are
presented in the subsequent columns. Theunresolved failure mode
issues for each OMS component are discussed in the associated
section 4 paragraph referenced in the final column.
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Tables II-A and II-B present summaries of the IOA CIL assessments
for the OMShardware and OMSEPD&C, respectively. The IOA INTL
column is the initial number of IOA PCIs for each OMScomponent.
The recommended IOA CIL baseline (IOA MAP) versus the NASA CIL
baseline, and resulting unresolved issues are presented in the
subsequent columns. Again, the unresolved failure mode issues
for each OMScomponent are discussed in the associated section 4
paragraph referenced in the final column.
Tables III-A and_III-B present summaries of the_recommended IOA
FMEAbaselines for the OMShardware and OMSEPD&C, respectively.
Tables IV-A and IV-B present sU_aries of the reco_ended IOA cIL
baselines for the OMS hardware and OMS EPD&C, respectively.
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TABLE I-A Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment - OMS Hardware
Components
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
VAPOR ISOLATION VALVE
QUAD CHECK VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PRQP STOR & D_$T SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
PROPELLANT TANK
GAGING PROBES
TOTALIZER
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
GALLERY LEG SCREEN
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD SCREEN
IOA
INTL
2
6
5
6
5
3
9
5
5
3
2
I0
3
2
1
1
IOA
MAP
1
3
3
2
4
5
5
1
5
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
NASA
FMEAS
1
2
3
2
3
3
3
1
ISSUES
0
1
1
1
2
2
2
0
PARAGRAPHS
FOR ISSUES
4.2.1.A
4.2.1.A.I
4.2.1.A.2
4.2.1.A.3
4.2.1.A.4
4.2.1.A.5
4.2.1.A.5
4.2.2.A
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
CROSSFEED VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
GIMBAL BELLOWS
FLEX LINE ASSEMBLY
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER & ORIFICE
8
8
33
3
15
2
3
8
4
4
i0
0
2
1
1
2
3
3
6
0
2
1
1
2
1
1
4
0
0
0
0
0
1
4.2.2.A.I
4.2.2.A.2
4.2.2.A.3
BIPROPELLANT VALVE ASSEMBLY
BIPROP CAVITY PRESS RLF VALVE
PLATELET INJECTOR
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
NOZZLE EXTENSION
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
27
5
3
2
2
12
3
3
1
8
4
2
2
1
8
1
1
0
6
0
2
2
1
3
1
1
0
2
4
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
4.2.3.A.2
4.2.3.A.3
4.2.3.A.4
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TABLE I-A Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment - OMS Hardware (cont'd)
Criticality: IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP FMEAS FOR ISSUES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
TANK FILL/VENT VALVE
STORAGE TANK
GN2 PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING
PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CHECK VALVE
ACCUMULATOR
PURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES & FITTINGS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL RING
GIMBAL RING BEARING
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
GIMBAL DRIVE MOTOR
GIMBAL DRIVE ASSEMBLY
REDUCTION GEAR
ANTIBACK DEVICE
GIMBAL DRIVE THRUST BEARING
MECHANICAL STOP, SNUBBER
CONTROLLER, GIMBAL ACTUATOR
3
2
2
6
5
4
3
2
II
3
6
7
1
1
1
2
7
2
3
2
1
2
2
1
0
3
2
3
2
2
2
0
I0
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
1
0
2
2
3
2
1
2
0
6
1
1
1
1
1
2
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
4
0
0
2
0
1
1
2
2
3
1
0
4.2.3.A.6
4.2.3.A.7
4.2.3.A.8
4.2.3.A
4.2.3.A.9
4.2.3.A. I0
4.2.3.A. II
4.2.3.A.12
4.2.3.A.13
4.2.3.A.14
4.2.3.A.15
TOTAL 284 138 101 47
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TABLE I-B Summary Of IOA FMEA Assessment - OMS EPD&C
Criticality:
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
IOA IOA
INTL MAP
16 2
20 4
4 2
2 1
12 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
METER
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, TOGGLE
PROP STOR & p_ST SUBSYSTEM
.
1
2
2
1
CONTROLS
VALVES
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
FUSE
INDICATOR, EVENT
METER
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, ROTARY
8 25
16 3
8 2
32 7
72 9
12 6
2 1
4 2
4 3
2 1
2 1
2 2
NASA
FMEAS
2
4
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
25
3
2
7
9
5
1
2
2
1
1
2
ISSUES
17
3
1
5
6
5
0
2
2
0
1
1
PARAGRAPHS
FOR ISSUES
4.2.1.B
4.2.1.B.I
4.2.1.B.2
4.2.1.B.3
4.2.1.B.4
4.2.1.B.5
4.2.1.B.6
4.2.2.B.1
4.2.2.B.2
4.2.2.B.3
4.2.2.B.4
4.2.2.B.5
4.2.2.B.6
4.2.2.B.7
4.2.2.B.8
4.2.2.B.9
4.2.2.B.I0
w
m
w
53
TABLE I-B Summary Of IOA FMEAAssessment - OMSEPD&C (cont'd)
Criticality: IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP FMEAS FOR ISSUES
.7
OME SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
GN2 ASSEMBLY
VALVES
DIODE 8 2 2 0
DRIVER 22 8 8 1 4.2.3.B.I
FUSE 8 3 3 0
RESISTOR 20 3 3 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 5 4 4 2 4.2.3.B.2
TVC ASSEMBLY
CONTROLLER 8 2 2 0
FUSE 2 1 1 1 4.2.3.B.3
INSTRUMENTATION
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, PRESSURE 3 1 1 1 4.2.3.B.4
OME ASSEMBLY
FUSE 2 1 1 0
METER 1 1 1 0
SENSOR, POSITION 2 1 1 1 4.2.3.B.5
SENSOR, PRESSURE 3 3 2 1 4.2.3.B.6
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 4 3 3 1 4.2.3.B.7
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 0 1 1 1 4o2.3.B.8
TVC ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, POSITION 4 1 1 0
THERMA_ CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
POD
DRIVER 44 2 2 1 4.2.4.B.I
FUSE 32 3 3 0
HEATER 64 1 1 1 4.2.4.B.2
RELAY 8 2 2 1 4.2.4.B.3
RESISTOR 28 3 3 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 12 1 0 1 4.2.4.B.4
SWITCH, THERMAL 32 2 2 1 4.2.4.B.5
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4 2 2 1 4.2.4.B.6
CROSSFEED
DRIVER 12 2 2 1 4.2.4.B.7
FUSE i0 3 3 0
HEATER 22 1 1 1 4.2.4.B.8
RELAY 4 2 2 0
RESISTOR 12 2 2 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 13 2 2 2 4.2.4.B.9
SWITCH, THERMAL 44 2 2 1 4.2.4.B.I0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4 2 2 1 4.2.4.B.II
TOTAL 667 147 142 70
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TABLE II-A Summary of IOA CIL Assessment - OMS Hardware
Components IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP CILS FOR ISSUES
4.2.1.AHE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
VAPOR ISOLATION VALVE
QUAD CHECK VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
PROPELLANT TANK
GAGING PROBES
TOTALIZER
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
GALLERY LEG SCREEN
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD SCREEN
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
CROSSFEED VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
GIMBAL BELLOWS
FLEX LINE ASSEMBLY
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER & ORIFICE
BIPROPELLANT VALVE ASSEMBLY
BIPROP CAVITY PRESS RLF VALVE
5
2
2
0
0
2
1
1
5
3
Ii
0
15
2
3
7
2
26
2
1
3
3
2
4
2
2
1
4
0
2
0
0
1
1
1
3
1
4
0
2
1
1
2
2
8
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
4
0
2
0
0
1
1
1
3
1
2
0
2
1
1
2
1
6
0
0
1
1
1
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
4
4.2.1.A.1
4.2.1.A.2
4.2.1.A.3
4.2.1.A.4
4.2.1.A.5
4.2.1.A.5
4.2.2.A
4.2.2.A.3
4.2.3.A
4.2.3.A.I
4.2.3.A.2
4.2.3.A.3
PLATELET INJECTOR
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
NOZZLE EXTENSION
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
3
2
2
4
3
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
0
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
4.2.3.A.4
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TABLE II-A Summary of IOA CIL Assessment - OMS Hardware (cont'd)
Criticality: IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP CILS FOR ISSUES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
TANK FILL/VENT VALVE
STORAGE TANK
GN2 PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING
PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CHECK VALVE
ACCUMULATOR
PURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES & FITTINGS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL RING
GIMBAL RING BEARING
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
GIMBAL DRIVE MOTOR
GIMBAL DRIVE ASSEMBLY
REDUCTION GEAR
ANTIBACK DEVICE
GIMBAL DRIVE THRUST BEARING
MECHANICAL STOP, SNUBBER
CONTROLLER, GIMBAL ACTUATOR
0
1
1
1
3
0
3
2
3
0
0
3
1
1
1
0
5
0
1
0
1
0
1
2
1
0
2
_0
1
2
1
0
1
1
0
2
1
2
2
1
2
0
2
1
1
1
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
1
2
1
0
4.2.3.A.6
4.2.3.A.7
4.2.3.A.8
4.2.3.A
4.2.3.A.9
4.2.3.A. II
4.2.3.A.13
4.2.3.A.14
4.2.3.A.15
r.
TOTAL 160 93 68 29
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wTABLE II-B Summary of IOA CIL Assessment OMS EPD&C
Criticality: IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP CILS FOR ISSUES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
METER
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, TOGGLE
PROp STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
1
6
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.2.1.B.I
CONTROLS
VALVES
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
FUSE
INDICATOR, EVENT
METER
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, ROTARY
8
0
0
12
28
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
5 14
0 0
1 1
6 6
0 4
2 3
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
4.2.2.B.I
4.2.2.B.3
4.2.2.B.4
4.2.2.B.S
4.2.2.B.6
4.2.2.B.9
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TABLE II-B Summary of IOA CIL Assessment - OMS EPD&C (cont'd)
Criticality: IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP CILS FOR ISSUES
OME SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
GN2 ASSEMBLY
VALVES
DIODE 0 2 2 0
DRIVER 14 6 5 1 4.2.3.B.I
FUSE 8 2 2 0
RESISTOR 6 1 1 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 5 4 2 2 4.2.3.B.2
TVC ASSEMBLY
CONTROLLER 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0
INSTRUMENTATION
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, PRESSURE 1 0 0 0
OME ASSEMBLY
FUSE 0 0 0 0
METER 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 1 0 1 4.2.3.B.6
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 1 0 0 0
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 0 1 0 1 4.2.3.B.8
TVC ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
POD
DRIVER 22 1 0 1 4.2.4.B.I
FUSE 0 2 2 0
HEATER 41 0 0 0
RELAY 4 1 1 1 4.2.4.B.3
RESISTOR 0 2 2 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, THERMAL 16 1 0 1 4.2.4.B.5
SWITCH, TOGGLE 2 1 1 1 4.2.4.B.6
CROSSFEED
DRIVER 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0 m
HEATER 10 0 0 0
RELAY 1 1 1 0
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 i
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 5 2 0 2 4.2.4.B.9
SWITCH, THERMAL 17 1 0 1 4.2.4.B.I0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 216 47 49 31
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TABLE III-A IOA Recommended criticalities- OMS Hardware
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
VAPOR ISOLATION VALVE
QUAD CHECK VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
TOTAL
PROP $TOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
PROPELLANT TANK
GAGING PROBES
TOTALIZER
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
GALLERY LEG SCREEN
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD SCREEN
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
CROSSFEED VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
GIMBAL BELLOWS
FLEX LINE ASSEMBLY
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 1 0 0 3
0 1 0 1 1 0 3
0 1 0 1 0 0 2
1 2 0 1 0 0 4
0 2 0 0 0 3 5
0 0 0 2 0 3 5
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER & ORIFICE
BIPROPELLANT VALVE ASSEMBLY
BIPROP CAVITY PRESS RLF VALVE
PLATELET INJECTOR
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
NOZZLE EXTENSION
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
1 2 0 2 0 0 5
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 3 3
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 2 0 1 0 0 4
1 0 0 2 1 0 4
0 4 0 0 0 6 i0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 7 0 1 0 0 8
3 1 0 0 0 0 4
2 0 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 0 6 8
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
l 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE III-A IOA Recommended Criticalities - OMS Hardware (cont'd)
Criticality: I/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
TANK FILL/VENT VALVE
STORAGE TANK
GN2 PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING
PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CHECK VALVE
ACCUMULATOR
PURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES & FITTINGS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL RING
GIMBAL RING BEARING
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
GIMBAL DRIVE MOTOR
GIMBAL DRIVE ASSEMBLY
REDUCTION GEAR
ANTIBACK DEVICE
GIMBAL DRIVE THRUST BEARING
MECHANICAL STOP, SNUBBER
CONTROLLER, GIMBAL ACTUATOR
TOTAL
0 0 0 1 0 1 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 2 0 0 3
0 1 0 1 0 0 2
0 1 0 2 0 0 3
0 1 0 1 0 0 2
1 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 1 0 1 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 4 0 6 i0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 2 0 0 2
1 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 2 0 0 2
0 1 0 2 0 0 3
0 2 0 1 0 0 3
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1
31 40 1 32 3 31 138
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TABLE III-B IOA Recommended Criticalities - OMS EPD&C
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
DIODE 0 0 0 3 0 1 4
DRIVER 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
FUSE 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 2 0 0 3
INSTRUMENTATION
METER 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
DIODE 0 1 0 8 4 12 25
DRIVER 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
FUSE 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
RELAY 0 2 0 3 1 1 7
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 6 3 9
SWITCH, TOGGLE "0 1 0 3 1 1 6
INSTRUMENTATION
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
INDICATOR, EVENT 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
METER 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
SWITCH, ROTARY 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
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TABLE III-B
Criticality:
IOA Recommended Criticalities - OMS EPD&C (cont'd)
i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
OME SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
GN2 ASSEMBLY
VALVES
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
TVC ASSEMBLY
CONTROLLER
FUSE
INSTRUMENTATION
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
OME ASSEMBLY
FUSE
METER
SENSOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
TVC ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, POSITION
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 2
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 2 0 0 2
0 6 0 2 8
0 3 0 0 3
0 0 0 3 3
0 2 0 0 4
0 1 0 1 2
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 2 0 3
0 0 2 1 3
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
THE_RMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
POD
DRIVER 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
FUSE 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
HEATER 0 0 0 0 i 0 1
RELAY 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
SWITCH, THERMAL 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
CROSSFEED
DRIVER 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
FUSE 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
HEATER 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
RELAY 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
SWITCH, THERMAL 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
TOTAL 11 5 41 54 36 147
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TABLE IV-A IOA Recommended Critical Items - OMS Hardware
Criticality: i/1 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
VAPOR ISOLATION VALVE
QUAD CHECK VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 1 0 0 3
0 1 0 1 1 0 3
0 1 0 1 0 0 2
1 2 0 1 0 0 4
0 2 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 2 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY 1
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE 0
PROPELLANT TANK 1
GAGING PROBES 0
TOTALIZER 0
COMMUNICATION SCREEN 1
GALLERY LEG SCREEN 0
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD SCREEN 0
TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1
CROSSFEED VALVE 1
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL) 0
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL) 0
GIMBAL BELLOWS 2
FLEX LINE ASSEMBLY 1
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS 1
LINES AND FITTINGS 2
2 0 1 0 0 4
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 3
0 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 0 0 4 .
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 2
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER & ORIFICE 1
BIPROPELLANT VALVE ASSEMBLY 0
BIPROP CAVITY PRESS RLF VALVE! 3
PLATELET INJECTOR 2
COMBUSTION CHAMBER 2
NOZZLE EXTENSION 1
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL) 0
TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS 1
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS 1
LINES AND FITTINGS 0
1 0 0 0 0 2
7 0 1 0 0 8
1 0 0 0 0 4
0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE IV-A IOA Recommended Critical Items - OMS HDW (cont'd)
i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TCTALCriticality:
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
TANK FILL/VENT VALVE
STORAGE TANK
GN2 PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING
PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CHECK VALVE
ACCUMULATOR
PURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES & FITTINGS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL RING
GIMBAL RING BEARING
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
GIMBAL DRIVE MOTOR
GIMBAL DRIVE ASSEMBLY
REDUCTION GEAR
ANTIBACK DEVICE
GIMBAL DRIVE THRUST BEARING
MECHANICAL STOP, SNUBBER
CONTROLLER, GIMBAL ACTUATOR
0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 2 0 0 3
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 2
0 1 0 1 0 0 2
1 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 1 0 1 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 4 0 0 4
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 0 0 2
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 31 40 1 18 2 1 93
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TABLE IV-B IOA Recommended Critical Items - OMS EPD&C
Criticality: i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/1R 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
DIODE 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
DRIVER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
INSTRUMENTATION
METER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
DIODE 0 1 0 3 1 0 5
DRIVER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
RELAY 0 2 0 3 1 0 6
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
INSTRUMENTATION
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INDICATOR, EVENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
METER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
SWITCH, ROTARY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m
65
w
TABLE IV-B IOA Recommended Critical Items - OMS EPD&C (cont'd)
Criticality: i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
oME SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
GN2 ASSEMBLY
VALVES
DIODE 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
DRIVER 0 0 0 5 0 1 6
FUSE 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 2 0 2 0 0 4
TVC ASSEMBLY
CONTROLLER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INSTRUMENTATION
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OME ASSEMBLY
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
METER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
TVC ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
POD
DRIVER 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
FUSE 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
HEATER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RELAY 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, THERMAL 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
CROSSFEED
DRIVER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HEATER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RELAY 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
SWITCH, THERMAL 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 ii 5 20 9 2 47
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4.1 General Unresolved Issues
Many of the unresolved issues which exist on individual FMEAs and
CILs are linked to several "general" issues identified by IOA
during the OMS FMEA/CIL assessment. These general issues concern
either the groundrules used by NASA/RI to perform the FMEA/CIL
analysis, or the NASA/RI analysis of the OMS subsystem. Each of
the general IOA issues may result in several FMEA and CIL issues.
The general issues identified by IOA in the OMS hardware and
EPD&C assessments are discussed in the following sections.
4.I.A Hardware
Because the majority of the original IOA OMS hardware issues have
been resolved, only two general hardware issues remain. Most of
the remaining specific issues exist independently and cannot, for
the most part, be linked to any general groundrule or analysis
differences.
= _ _
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4.1.A.I Loss of TVC During TAL Abort
The OMS activities during a TAL abort include a pre-MECO OMS dump
and, beginning with STS-26, a post-MECO i00 fps ET separation
burn. For some TAL aborts (lat e TAL), the post-MECO ET sep burn
may need to be lengthened to complete an OMS dump which could not
be completed before MECO. During the pre-MECO dump, the OMS
engines remain in the ascent stow position and TVC is inactive.
For the post-MECO activities, the OMS engines are driven to an I-
loaded CG position and TVC is, again, inactive. IOA and NASA/RI
agree on a groundrule that two OMS engines are required to ensure
the successful completion of all OMS dumps and burns during RTLS
and TAL aborts. Thus, single failures which result in the loss of
one OMS engine are classified as abort i/l's.
However, IOA also considers a single TVC failure which results in
the inability to move an OMS engine from the pre-MECO stow
position to the post-MECO CG position to be a possible i/i during
a TAL abort. The increased RCS activity required to maintain
orbiter control during the post-MECO OMS operations, with one OMS
engine out of position, may consume RCS propellant needed to
complete the abort. Shutting the affected engine down results in
a i/i (per above groundrule), and using the engine may consume
needed RCS propellant. IOA does not consider RCS control
authority to be a problem, but is concerned about RCS propellant
over-consumption with this failure scenario.
No RCS consumption data appears to exist for the failure scenario
in question: one OMS engine failed out of position; other OMS
engine in correct I-loaded CG position. The scenarios which have
been analyzed include: I) one engine failed out of position;
other engine has active TVC, and 2) both engines in CG position
(TVC inactive); RCS maintaining orbiter control (normal TAL post-
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MECOsituation).
Because of a lack of data which indicates that RCS propellant
over-consumption is not a problem for the failure scenario in
question, IOA recommends that the TAL abort criticality be
classified as a I/I on applicable FMEAs. If it is determined
that, for the worst case TVC failure during two engine post-MECO
OMS activities, the orbiter can be adequately controlled within
RCS capabilities and with no RCS consequences for the remainder of
the abort, then IOA would have no TAL crit I issues for TVC
failures.
4.1.A.2 Additional Items and Failure Modes
A number of OMS hardware subsystem items and failure modes
identified by IOA during the analysis phase are not covered in the
current NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that these items and
failure modes be incorporated into the FMEA/CIL. These issues are
identified in Appendix F by issue codes HDW 4 and HDW 5.
4.1.B EPD&C
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4.1.B.I Loss of Valve Talkbacks
IOA considers the loss of data to determine the actual position
of a valve to be a 3/2R PPP criticality. Valve position data is
provided by the GPC/MDM discretes and the event indicators, which
provide redundancy for each other. Loss of all redundancy may
lead to falsely failing the valve closed or open which could
effect mission operations. NASA FMEAs have a 3/3 criticality for
these failures.
The IOA does not consider preSsure_or temperature sensors to be
redundant to event indicators and discretes to determine valve
position.
See JSC 10588 pages 5-18.
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.ultip  unrelatedFai ures n odundancyStrlng
IOA considers the redundancy strings on several current FMEAs to
include "multipleunrelated failures", which is beyond the scope
of the IOA's interpretation of NSTS 22206. On FMEAs to which this
issue applies, IOA recommends that a bellows failure not be
considered in the redundancy string and the criticality thus be
downgraded. The NASA is right _h@_t thl_S _ai!ur_ou_l-d c_e_:i i_!_
continuous power on the associated valve(s), since the slgnal
through this item would inhibit closing or openlng when the valves
reach full closed or open. However, NASA's scenario with another
failure consisting of bellows rupture is irrelevant. AbellOws _;_
rupture anytime exposing electrical components and valve motor to
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propellant is serious, not just when the valve motor is
continuously on and hot. That is, this failure does not
significantly contribute to the bellows rupture failure.
Furthermore, the valves are protected from continuous power by an
electrical thermal shutoff device within the valve motor at no
more than 352 F, and according to the specs, "the motor and
actuation mechanism shall not fail as a result of prolonged power
application."
See AC Motor Valve Spec MC284-0430 Sect. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11
4.1.B.3 Multiple Unrelated Failures in Effects
IOA considers the effects on several current FMEAs to include
"multiple unrelated failures", which is beyond the scope of the
IOA's interpretation of NSTS 22206. IOA concurs with the NASA's
criticalities and screens, but recommends that a bellows failure
not be considered in this FMEA's effects field. The NASA is right
that this failure could cause continuous power on the associated
valve(s), since the signal through this item would inhibit closing
or opening when the valves reach full closed or open. However,
the NASA's scenario with another failure consisting of bellows
rupture is irrelevant. A bellows rupture anytime exposing
electrical components and valve motor to propellant is serious,
not just when the valve motor is continuously on and hot. That
is, this failure does not significantly contribute to the bellows
rupture failure.
Furthermore, the valves are protected from continuous power by an
electrical thermal shutoff device within the valve motor at no
more than 352 F, and according to the specs, "the motor and
actuation mechanism shall not fail as a result of prolonged power
application."
See AC Motor Valve Spec MC284-0430 Sect. 3.1, 3_2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11
4.1.B.4 Additional Items and Failure Modes
A number of OMS EPD&C subsystem items and failure modes identified
by IOA during the analysis phase are not covered in the current
NASA FMEA/CIL. The IOA recommends that these items and failure
modes be incorporated into the FMEA/CILs. These issues are
identified in Appendix F by issue codes EPD&C 4 and EPD&C 5.
4.1.B.5 Failure Mode Differences
Several EPD&C issues exist because of differences in the failure
modes defined by the IOA and the NASA for these items. See the
applicable issues.
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4.1.B.6 Failed-On Heaters Detected Too Late
Several issues on current thermal control component FMEAs exist
because of the detectability of failed-on heaters. IOA recommends
upgrading the criticality of these FMEAs based on the following
argument. The first failure results in the associated heater set
failed on. A second failure in the same heater group would result
in both elements of two or more heaters on simultaneously when the
redundant heater group is active, This results in a temperature
exceeding the pod structural qualified limit of 425 F in approx-
imately two minutes and possible loss of crew/vehicle due to
structural damage.
The NASA baseline FMEA hazards field partially supports this:
"Failed on heater may cause potentiai fracture mechanical problem
depending on heater location and application of increased
propellant pressure (crit 3 - alternative action and time to
abort after second failure). Not detectable unless multiple =
heaters failed on." The NASA's baseline Time to Effect field is
"Immediate to Hours".
See Flight Rules 6-72a, and JSC NASA Heater Book.
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w4.2 Specific Unresolved Issues
The specific OMS hardware and EPD&C unresolved issues are
presented in the following sections and paragraphs which were
referenced in tables I and II. The organization of the sections
and paragraphs follow the OMS breakdown hierarchy shown in
Figures 4 and 5, and used in tables I and II.
Unresolved issues which are related to general issues discussed in
section 4.1 contain a reference to the applicable general issue.
Each issue is presented in a standard format which gives the
failure mode, applicable FMEA number and IOA assessment ID, the
NASA and IOA criticality and screen assignments, and the
rationale behind the IOA issue. Refer to the detailed assessment
sheets in Appendix C for further information on each issue.
4.2.1 Helium Pressurization Subsystem
4.2.1.A Hardware
w
=
w
w
4.2.1.A.1 Tank Isolation Valves
i) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
03-3-1003-2
OMS-III
2/IR PPP, CIL
2/IR PFF, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the restricted flow failure mode be
placed on a new FMEA separate from the fails closed mode since
the restricted flow mode fails the B and C redundancy screens.
Both isolation valves are open during ascent (OMS-I and OMS-2),
and restricted flow through one valve would not be detectable
(fail B screen). Also, any upstream contamination source could
affect the parallel isolation valves simultaneously (fail C
screen).
4.2.1.A.2 Regulators
I) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED, RESTRICTED FLOW, LOW OUTPUT
03-3-1004-2 2/IR PPF, CIL
OMS-II9, 120, 121 2/IR PFF, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the B redundancy screen be failed
for these failure modes. These regulator failures would not be
detectable during times when both parallel flow paths are open
(e.g., ascent).
w 71
4.2.1.A.3 Vapor Isolation Valves
I) FAILURE: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-3-1006-1
0MS-127
0MS-128
3/3 ---
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/IR PFP, CIL
(Fails to close)
(Internal leakage)
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this item and these failure modes .
be upgraded to 3/1R PFP and placed on the CIL. The current 3/3
criticality does not reflect the worst case potential effects
of propellant migration into the helium subsystem due to the
loss of all redundancy (vapor isol valve and check valve
assembly). IOA contends that the contamination of upstream
components by prop or prop vapors which could occur during _--
mission could result in the inability to repressurize the OMS
prop tanks. Contamination of the regulator sensing ports could
cause the regulators to fail closed. A failed open redundant
quad check valve poppet is not detectable during flight (fail B
screen). IOA also recommends that the crossover of prop or
prop vapors resulting in a hypergolic reaction in the lines be
added as a possible effect on this FMEA.
This issue is supported by the fact that these failures and/or
"prop vapor exposure" are listed as causes on other functional
crit IR FMEAs (03-3-1003-2, 1004-1, 1004-2, and 1006-2). The
criticality assigned to a failure mode should reflect the worst
case ultimate effects of the failure. Since the loss of all
redundancy can result in the inability to repressurize the prop
tanks, these failures should be classified aS a 3/1R PFP. IOA
does not consider the potential severity of these failures to
be adequately addressed by their listing as a cause on the
above IR FMEAs.
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4.2.1.A.4
1) FAILURE:
Quad Check Valves
c
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-3-1007-1
0MS-133
OMS-134
3/3 ---
2/IR PFP, CIL (Fuel)
3/IR PFP, CIL (Oxid)
ISSUE: IOA recommends that a 2/1R PFP FMEA and CIL for the
fuel assembly and a 3/1R PFP FMEA and CIL for the oxidizer
assembly. The current single 3/3 criticality does not reflect
the worst case potential effects of propellant migration into
the helium subsystem due to the loss of all redundancy (series
poppets for fuel leg; series poppets and vapo r !sol valve for
oxidizer leg). IOA contends that the contaminati0nof upstream
components by prop or prop vapors which could occur during a
mission could result in the inability to repressurize the OMS
prop tanks. Contamination of the regulator sensing ports could
cause the regulators to fail closed. A failed open quad check
valve poppet is not detectable during flight (fail B screen).
72
==
m
m
mm
[]
m
N
n
g
I
z
I
ww
w
w
w
w
IOA also recommends that the crossover of prop or prop vapors
resulting in a hypergolic reaction in the lines be added as a
possible effect on these proposed FMEAs.
This issue is supported by the fact that these failures and/or
"prop vapor exposure" are listed as causes on other functional
crit IR FMEAs (03-3-1003-2, 1004-1, 1004-2, and 1006-2). The
criticality assigned to a failure mode should reflect the worst
case ultimate effects of the failure. Since the loss of all
redundancy can result in the inability to repressurize the prop
tanks, these failures should be classified as 2/IR PFP (fuel
assembly), and 3/IR PFP (oxidizer assembly). IOA does not
consider the potential severity of these failures to be
adequately addressed by their listing as a cause on the above
IR FMEAs.
4.2.1.A.5 Quick Disconnect Couplings
I) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-3-1002-1 2/IR FFP, CIL
OMS-102 2/IR FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open (during flight)"
be added as a failure mode on this FMEA. This is a credible
failure mode and is addressed on RCS QD coupling FMEAs.
2) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-3-1205-1 3/IR FFP, CIL
OMS-I13,123,137,146 3/IR FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open (during flight)"
be added as a failure mode on this FMEA. This is a credible
failure mode and is addressed on RCS QD coupling FMEAs.
3,4) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE
03-3-1002-3, 1205-3 3/3 ---
0MS-I03,114,124,138,147 3/3 ---
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "fails closed" and "restricted
flow" be added to the failure modes on this FMEA. These are
credible failure modes and are addressed on RCS QD coupling
FMEAs.
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4.2.1.B EPD&C
4.2.1.B.I Remote Power Controllers
i) FAILURE: FAILS HIGH .....
05-6L-2176-2
OMS-399
3/IR PPP
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends failing the B screen. This failure
is not detectable until the associated switch - is put in OPEN _
position, but this causes valve to be stuck open. If the crew
had known about the failure, they might not have thrown the
switch into OPEN, to avoid sticking the valve open.
Therefore, failure is detected but detected too late.
4.2.1.B.2 Toggle Switches for Valves
1) FAILURE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE "OPEN" POSITION)
NO FMEA
0MS-438,442 3/1R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends that the NASA generate a FMEA with
this "Stuck in open position (Both contact sets)" Failure
Mode. The closest existing match available is the NASA's FMEA
05-6L-2026-I with a "FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS
TO CONDUCT (ONE CONTACT SET)" Yailure Mode, which is already
matched to OMS-440 and 443. See 4.1.B.4.
4.2.1.B.3 Meters
1) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
05-6L-2153-I 3/3 ---
OMS-444 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA does, but the NASA does not, imply that CRT
displays and Mission Control Center are redundant to item to
get nitrogen and helium pressure measurements. Loss of
function can lead to falsely-failing one OMS HE tank or two
OMS GN2 tanks, and thus loss of mission or an ATO.
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4.2.1.B.4 Pressure Sensors
I) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORTED,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
03-3-1801-1 3/3 ---
OMS-445,446 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Loss of all redundancy can result in falsely failing
the Helium Tank during ascent requiring an ATO be called,
since there may not be enough time to verify the failure.
See Flight Rule 6-1.
w
4.2.1.B.5 Temperature Sensors
i) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
03-3-1802-1 3/3 ---
OMS-447 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Loss of all redundancy can result in falsely failing
the Helium Tank during ascent requiring an ATO be called,
since there may not be enough time to verify the failure. See
Flight Rule 6-1.
w
w
4.2.1.B.6 Toggle Switches for Instrumentation
i) FAILURE, NASA: ALL CREDIBLE MODES (FAILS TO TRANSFER,
SHORTS,OPENS)
FAILURE, IOA: FAILS TO SWITCH (POLES STUCK IN ONE OF
THREE POSITIONS OR POLES FAIL TO MAKE
CONTACT IN ANY POSITION)
05-6L-2033-I 3/3 ---
0MS-449 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA does, but the NASA does not, imply that CRT
displays and Mission Control Center are redundant to item to
get Nitrogen and Helium Pressure measurements. Loss of
function can lead to falsely failing one OMS HE tank or two
OMS GN2 tanks, and thus loss of mission or an ATO.
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4.2.2 Propellant Storage & Distribution Subsystem
4.2.2.A Hardware
4.2.2.A.I Tank Isolation Valves
I) FAILURE: RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED
NO FMEA
OMS-20014X 3/IR PNP
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. Failure of the propel!ant tank isolation valve
internal relief device is listed as a cause on current prop .......
line and gimbal bellows external leakage FMEAs, however IOA
recommends that a new 3/IR PNP FMEA be generated for this
failure mode. The potential IR effects of this failure
(overpressurization and rupture of prop lines and components)
warrant a separate FMEA to give this failure the proper amount
of attention. AC motor valve relief device failures are
currently addressed as failure modes on individual FMEAs
(however, IOA takes issue with the criticalities assigned).
The OMS propellant tank isolation v_ives are nominally0pen
during a mission, therefore a previous failure is required for
the valves to be closed and this failure mode to be applicable.
4.2.2.A.2 Crossfeed Valves
I) FAILURE: RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED ......
NO FMEA
OMS-20015X 3/IR PNP
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. Failure of the crossfeed valve internal relief
device is listed as a cause on current crossfeed !_ne external_
leakage FMEAs, h0wever IOA reco_mends that a-new 3/IR_PNP _A
be generated for this failure mode. The potential 1R effects
of this failure(o_ressurization and_p£_eoTcrossi_e-ec[ _
lines) warrant a separate FMEA to give this faiulure_e pr_pe_
amount of attention. AC motor valve relief device failures are
currently addressed as failure modes on individual FMEAs
(however, IOA takes issue with the criticalities assigned).
The OMS crossfeed valves are nominally open during a mission,
therefore a previous failure is required for the valves to be
closed and this failure mode to be applicable.
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4.2.2.A.3 Quick Disconnect Couplings
1,2) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-3-2001-1, 2009-1
OMS-150,156,165,168,171,174
207,210,213,231,234
2/1R FFP, CIL
2/1R FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open (during flight)"
be added as a failure mode on this FMEA. This is a credible
failure mode and is addressed on RCS QD coupling FMEAs.
3,4) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE
03-3-2001-3, 2009-3 3/3 ---
OMS-151,157,166,169,172,175 3/3 ---
208,211,214,232,235
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "fails closed" and "restricted
flow" be added to the failure modes on this FMEA. These are
credible failure modes and are addressed on RCS QD coupling
FMEAs.
4.2.2.B EPD&C
4.2.2.B.I Diodes
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2253A-1 2/IR PPP, CIL
OMS-450A,452A 3/IR PPP
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2007-1, since this failure causes Tank Isol
valve to fail open. According to the last available NASA
criticality, this FMEA should be in the new NASA CIL list but
is not. The IOA assumes that the NASA downgraded this to a
non-CIL.
2) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6L-2253A-2 2/IR PPP, CIL
OMS-451A,453A 3/3 ---
ISSUE: The IOA recommends removing this FMEA from the CIL.
The IOA believes this failure has no effect, since only a
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer (MDM) is behind the "GPC close"
diodes, and that is well protected internally from reverse
current. According to the last available NASA criticality,
this FMEA should be in the new NASA CIL list but is not. The
IOA assumes that the NASA downgraded this to a non-CIL, and
tentatively concurs.
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3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2253C-I
OMS-450C,452C
3/IR PPP
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends failing the B screen, thus adding
this to the CIL list, since the MCA status of relay positions
are not readily accessible by the crew. Therefore, "close"
relays which do not open and "open" relays which do not close
because of a failed open diode are not detectable and the
failed diode is not detectable inflight.
4) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2253D-I
OMS-450D,452D
3/2R PPP
311R PPP _
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2007-1, since this failure causes Tank Isol
valve to fail open.
5) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2255 -i
OMS-450E,452E
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
6) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2256 -I
OMS-450F,452F
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
7) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2256A-I
OMS-450G,452G
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
8 ) FAILURE : FAILS SHORT
05-6L-2256B-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
OMS-451C,453C 3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
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9) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2257-I
OMS-454,456
3/IR PPp
3/2R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is indirectly driven
by OMS Hardware FMEA 03-3-2008-2, since loss of redundancy
causes crossfeed valve to fail closed. The IOA recommends
failing the B screen, thus adding this to the CIL list, since
the MCA status of relay positions are not readily accessible
by the crew. Therefore, "close" relays which do not open and
"open" relays which do not close because of a failed open
diode are not detectable and so the failed diode is not
detectable inflight.
i0) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6L-2257-2
OMS-455,457
3/IR PPP
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2008-2, since this failure causes the
crossfeed valve to fail closed.
ii) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2257A-I
OMS-454A,456A
2/IR PPP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2008-2, since this failure causes the
crossfeed valve to fail closed. According to the last
available NASA criticality, this FMEA should be in the new
NASA CIL list but is not. The IOA assumes that the NASA
downgraded this to a non-CIL.
12) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6L-2257A-2
OMS-455A,457A
2/IR PPP, CIL
313 ---
ISSUE: The IOA recommends removing this FMEA from the CIL.
The IOA believes this failure has no effect, since only a
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer (MDM) is behind the "GPC close"
diodes, and that is well protected internally from reverse
current. According to the last available NASA criticality,
this FMEA should be in the new NASA CIL list but is not. The
IOA assumes that the NASA downgraded this to a non-CIL, and
tentatively concurs.
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13) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2257C-I 3/IR PPP
0MS-454C,456C 3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends failing the B screen, thus adding
this to the CIL list, since the MCA status of relay positions
are not readily accessible by the crew: ....Therefore, "close"
dorelays which do not open and "open" relays which : not ciose _
because of a failed open diode are not detectable and the
failed diode is not detectable inflight.
14) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2259 -I
OMS-454F,456F
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
15) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-65-2260 -i 2/IR PFP, CIL
OMS-454G,456G 3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
16) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2260A-I
OMS-454H,456H
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
17) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2260B-2
OMS-4541,456I
3/1R PFP, CIL
3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
4.2.2.B.2 Hybrid Drlvers
1) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2202'I
0MS-466,470 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. Worst case would be falsely
failing the A or B valve closed resulting in loss of mission
due to safety considerations. See 4.1.B.I.
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J2) FAILURE: FAILS HIGH
05-6L-2202-2 3/3 ---
OMS-469,473 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. Worst case would be falsely
failing the A or B valve closed resulting in loss of mission
due to safety considerations. See 4.I.B.I.
3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2204-I
OMS-458,459,460,461,462,463,464,465
3/3 ---
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. Worst case is valve declared
failed closed and redundant valve is used to complete
crossfeed. Loss of all redundancy could result in falsely
failing the crossfeed system resulting in loss of mission.
See 4.I.B.I.
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4.2.2.B.3 Fuses
i) FAILURE: OPENS, INADVERTENTLY OPENS
05-6L-2004-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
OMS-474,475,476,477 3/2R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
4.2.2.B.4 Relays
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
05-6L-2126-1
OMS-492,496,508,513
3/IR PNP
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends failing the B screen, thus adding
this to the CIL list. These relays are not Standby Redundant
to any other items since they are normally operational. Some
of these relays failing have no immediate effect and cannot be
detected except via MCA status signals which are not readily
used by the crew.
2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, INADVERTENTLY TRANSFERS,
FAILS CLOSED
05-6L-2126-2
OMS-493,497,509,510
2/IR PFP, CIL
2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2007-1. See 4.1.B.3.
81
3) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
05-6L-2127 -2
OMS-491,495,507,512
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.3.
4 ) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, INADVERTENTLY TRANSFERS,
FAILS CLOSED
05-6L-2130-2
0MS-485,489,501,505
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
5) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
05-6L-2131 -2
0MS-483,487,499,503
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3 ---
ISSUE: See 4.1.B.2.
4.2.2.B.5 Resistors
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2078-I
OMS-530,537,576,584
3/3 ---
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Worst case would be falsely failing the A or B valve
closed resulting in loss of mission due to safety
considerations. See 4.I.B.I.
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2079-2
OMS-572,578
2/IR PPP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2007-1. See 4.1.B.2.
3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN _ _ _
05-6L-2079A-2 2/IR PFP, CIL
OMS-526,532,570_580 3/2R PPP ........................
ISSUE: The lOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware _A 03-3-2007-i. The IOA recommends passing the B
screen since the effect of the failure (barberpole indicated
on a valve position indicator) is readily detectable. The
problem remains to determine if the valve or this item failed.
See 4.1.B.2.
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u4) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2082-I
OMS-518,524,562,568
3/3 ---
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. Worst case is valve declared
failed closed and redundant valve is used to complete
crossfeed. Loss of all redundancy could result in falsely
failing the crossfeed system resulting in loss of mission.
See 4.I.B.I. See JSC 10588 pg. 5-18.
5) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2083-I
0MS-514,520,558,564
2/IR PPP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2007-1. See 4.1.B.2.
6) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2083A-I
0MS-538,544
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA's recommended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2007-1. The IOA recommends passing the B
screen since the effect of the failure (barberpole indicated
on a valve position indicator) is readily detectable. The
problem remains to determine if the valve or this item
failed. See 4.1.B.2.
i
4.2.2.B.6 Toggle Switches
i) FAILURE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE "OPEN" POSITION)
NO FMEA
OMS-593,596 3/3 ---
ISSUE: The IOA recommends that the NASA generate a FMEA with
this "STUCK IN OPEN POSITION (BOTH CONTACT SETS)" Failure
Mode. The closest existing match available is the NASA's FMEA
05-6L-2027-I with a "FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS
TO CONDUCT (ONE CONTACT SET)" Failure Mode, which is already
matched to OMS-592 and 595. See 4.1.B.4.
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2) FAILURE, NASA:
FAILURE, IOA:
INADVERTENT OPERATION, SHORTS,
INADVERTENTLY CLOSES (ONE CONTACT SET)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE "CLOSED"
POSITION)
05-6L-2027-2 3/IR PNP
0MS-594,597 2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA's reco_ended criticality is driven by OMS
Hardware FMEA 03-3-2007-2, since this failure causes the tank
isolation valve to fail closed. Also, the NASA failed only
one pole, considering the other pole as redundant, whereas the
IOA considered the worst case failure mode by failing a part
common to both poles (e.g. toggle lever). This is the reason
for the IOA's higher criticality. The NASA considered one
pole to be standby redundant to the other and so had "Not
Applicable" for B screen. See 4.1.B.5.
3) FAILURE, NASA:
FAILURE, IOA:
FAILS TO T_SFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS
TO CONDUCT (BOTH CONTACT SETS)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN GPC POSITION)
05-6L-2028-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
0MS-586,589 3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: ACCording_t0 the iast aVliiabie_NAsA criticai_ity, this
FMEA should be in the new NASA CIL list, but it is not.
Therefore, the IOA assumes that the NASA downgraded this FMEA
to a non-CIL. The IOA recommends that the NASA use the
previous (last available to the IOA) criticality and screens
(3/IR PFP) and reinstate this FMEA as a CIL.
4) FAILURE, NASA:
FAILURE, IOA:
INADVERTENTLY OR PREMATURELY TRANSFERS TO
CLOSE, FAILED IN THE "CLOSE" POSITION
(BOTH CONTACT SETS)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN CLOSED
POSITION)
05-6L-2028-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
OMS-588,591 3/IR PPP_ _..... _ .....
ISSUE: The IOA concurs with the NASA's criticality, since it
agrees with OMS Hardware FMEA 03-3-2008-2 (causes crossfeed
valve to fail closed), However, the NASA fal_ed the B screen _
because one of the two poles failing is undetectable. The IOA
believes this is a carry-over from when the NASA failed only
one contact set, and recommends passing this B screen. See
4.1.B.5.
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5) FAILURE, NASA:
FAILURE, IOA:
INADVERTENTLY TRANSFERS TO OPEN,FAILED
IN THE "OPEN" POSITION (BOTH CONTACT SETS).
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OPEN POSITION)
05-6L-2028-3
OMS-587,590
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends passing the B screen, and thus
removing this as a CIL, since the effect of this failure
(inability to close a valve) is detectable via the valve
position indicator. See 4.1_B.2.
4.2.2.B.7 Event Indicators
I) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW,
FAILS MIDTRAVEL)
05-6L-2151-I 3/3 ---
0MS-602,603 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. Worst case would be falsely
failing the A or B valve closed resulting in loss of mission
due to safety considerations. See 4.I.B.I.
2) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW,
FAILS MIDTRAVEL)
05-6L-2152-I
0MS-600,601
3/3 ---
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. Worst case is valve declared
failed closed and redundant valve is used to complete
crossfeed. Loss of all redundancy could result in falsely
failing the crossfeed system resulting in loss of mission.
See 4.1.B.1. See Malfunction Procedure RCS 103a and JSC 10588
pg. 5-18.
4.2.2.B.8 Meters
i) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
05-6L-2155-I
OMS-605,607
3/3 ---
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. Loss of all redundancy in
prelaunch and onorbit phases would result in OMS Helium tank
being declared failed resulting in a loss of delta velocity
and loss of mission capability, unless sensor failure is
determined. See 4.I.B.I. See Flight Rule 6-41.
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2) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
05-6L-2157-I
OMS-604 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The NASA's Review Comments stated "Delete this FMEA".
The IOA recommends that the NASA not delete this FMEA. This
item is associated with the flight-dependent Payload Bay Kit,
but also displays Forward RCS and OMS tank pressures which are
not flight-dependent. The IOA also recommends a change from
NASA's original 3/3 criticality to 3/2R, because false
indications of OMS tank pressure giving an appearance of a
leak could lead to loss of mission for safety reasons.
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4.2.2.B.9 Temperature Sensors
1) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
03-3-2803-1 3/3 ---
0MS-610,611 2/2 ---, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 2/2 since loss of mission could
occur in the liftoff phase with no redundancy. A temperature
sensor failure could lead to wrongly failing the OMS fuel
propellant tank leading to the establishment of a shallow ATO
before sensor failure is determined.
See JSC 20923 PCN-I and Flight Rule 6-2 then 6-40k.
4.2.2. B. i0 Rotary Switches
i) FAILURE: FAILS TO SWITCH (POLES STUCK IN ONE OF THREE
POSITION OR POLES FAIL TO MAKE CONTACT IN ANY
POSITION)
05-6L-2034-I 3/3 ---
OMS-612 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA does, but the NASA does not, imply that CRT
displays and MCC are redundant to this item to get OMS
propellant tank ullage, (and RCS R/L/FWD prop ullage and RCS
R/L/FWD Helium Tank pressure) measurements. Loss of
redundancy can result in loss of mission for safety reasons
since the actual status of the systems are unavailable,
implying a criticality of 3/2R.
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4.2.3 OME Subsystem Issues
4.2.3.A Hardware
4.2.3.A.I Engine Inlet Filter and Orifice
i) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION PASSAGE
03-3-4002-2 3/3 ---
OMS-248 i/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
i/1 and placed on the CIL. The current 3/3 criticality does
not reflect the worst case potential effects of engine
contamination due to an inlet filter failure. Contamination of
the OMS engine injector orifices or cooling channels could
result in combustion chamber burn-through. This issue is
supported by the fact that this failure is listed as a cause on
other 1/1 FMEAs (03-3-4004-1, 4005-2). The criticality
assigned to a failure mode should reflect the worst case
ultimate effects of the failure. Since this failure can result
in burn-through of the engine, it should be classified as a
1/1. IOA does not consider the potential severity of this
failure to be adequately addressed by its listing as a cause on
the above 1/1 FMEAs.
This failure should at least be upgraded to a 2/1R PPP, 1/1
abort since it could result in the loss of one OMS engine.
i
u
4.2.3.A.2 Bipropellant Valve Assembly
i) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW OF ENGINE CONTROL VALVE
NO FMEA
OMS-330 2/IR PPP, 1/1 ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that a 2/1R PPP, i/I abort FMEA
and CIL be generated for this item and failure mode. IOA does
not consider this failure to be adequately addressed on 03-3-
4001-2, which lists "plugged opening orifice" as a cause for a
failed closed control valve resulting in failed closed biprop
valves. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters and/or orifices, and
recommends that it be addressed as a failure mode (as opposed
to a cause) to ensure that it gets the proper amount of
attention. IOA does not consider the potential severity of
this failure to be adequately addressed by its listing only as
a cause on the above FMEA.
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2 ) FAILURE : PROP LEAKAGE INTO ACTUATOR
NO FMEA
0MS-342 3/1R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that a 3/IR PFP FMEA and CIL be
generated for this failure mode. Leakage of propellant past
the biprop ball valve seals and actuator seals could result in
mixing of hypergolic propellants in actuator cavities or
venting of propellant into the pod causing possible corrosion,
fire, explosion, and exposure of EVA and ground crews. Seal
failures not detectable in flight (fail B screen).
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4.2.3.A.3 Biprop cavity Pressure Relief Valve
1,2) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED, RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
0MS-262 1/1 ---, CIL (Fails closed)
OMS-20005X 1/1 ---, CIL (Restricted flow)
ISSUE: These failure modes are not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that these failure modes be
addressed as 1/1's on the FMEA/CIL. The fails closed mode is
currently listed as a cause on 03-3-4001-6, however IOA does
not consider the potential severity of this failure to be
adequately addressed by its listing only as a cause. These_
failures each result in overpressurization of the biprop valve
cavity during post OMS burn heat soak-back. IOA considers the
worst case effect of overpressurization to be structural
failure of the biprop valve housing resulting in leakage of
propellant into the pod causing possible corrosion, fire,
explosion, and exposure of EVA and ground crews.
Less severe (2/IR PPP, i/I abort) effects of these failures
would be loss of the affected OMS engine or failure of the ball
valve seals causing subsequent biprop valve internal leakage.
However, tests have shown that the ball Valve seals may not
fail and relieve the pressure build-up until 1700 psi. The
valve housing is designed only to 825 psi. Therefore, a
housing leakage could occur before the ball valve seals fail.
Per NSTS 22206 (p. 2-11, item h), any external leakage of
propellant should be classified as a crit i.
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3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
NO FMEA
OMS-263 2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. It is addressed as a cause on 03-3-4001-6,
however IOA does not consider the potential severity of this
failure to be adequately addressed by its listing only as a
cause. The internal leakage mode is adequately addressed as a
failure mode on 03-3-4001-6. IOA recommends that the "fails
open" mode also be addressed as a failure mode on a new 2/IR
PFP FMEA and CIL to ensure that it gets the proper amount of
attention. A failed open relief valve would not be detectable
in flight (fail B screen).
4) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
OMS-265 i/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that this valve housing be added
to the other valve housings listed on 03-3-2101-1, with
corresponding retention rationale. Failure of this valve
housing would also result in leakage of propellant into the pod
causing possible corrosion, fire, explosion, and exposure of
EVA and ground crews.
4.2o3.A.4 Propellant Quick Disconnect Couplings
I) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-3-4507-1 2/IR FFP, CIL
OMS-253,267,273,277 2/IR FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open (during flight)"
be added as a failure mode on this FMEA. This is a credible
failure mode and is addressed on RCS QD coupling FMEAs.
2) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE
03-3-4507-3 3/3 ---
OMS-254,268,264,278 3/3 ---
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "fails closed" and "restricted
flow" be added to the failure modes on this FMEA. These are
credible failure modes and are addressed on RCS QD coupling
FMEAs.
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3) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF ENGINE PORTS
NO FMEA
OMS-345 3/3 ---
ISSUE: Leakage of these engine ports (CP001, CP002, CP005,
CP006, CP007, and CP008) does not appear to be addressed on the
current NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that leakage of all
engine ports be addressed on the FMEA/CIL and/or the OMRSD.
Leakage of these ports would expose internal engine parts to
ambient, and could lead to contamination. However, leakage by
itself is no effect.
4) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE (ENGINE PORTS)
NO FMEA
OMS-346 3/3 ---
ISSUE: Failure of these engine ports (CP001, CP002, CP005,
CP006, CP007, and CP008) does not appear to be addressed on the
current NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that "fails to couple"
of all applicable engine ports be addressed on the FMEA/CIL for
completeness. Failure has no effect.
5) FAILURE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE, RESTRICTED FLOW
(ENGINE PORTS)
NO FMEA
0MS-347 3/3 ---
ISSUE: Failure of these engine ports (CPO01, CPO02, CPO05,
CP006, CPO07, and CP008) does not appe_r_to be addressed on the
current NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that these failures be
addressed for all engine ports on the FMEA/CIL for
completeness. Failures have no effect.
4.2.3.A.5 GN2 Fill/Vent Valve
i) FAILURE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED
03-3-4511-1
OMS-294
3/1R PFP, CIL
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the redundancy string listed in the
"E" effects be revised. IOA considers the string to include
only the fill/vent coupling seal and cap, accumulator, and
other engine. There are no additional redundant valves or
couplings.
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4.2.3.A.6 GN2 Isolation Valve
i) FAILURE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS CLOSED
03-3-4503-2
OMS-299
3/IR PPP, I/I ABORT, CIL
3/IR PPP, I/i ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the "E" effects on this FMEA be
revised. The downstream regulator is not redundant for a
failed closed isolation valve.
2) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
03-3-4503-2
OMS-303
3/IR PPP, I/I ABORT, CIL
2/IR PFP, i/I ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the restricted flow failure mode be
upgraded to a 2/IR PFP, I/i abort criticality, and placed on a
new FMEA separate from the fails closed mode. Restricted flow
would not be detectable until the start of an OMS burn when the
crew would get a C&W alert 3 seconds after the regulator
pressure drops and is not replenished. The crew may then not
have time to inhibit the englne purge (to save engine restart
capability) if the burn duration is short, thus depleting the
accumulator and resulting in inability to restart the affected
engine (engine redundancy lost). This is the same scenario
which drove 03-3-4505-2 and 03-3-4551-2 to 2/IR PFP, i/I abort
criticalities.
The fails closed mode for the isolation valve is detectable
prior to the start of a burn, and the remaining engine start
can be saved (engine redundancy not lost).
4.2.3.A.7 GN2 A¢oumulator
I) FAILURE: RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-3-4552-1
0MS-322
OMS-323
2/IR PPP, I/I ABORT, CIL
i/I ---, CIL (Rupture)
2/IR PPP, i/i ABORT, CIL (External leakage)
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the "rupture" mode be upgraded to a
I/I and placed on a new FMEA and CIL to distinguish the
potential effects form the 2/IR PPP, i/1 abort effects of
external leakage. NSTS 22206 requires that the criticality
assigned to non-filament-wound pressure containers with design
limit pressures greater than i00 psi include the effects of
potential shrapnel damage. The accumulator is a non-filament-
wound titanium tank which stores GN2 at 325 psi. "Based on the
NSTS 22206 groundrule and the possibility of material flaws,
IOA makes the above recommendation.
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4.2.3.A.8 GN2 Quick Disconnect Couplings
1,2) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-3-4502-1, 4506-1 3/IR FFP, CIL
OMS-287,312 3/1R FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open (during flight)"
be added as a failure mode on these FMEAs. This is a credible
failure mode and is addressed on RCS QD coupling FMEAs.
3,4) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE
03-3-4502-3, 4506-3 3/3 ---
0MS-288,313 3/3 _ .......
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "fails closed" and "restricted
flow" be added to the failure modes on these FMEAs. These are
credible failure modes and are addressed on RCS QD coupling
FMEAs.
4.2.3.A.9 TVC Gimbal Ring Bearings
i) FAILURE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
03-3-6409-1
OMS-363
2/IR PPP, CIL
2/IR PPP, i/I ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be-classified as
a crit i/i for TAL aborts. Failure results in loss of TVC for
the affected engine. See 4.I.A.!.__-_ ....
2 ) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, DISATTACHMENT OF GIMBAL RING AND
MOUNTING PAD
NO FMEA
OMS-20002X i/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-3-6409-1 addresses only the physical
binding/jamming failure mode. IOA recommends that a new I/i
FMEA and CIL be generated for a structural failure of a gimba!
ring bearing which results in disattachment of the glmbal ring
and mounting pad. IOA considers the worst case structural
failure of a bearing at an attachment point to result in ....
disattachment. Such a failure of a gimbal bearing would result
in loss of OMS engine restraint and possible prop line rupture
or vehicle damage.
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4.2.3.A. 10 TVC Actuator Gimbal Drive Motors
i) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OPERATION
NO FMEA
0MS-366 3/IR PPP
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the
NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA considers this to be a credible failure
mode and recommends that it be added to 03-3-6401-1. A severe
rotation of the motor synchro armature with respect to the
motor shaft could result in motor output opposite of that
commanded (CAR AB9612). Therefore, IOA also recommends that
"motor synchro armature rotation" be included as a cause on 03-
3-6401-1.
4.2.3.A.II TVC Actuator Gimbal Drive Assembly
i) FAILURE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
03-3-6402-2
0MS-367, 376, 379, 20009X, 20011X
2/IR PPP, CIL
2/IR PPP, 1/1 ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be classified as
a crit I/i for TAL aborts. Failure results in loss of TVC for
the affected engine. See 4.I.A.I.
4.2.3.A.12 TVC Actuator Reduction Gears
1,2) FAILURE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
NO FMEA
OMS-369
0MS-370
3/IR PPP (Physical binding/jamming)
3/IR PPP (Structural failure)
ISSUE: This item and failure mode are not currently addressed
on the NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that these credible
reduction gear failure modes be addressed. The reduction gear
is a moving, load-bearing component whose failure would result
in the loss of one channel. IOA recommends a that new 3/1R PPP
FMEA be generated for each of these reduction gear failure
modes. The reduction gears in the TVC actuator assembly are at
the same level of detail as other TVC hardware items which are
addressed on the current NASA FMEA/CIL.
93
4.2.3.A.13
i) FAILURE:
TVC Actuator Anti-Back Devices
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FAILS TO TRANSMIT TORQUE
OR FAILS TO STOP ROTATION OF INACTIVE CHANNEL
NO FMEA
OMS-372 3/IR PPP
ISSUE: "Structural failure" of the antiback device is not
currently addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-3-6403-1
addresses only the physical binding/jamming failure mode. A
structural failure causing the inability to transmit motor
torque would result in the loss of the Operational channel
(crit 3/1R). A structural failure causing the inability to
stop rotation of the unused channel would also result in the
loss of one channel (crit 3/IR). IOA recommends that a new
3/1R PPP FMEA be generated for these anti-back device failure
modes.
2) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FAILS TO TRANSMIT TORQUE
AN___DDFAILS TO STOP ROTATION OF INACTIVE CHANNEL
NO FMEA
0MS-373 2/1R PPP, 1/1 ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: "Structural failure" of the antibaCk_deVice is not
currently addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-3-6403-1
addressed only the physical binding/jamming failure mode. A
structural failure causing both the inability to transmit motor
torque and the inability to stop rotation of the unused channel
would result in the loss of the actuator and the effected OMS
engine. IOA recommends that a new 2/1R PPP, 1/1 abort FMEA and
CIL be generated for this anti-back device failure mode. See
4.I.A.I.
4.2.3.A. 14 TVC Actuator Thrust Bearings
i) FAILURE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
03-3-6404-1 3/IR PPP
0MS-375 3/IR PPP (Thrust bearings)
OMS-20007X 3/IR PPP (Secondary drive gear bearings)_ _
ISSUE: SSM states that the bearings on either side of the
secondary drive gear are thrust bearings and are covered by 03-
3-6404-1. However, the quantity on 03-3-6404-1 shows Only two
bearings per actuator, and the "functional description" portion
of the FMEA describes only two bearings per actuator. The
correct quantity is four per actuator. IOA recommends_ that the
quantity and "functional description" on 03-3-6404-1 be
corrected to include the thrust bearings on either side of the
secondary drive gear. IOA was unable to confirm that these
bearings are thrust bearings.
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2) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
NO FMEA
OMS-374 2/IR PPP, i/i ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: Structural failure of the thrust bearings is a credible
failure mode which is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-3-6404-1 addresses only the physical
binding/jamming failure mode. A structural failure of a
bearing could cause binding of the gimbal drive or loss of gear
meshing with one channel, and subsequent loss of TVC for one
OMS engine. IOA recommends that a new 2/IR PPP, i/i abort FMEA
and CIL be generated for this thrust bearing failure mode. See
4.1.A.l.
3) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR BEARINGS)
NO FMEA
OMS-20008X 2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: The SSM states that the bearings on either side of the
secondary drive gear are also thrust bearings. IOA was unable
to confirm that these bearings are thrust bearings.
Structural failure of the thrust bearings is a credible failure
mode which is not currently addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL.
FMEA 03-3-6404-1 addresses only the physical binding/jamming
failure mode. A structural failure of a bearing could cause
binding of the gimbal drive or loss of gear meshing with one
channel, and subsequent loss of TVC for one OMS engine. IOA
recommends that a new 2/IR PPP, I/i abort FMEA and CIL be
generated for this thrust bearing failure mode. See 4.I.A.I.
4.2.3._.15 TVC _ctuator Mechanical Stop, Snubber
i) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
03-3-6406-1
0MS-378
3/3 NNN
2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
2/IR PPP, i/i abort and placed on the CIL. IOA maintains
concern that a snubber structural failure could result in
binding or jamming of the gimbal output drive assembly or
incorrect TVC resulting in loss of the affected engine. See
4.I.A.I. The "remarks" section on the 3/7/87 FMEA page also
supports a higher criticality for this item and failure mode.
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4.2o3oB EPD&C
4.2.3.B.I Hybrid Drivers
I) FAILURE: FAILS HIGH
05-6L-2206-2
0MS-633,641
3/IR PPP
3/1R PFP, CiL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends failing the B screen, thus adding
this to the CIL list, since the first failure's effect (GN2
Pressure Isolation Valve stuck open) is not detectable, except
via an MDM valve position signal. But since the FSSRs do not
mention that signal, the IOA assumed that the software does
not use the signal to detect valve stuck open,
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4.2.3.B.2 Toggle switches :_ :_
I) FAILURE, NASA:
FAILURE, IOA 672:
FAILURE, IOA 673:
INADVERTENT OPERATION, SHORTS,
INADVERTENTLY CLOSES ONE CONTACT SET
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ARM/PRESS
POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ARM
POSITION) .....
05-6L-2029-2 3/iR ???
0MS-672,673 3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA concurs with the NASA's criticality, since it
agrees indirectly with OMS Hardware FMEA 03-3-4001-1. This
NASA FMEA's Redundancy Screens were missing from the latest
available NASA report, since this FMEA did not appear in the
NASA's new CIL package, the IOA assumes that the NASA passed
all of the screens. The IOA recommends failing the B screen,
since this failure is not detectable except during an OMS
burn, which could be too late. The IOA also recommends
considering both contact sets in the Failure Mode.
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w2) FAILURE, NASA:
FAILURE, IOA:
INADVERTENT OPERATION - SHORTS
(ONE CONTACT SET)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN "ON" POSITION)
05-6L-2030-2
0MS-676
3/IR PNP
3/1R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA concurs with the NASA's criticality, since the
NASA's crit agrees indirectly with OMS Hardware FMEA 03-3-
4001-1. The NASA failed only one pole, considering the other
pole as redundant, whereas the IOA considered the worst case
failure mode by failing a part common to both poles (e.g.
toggle lever). The NASA considered one pole to be standby
redundant to the other and so had "Not Applicable" for B
screen. The IOA recommends failing the B screen since this
failure would not be readily detectable until it is too late.
w
w
w
4.2.3.B.3 Fuses
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6L-2008-I 3/IR PPP
OMS-685,686 3/IR PNP
ISSUE: The fuse in the STANDBY circuit is Standby Redundant
to the fuse in the ACTIVE circuit. Therefore, since B screens
will differ ("NA" and "P"), the IOA recommends splitting this
FMEA into two FMEAs.
4.2.3.B.4 Pressure Sensors for GN2 Assembly
I) FAILURE : ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORTED,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
03-3-4581-1 3/3 ---
OMS-687,688 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. If lose all redundancy, the
real status of the OMS Engine Gaseous Nitrogen Tank will be
unavailable or falsely indicated (loss of N2) and can result
in falsely failing two OMS GN2 Tanks as leaking or failed.
Therefore, mission capabilities could be lost or an ATO could
be called, implying crit 3/2R. See Flight Rule 6-40.
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4.2.3.B.5
i) FAILURE:
Position Sensors
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORTED,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
03-3-4081-1
OMS-693,694
3/3 ---
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends 3/2R. False indication of valve
position could lead to limiting OMS engine use, especially
when little time to verify. The engine will be used only if
the other engine has failed and then only for deorbit burn.
Loss of all redundancy during LiftOff or on0rbit phase would
lead to failure to reach desired altitude (limit altitude to
RCS redlines to ensure deorbit capability) so could lose some
altitude-sensitive missions, implying crit 3/2R_
The NASA Review Comment's Action Item partially supports this:
"Will use engine if LVDT > 70%. Between 8 and 70% will not
use engine unless no other option available for deorbit."
See OMS Training Manual 2102 page 79.
4.2.3.B.6 Pressure Sensors for OME Assembly
I) FAILURE: ERRONEOUSOUTPUT (OPEN, SHORTED,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
NO FMEA
0MS-689 2/2 ---, 1/1 ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends adding a FMEA for this item with a
2/2, 1/1 Abort criticality, thus adding to the CIL list. The
NASA has no apparent FMEA to explicitly cover this item. The
closest NASA FMEA is 03-3-4581-1 for "OMS Engine Pneumatic
Pressure Sensor" instead of "OMS Engine Regulator Outlet
Pressure Sensor". See 4.1.B.4.
This failure could lead to falsely failing one OMS engine or
preventing its use for non-critical burns (see Flight Rule 6-4,
Line Failure), possibly resulting in loss of mission. The i/I
Abort is a weak or tentative recommendation. Loss of one OMS
engine during RTLS or TAL could result in inability toperform!
time critical propellant _dump.
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4.2.3.B.7 Temperature Sensors
i) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
03-3-4802-1 3/3 ---
OMS-698 3/2R PPP, 1/1 ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends crit 3/2R and crit i/1 for aborts,
thus adding this FMEA to the CIL list. After this failure,
the associated OMS engine would be declared failed because of
apparent engine temperatures outside the desired limits (<25 F
or >130 F), unless sensor failure was determined. Failure of
all redundancy (the other OMS engine's sensor failed) could
lead to incorrectly failing both OMS engines and possible
early mission termination and loss of mission. However, this
is an especially serious criticality 1/1 during aborts because
of insufficient time to determine failure.
See JSC 20923 PCN-I Rule 6-3
4.2.3.B.8 Signal Conditioners
i) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
03-3-8001-1
OMS-21001X
3/2R PPP
2/2 ---, i/i ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends upgrading this FMEA to 2/2, 1/1
Abort, thus adding this to the CIL list. The IOA's crit is
based on the highest criticality of the signals routed through
the signal conditioners. These worst case signals are from
the OMS engine temperature and pressure sensors (e.g. Engine
Regulator Outlet Pressure Sensor; see OMS-689 or Section
4.2.3.B.6). Loss of a vital engine measurement will prevent
the crew from using that OMS engine for non-critical burns,
resulting in loss of mission.
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4.2.4 Thermal Control Subsystem Issues
4.2.4. A Hardware
IOA analyzed and assessed thermal control subsystem items as
EPD&C items. See 4.2.4.B for assessment results.
4 •2 •4. B EPD&C
4.2 •4 •B. 1 Pod Hybrid Drivers
i) FAILURE: FAILS HIGH
05-6L-2210-2
0MS-706,708,710,712,714,715,718,720,
722,724,726,728,730,732,734,736,
738,740,742,744,746,748
312R PPP
2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends raising this criticality to 2/1Rr
thus adding this to the CIL list, since this failure is one
failure away from loss of crew/vehicle and damage may occur
before it is detected. See 4.1.B.6. See Flight Rules 6-72a,
and JSC NASA Heater Book.
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4.2.4.B.2 Pod Heaters
1) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED
03-3-7001-1
OMS-783,785,787,789,791,793,795,797,
815,817,819,821,823,825,827,829,
831,835,837,807,809,811,813
ISSUE: The IOA recommends deleting these FMEAs, since Heater
elements cannot fail closed or short such that they are
continuously on.
3/2R PPP
(NON-CREDIBLE)
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4.2.4.B.3 Pod Relays
1) FAILURE: FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED POSITION)
05-6L-2134-2 3/2R PFP, CIL
OMS-846,848,850,852 2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends raising this criticality to 2/1R,
thus adding this to the CIL list, since this failure is one
failure away from loss of crew/vehicle and damage may occur
before it is detected. See 4.1.B.6. See Flight Rules 6-72a,
and JSC NASA Heater Book.
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4.2.4.B.4 Pod Temperature Sensors
i) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
NO FMEA
OMS-882,883,884,885,886,887,
888,889,890,891,892,893
3/3
ISSUE: The IOA recommends adding a FMEA. The NASA has no
apparent FMEA to explicitly cover these pod temperature
sensors. The closest FMEA is 03-3-2804-1 for Crossfeed
instead of Pod temperature sensors.
4.2.4.B.5 Pod Thermal Switches
i) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
03-3-7002-2
OMS-895,897,899,901,903,905,907,909,
911,913,915,917,919,921,923,925
3/2R PPP
2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends raising this criticality to 2/1R,
thus adding this to the CIL list, since this failure is one
failure away from loss of crew/vehicle and damage may occur
before it is detected. See 4.1.B.6. See Flight Rules 6-72a,
and JSC NASA Heater Book.
The IOA also recommends splitting this FMEA since this FMEA
covers both pod and crossfeed thermal switches, but their
criticalities and effects are quite different. See
4.2.4.B.I0.
4.2.4.B.6 Pod Toggle Switches
I) FAILURE, NASA:
FAILURE, IOA:
INADVERTENTLY OR PREMATURELY TRANSFERS TO
"AUTO" POSITION (ONE CONTACT SET)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN "ON" POSITION)
05-6L-2031-2
OMS-926,927
3/2RPFP, CIL
2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends raising this crit to 2/IR and
passing the B screen. The NASA failed only one pole or
contact set, considering the other pole as redundant, whereas
the IOA considered the worst case failure mode by failing a
part common to both poles (e.g. toggle lever). This is the
reason for the IOA's higher criticality and the NASA's failed
B screen, since one pole may be undetectable, but not both.
Also, the NASA's ITEM field mentions GROUP1 only, but has no
separate FMEA for GROUP2 heater system. The IOA assumes this
FMEA was meant to cover both groups.
m I01
4.2.4.B.7 Crossfeed Hybrid Drivers
1) FAILURE: FAILS HIGH
05-6L-2137-2
OMS-931,933,935,937,939,941
3/2R PNP
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The NASA implies, with a B Screen of Not/Applicable,
that this item is Standby Redundant to some other item. The
IOA disagrees and recommends passing the B screen, since this
driver operates normally in the string, not passively waiting
for another item to fail before it operates.
4.2.4.B.8 Crossfeed Heaters
i) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
03-3-7011-1
OMS-953,955,957,965,973,959,
961,963,967,969,971
3/2R PPP
(NON-CREDIBLE)
ISSUE: The IOA recommends deleting these FMEAs, since Heater
elements cannot fail closed or short such that they are
continuously on.
4.2.4.B.9 Crossfeed Temperature Sensors
I) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
03-3-2804-1 3/3
OMS-994A,997A,998A,1001A,1002A 2/2 ---, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends raising this crit to 2/IR, thus
adding this to the CIL list. The IOA assumed no launch if a
sensor indicates crossfeed temps outside the desired limits
(<50 F or >90 F) unless sensor failure was determined and the
risks of loss Of detectability for the thermal system is
accepted (this ensures crossfeed for aborts). Worst case
effect would be a false indication of heater system failed off
on a mission critical crossfeed line, leading to delayed
launch and/or possible loss of mission due to loss of
interconnect/crossfeed capability. This implies a crit 2/2
since there is no redundancy,
See Flight Rules 6-9a (vs) 6-73d and Malf. Proc. OMS ll.5a
notes 2,3,4. .........
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2) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN,
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE)
03-3-7801-i 3/3
OMS-994,997,998,1001,I002 2/2
--mm
---, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends raising this crit to 2/IR, thus
adding this to the CIL list. The IOA assumed no launch if a
sensor indicates crossfeed temps outside the desired limits
(<50 F or >90 F) unless sensor failure was determined and the
risks of loss of detectability for the thermal system is
accepted (this ensures crossfeed for aborts). Worst case
effect would be a false indication of heater system failed off
on a mission critical crossfeed line, leading to delayed
launch and/or possible loss of mission due to loss of
interconnect/crossfeed capability. This implies a crit 2/2
since there is no redundancy.
See Flight Rules 6-9a (vs) 6-73d and Malf. Proc. OMS ll.5a
notes 2,3,4.
4.2.4.B.I0 Crossfeed Thermal Switches
i) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
03-3-7002-2
OMS-I004,1006,1008,1010,I012,1016,
I024,1026,1030,i038,1040,i044
3/2R PPP
3/2R FFP, CIL
ISSUE: The IOA recommends failing the A screen and B screen,
thus adding this to the CIL list. ' The IOA also recommends
splitting this FMEA, since this FMEA covers both pod and
crossfeed thermal switches, but their crits and effects are
quite different (see 4.2.4.B.5). This FMEA covers both
'Control Temp' and 'Over Temp' thermal switches. Over Temp is
Standby Redundant to Control Temp. Since there are NO TEST
POINTS between them, and no way to artificially fail a Control
Temp thermal switch, there is no way to test on the ground or
inflight for a failed closed Over Temp thermal switch.
4.2.4.B.II Crossfeed Toggle Switches
I) FAILURE, NASA:
FAILURE, IOA:
FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO TRANSFER,
FAILS OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN "OFF" POSITION)
05-6L-2036-I
OMS-I047,1049
3/3 ---
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The IOA recommends criticality of 3/2R since the loss
of all redundancy (other switch fails) is a possible loss of
mission due to loss of interconnect/crossfeed capability.
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4.3 Resolved Issues
4.3,A Hardware
Several meetings and/or data exchanges be£weenIoA and the NASA
OMS and OMS TVC subsystem managers occurred between June and
December 1987 in an effort to resolve the OMS hardware FMEA/CIL
issues. During this period, resolution was reached on the J............
majority of the issues originaliy identified by IOA All resoived
hardware issues are documented in the detailed assessment sheets
(Appendix C). Those resolved issues which resulted in'changes to
the OMS hardware FMEA/CIL are also denoted in Appendix F with
"resolution codes".
The forty-seven (47) OMS hardware FMEA/CIL issues which remain
unresolved are presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2.
4.3.B EPD&C
Resolution of the OMS EPD&C FMEA/CIL issues with the OMS subsystem
manager was not initiated due to time constraints. Therefore, all
of the EPD&C issues identified by IOA remain unresolved, and are
presented in section 4.1 and 4.2.
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4.4 Additional Comments and Conaerns
During the assessment of the NASA OMS FMEA/CIL, IOA identified
several areas of concern which may not be evinced by the
individual failure mode issues presented in this report. These
concerns are discussed in the following hardware and EPD&C
sections. Several general comments about the IOA assessment and
resolution process are also given.
4.4.A Hardware Comments and Concerns
The assessment of both the OMS and OMS TVC subsystems are included
in this report. IOA interfaced with both the OMS and OMS TVC
subsystem managers to obtain data and resolve issues. Unless
otherwise noted, general discussions in this report about the "OMS
subsystem" pertain to the combined OMS and OMS TVC subsystems.
The IOA OMS hardware FMEA and CIL assessments were performed on
the NASA/RI FMEA/CIL reevaluation information received by IOA as
of 1/01/88. Any updates or changes in this information made by
NASA/RI after this date are not reflected in this report. The IOA
assessment of the OMS hardware CILs was performed against the
post-CCB CIL package dated 12/05/87. This information was
presented at OMS PRCB on 23 December 1987. Assessment of the OMS
TVC CILs was performed against the 11/14/87 versions of the CIL
sheets. As of 1/01/88, the OMS TVC CILs had not been presented to
a CCB or PRCB. The IOA assessment of the OMS hardware FMEAs (non-
CILs) was performed against a criticality and screen summary
package dated 10/22/87. Assessment of the OMS TVC FMEAs (non-
CILs) was performed against FMEA pages received as of 1/01/88,
with revision dates ranging from 3/7/87 to 11/14/87.
The NASA/RI FMEA/CIL reevaluation was primarily concerned with CIL
items. FMEA (non-CIL) criticalities and screens were also
reviewed, however updated FMEA sheets (except for TVC FMEAs) were
not generated. Instead, summary sheets showing only criticalities
and screens were produced. Therefore, IOA assessed FMEA (non-CIL)
crits and screens only. The "effects" and other areas listed on
a FMEA sheet could not be assessed. Issues identified on FMEAs
(non-CILs) which were agreed to by the subsystem manager are
documented in this report as resolved, even though incorporation
of the issues on updated FMEA sheets could not be verified.
OMS thermal control and instrumentation items are covered on the
NASA OMS hardware FMEA/CIL, however IOA analyzed and assessed
these items as EPD&C items. See the EPD&C portions of this
report for the assessment results on these items.
On the current NASA FMEA/CIL, one "FMEA or CIL sheet may include
several components and/or failure modes. The criticality and
screens assigned on the FMEA or CIL reflect only the worst case
component failure mode. IOA accepted this practice (with
reservation) since the components and failure modes are addressed,
however IOA is concerned that this lumping of components and
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failure modes on FMEAs and CILs reduces insight__DtQ the effects ......
of individual OMS subsystem component failures and may lessen the
attention given to critical failure modes. The components and
failure modes lumped together on one FMEA or CIL could have
different criticality and screen assignments if they were
separated onto individual FMEAs and CILs, and better insight would
be obtained. For example, the bipropellant valve assembly FMEAs
(03-3-4001) include the engine control valve, pneumatic actuator,
rack & pinion assembly, bipropellant valves, and bipropellant
valve cavity pressure relief valve. IOA recommends that the
engine control valve and pressure relief valve be addressed on
individual FMEAs and assigned unique criticalities since they are
not mechanically linked to the bipropellant valves, pneumatic
actuator, and rack & pinion. This would provide better insight
into the effects of the failures of these components and would
ensure that they receivethe appropriate amount of individual
attention.
Another example of this concern is the TVC gimbal actuator output
drive assembly FMEAs (03-3-6402) which include £he acme screw, nut
tube assembly, end bearings, attach hardware, drive shaft, drive
shaft bearings, and primary and secondary drive gears. IOA again
recommends that these components be separated onto individual
FMEAs and assigned unique criticalities to provide better insight
into the variety and severity of pos_ib!e failure mode s in the
assembly. Lumping the failures of components on one FMEA lessens
insight into which failures are more or less important and which
deserve more or less attention.
Related to this concern are the issues raised by IOA (and agreed
to by the SSM) that leakage of valve housings should be addressed
on the FMEA/CIL. IOA recommended that a new FMEA and CIL be
generated for each valve housing, however accepted the lumping of
all valve housings onto existing helium, propellant, and GN2 line
leakage FMEAs.
Some OMS subsystem failures do not exist as "failure modes" on
current FMEAs and CILs. Instead, they are listed only as causes
on FMEAs and CILs for other failure modes. IOA does not consider
a failure mode to be adequately addressed only by its listing as a
cause on a FMEA or CIL. For example, the "failed closed" and
"failed open" failure modes for the bipropellant valve cavity
pressure relief valve are addressed only as causes on 03-3-4001-6
(see section 4.2.3.A.3). All critical failures should be listed
as failure modes on FMEAs and CILs to ensure that they receive the
appropriate amount of attention. _ ....
In several instances in the OMS hardware FMEA/CIL, a failure mode
listed on a FMEA is also listed as a cause on another FMEA with a
more severe criticality. IOA considers this to be an
inconsistency. The criticality assigned to a failure mode should
reflect the worst case ultimate effect of the failure. If a
failure mode can cause another critical failure, the criticality
assigned to the failure mode should reflect that fact. See
4.2.3.A.I as an example.
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4.4.B EPD&C Comments and Concerns
The IOA OMS EPD&C FMEA and CIL assessments were performed on the
NASA/RI FMEA/CIL reevaluation information received by IOA as of
1/01/88. Any updates or changes in this information made by
NASA/RI after this date are not reflected in this report. The IOA
assessment of the OMS EPD&C CILs was performed against the post-
CCB CIL package dated 12/08/87. This information was presented at
OMS PRCB on 23 December 1987. The IOA assessment of the OMS EPD&C
FMEAs (non-CILs) was performed against a criticality and screen
summary package dated 5/6/87. Since updated FMEA (non-CIL) sheets
were not generated by NASA/RI, only the criticalities and screens
could be assessed.
IOA takes issue with the NASA interpretations of NSTS 22206,
Section 2.1.s, page 2-4, the definition of redundancy. The NASA-
applied definition of the redundancy string allowed the selection
of specific failures which were required to cause known problems,
e.g., failures required to cause continuous power to valves. IOA
considers many NASA redundancy strings to include multiple
unrelated failures.
IOA analyzed the function of the item or the item's circuit string
and determined the impact of the failure. Per NSTS 22206
interpretation, the redundancy string was defined as any other
item that is capable of performing the function of this item or
string. Criticalities were then assigned based on this
redundancy. In general, the NASA definition tended to be
more conservative (assigned a more severe criticality on the
FMEA). However, IOA was requested to follow NSTS 22206. The
difference in interpretations accounts for the high number of
issues cited.
Because of time constraints, IOA did not generate new analysis
worksheets to match the diode groupings that NASA used.
In general, each item was considered to have two functions: to
control a valve open or closed, and to prevent inadvertently
opening or closing a valve. These two functions correspond to the
two main failure modes, fail open and fail closed. Also,
redundancy often depends on the failure mode. Two parallel items
can be considered redundant to each other for the failed open
failure mode, and two series items can be considered redundant for
the failed closed failure mode.
The electrical components within valves (microswitches, diodes,
etc.) are not specifically addressed on the current NASA FMEA/CIL.
Due to time constraints, IOA also did not individually address
these items. However, IOA recommends that the EPD&C components
within a valve be addressed individually on FMEAs and CILs to
provide better insight into the effects of their failures, and to
ensure that critical failures receive the proper amount of
attention. Failures of valve EPD&C components are not visible on
the current valve hardware FMEAs.
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ACRONYM8
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Ac
ac
Ae
AOA
At
ARCS
ASSY
ATO
ATT
BFS
CIL
CL
CRIT
CRT
C&W
D/C
DAP
dc
DISP
DPS
EPD&C
EPDCS
F
FC
FDA
FM
FMEA
FRCS
FSSR
ft
FU
G
GFE
GN2
GNC
GPC
GSE
He
HW
Hz
IOA
Isol
JSC
LPS
LRU
LVDT
MCA
MCC
MDAC
- Nozzle inlet plane area
- Alternating Current
- Nozzle exit plane area
- Abort Once Around
- Nozzle throat area
- Aft Reaction Control Subsystem
- Assembly
- Abort to Orbit
- Attitude
- Backup Flight System
- Critical Items List
- Close (Closed)
- Criticality
- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning System
" Displays and Controls
- Digital Autopilot
- direct current
- Display
- Data Processing System
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control System
- Functional, Fahrenheit
- Flight Critical
- Fault Detection Annunciation
- Failure Mode
- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- Forward Reaction Control System
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Feet
- Fuel
- Gravity
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- Guidance Navigation and Control
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Helium
- Hardware
- Hertz (cycles per second)
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Isolation
- Johnson Space Center
- Launch Processing System
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Linear Variable Differential Transformer
- Motor Control Assembly
- Mission Control Center (JSC)
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
i
A-I
MDM
MECO
MM
MMH
MNVR
MOD
MSEC
N204
NA
NASA
NSTS
NTO
O.D.
OI
OMRSD
OME
OMS
OP
OPS
OX
OXID
PASS
PBI
Pc
PCI
PCMMU
PLS
PRESS
psi
psia
psid
psig
RCS
RHC
RI
RM
RPC
RTLS
scfm
SFOM
SM
SPEC
STS
SSM
SSSH
SW
TAL
TCA
TD
TK
TPS
TVC
V
VLV
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Cutoff
- Major Mode
- Monomethyl Hydrazine
- Maneuver
- Mission Operations Directorate
- millisecond
- Nitrogen Tetroxide
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Nitrogen Tetroxide
- Outside Diameter
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and ....
Specifications Document
- Orbital Maneuvering Engine
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Open
- Operations
- Oxidizer
- Oxidizer
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Push-Button Indicator
- Chamber Pressure
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulator Master Unit
- Primary Landing Site
- Pressure
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
- Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
- Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
- Reaction Control System
- Rotational Hand Controller
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Power Controller
- Return to Launch Site
- Standard Cubic Feet per Minute
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Systems Management
- Specification
- Space Transportation System
- Subsystem Manager (NASA)
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Software
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thrust Chamber Assembly
- Touch Down -_ .... _ _
- Tank
- Thermal Protection System
- Thrust Vector Control
- Velocity, Volts
- Valve
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
D
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22_06, Instructions For Preparation
o_ FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TA___LL- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY M_sSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
_GHEST CRITICALITy - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accompilshments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARy MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
_IFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
I_/_DING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
R
i.
.
.
.
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
•
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
•
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the wDrst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
u Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
i0. Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE". Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
ii. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
w
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B.3 OMS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis and assessment was performed to the component or
assembly level. The analysis and assessment considered the worst
case effects of the hardware or functional failure on the
subsystem, mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
I. Top level redundancy is considered in determining functional
criticality• The OMS function is to provide delta-V for orbit
insertion, on-orbit ops, and deorbit. From a top down system
analysis approach, the OMS has redundancy via the left and
right subsystems. In determining redundancy for hardware
items downstream of the crossfeed line, items which perform
the same function in each pod may be considered redundant to
each other, depending on the failure mode.
2. No RCS backup deorbit capability exists in the event of loss
of OMS deorbit capability• It cannot be ensured that enough
OMS propellant will remain to comple£e an RCS deorbit burn
since the RCS jets have a lower Isp. However, OMS through
RCS can be used to achieve orbit insertion• An AOA abort can
be accomplished without OMS engines.
• Loss of an OME is, at a minimum, a loss of mission during the
on-orbit phaset Loss of the first OME is possible loss of
mission objectives (ref. flight rule 6-48),-ahd loss of the _
next OME will lead to loss of deorbit capability (no RCS
deorbit assumed) and loss of life/vehicle. An OMS engine
which will be used only for critical burns is not considered
lost.
• The OMS payload bay kit hardware is not addressed in this
analysis.
• Flight rules and Flight Systems Software Requirements (FSSR)
are not used to downgrade criticalities, only to upgrade and
provide better system understanding•
6. Analysis of component filters are covered in the analysis of
the component. Filters which are not integral to other
components are analyzed separately.
7. For the thermal control analysis it is assumed that, at the
time of vehicle liftoff, all areas of the thermal environment
are within redlines.
, If applicable, the redundancy and criticalities assigned to
an electrical component are tied to those assigned to
mechanical parts affected by the failure of the electrical
component.
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• Electrical components which enable and inhibit operation
(e.g., allows a valve to be opened and closed) are not
redundant to elec£rical components which control the
operation (e.g., actually opens and closes the valve).
i0. Instrumentation passage of screen B does not require the
ability to discern between sensor or hardware failure, but on
detection of the measurement being out of a predefined limit.
The ability to differentiate between sensor and hardware
fa_ilure is reflected in the criticality assignment.
ii. Two OMS engines are required to ensure the successful
completion of RTLS and TAL pre and post-MECO OMS dumps. Loss
of one engine may result in the inability to complete a
planned dump leading to violations of propellant tank landing
constraints and/or orbiter mass properties constraints. For
post-MECO OMS dumps, both engines must have successful purges
between the pre and post-MECO dumps. Loss of TVC control of
one engine will result in either loss of the affected engine
and inability to complete the OMS dump, or loss of vehicle
control using the affected engine. An OMS TVC failure does
not affect the ability to perform an OMS dump before MECO.
12. The crew will manually shut down an OMS engine in response to
an OMS FDA caused by the violation of engine operating limits
before the effects become life/vehicle threatening (e.g.,
engine explosion). However, this action may not preclude
damage to and loss of the engine. This assumption does not
apply to failures which lead directly to catastrophic effects
(e.g., engine structural failures).
13. IOA-OMS assumed the inability to re-open a propellant tank
isolation valve on ascent is not a credible event. These
valves are open prelaunch and are used to supply propellants
for orbital insertion, orbital circularization, and RTLS/TAL
aborts.
14. IOA-OMS assumed if a valve was closed for some reason (i.e. to
isolate a leak) after ascent, the inability to re-open this
valve was-a credible failure and the reason to close was not
in the redundancy string.
15. MDM discretes and the event indicators (talkbacks) provide the
logic and visual status of the valve position. Resistors,
diodes, and hybrid drivers are used in the circuitry that
provide this data. IOA-OMS claims the failure of these items
may lead to a false indication of the valve position. The
worst effect of these indicators would be to falsely fail the
valve closed which may affect on-orbit operations.
16. IOA-OMS did not analyze electrical components within the valve
(microswitches, diodes, etc.) for this assessment report,
unlike the IOA-RCS EPD&C report.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets.
Each of these worksheets identifies the NASA FMEA being assessed,
corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet ID, item, criticality,
redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each failure mode,
the highest assessed hardware and functional criticality is
compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the compare row under
the column where the discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
m
=
u
w
w
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(llke or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline =
New =
NASA FMEA/CIL
Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-100
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1001-1
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS _.... _
MDAC ID: I00
ITEM: TANK, HELIUM STORAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
.IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
DURING ENTRY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-101
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: i01
ITEM: TANK, HELIUM STORAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
DURING ENTRY.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY.
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-I02
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1002-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
102
COUPLING, HELIUM FILL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RIORIGINALLY PASSED A SCREEN. HOWEVER, DURING MEETING
BETWEEN IOA AND SSM, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE A SCREEN SHOULD BE
FAILED FOR ALL QD COUPLINGS BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN ...._
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE AND
iS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECO_ENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING
ENTRY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-I03
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1002-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
103
COUPLING, HELIUM FILL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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N
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-I04
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
104
COUPLING, HELIUM FILL
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
=
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ]' [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE__M3_RKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND 'i_STRICTED FLOW". _.....
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-105
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
105
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING ASTATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
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l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-106
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS ..
106
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE"_ .....................
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN i/I EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONAB_. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-107
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
107
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES FOR THE FAILS CLOSED FAILURE MODE. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET OMS-III.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS.
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i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-108
03-3-I003-1
OMS
108
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
•REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED B SCREEN, HOWEVER CHANGED S SCREEN TO
FAIL PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
PROP TANK OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE WITH THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY (INCLUDING THE PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-109
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
109
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P J [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
u
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED B SCREEN, HOWEVER CHANGED B SCREEN TO
FAIL PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
PROP TANK OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE WITH THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY (INCLUDING THE PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
nmm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-IIO
03-3-1101-1
OMS
Ii0
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ]. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
- ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE _ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATE_NT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-III
03-3-1003-2
OMS
iii
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED
FLOW). HOWEVER, NASA/RI ADDED "RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON 03-3-1003-2 (FAILS CLOSED).
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE PLACED ON A NEW FMEA
SEPARATE FROM "FAILS CLOSED", AND THAT THE B AND C SCREENS BE
FAILED. A FLOW RESTRICTION DURING DUAL-LEG OPERATION WOULD NOT
BE DETECTABLE (FAIL B SCREEN).
ALSO, ANY CONTAMINATION CAN AFFECT BOTH VALVES SIMULTANEOUSLY
(FAIL C SCREEN).
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l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-II2
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS
112
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .........
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS".
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED O_TION). IOA
AGREES WITH NASA/RI THAT THIS FAILURE MODE NEED NOT BE ADDED TO
THE FMEA/CIL. WORST CASE OF "DELAYED OPERATION" IS COVERED BY
"FAILS TO OPEN". _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-II3
03-3-1205-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
113
COUPLING-TEST PORT, HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AND AGREES WITH FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-114
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
03-3-1205-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
114
COUPLING-TEST PORT, HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[3/3
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_mmKs-.
IOA FAILURE MODES QN ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAI_ C-LOSED" _D
"RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA.
THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-II5
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
115
COUPLING-TEST PORT, HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-II6
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
116
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C z
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE TWO HE LINE SEGMENTS BETWEEN THE HE
ISOL VLVS_D HE PRESS REGS TO BE REDUNDANTTO EACH 0THER. IOa
AGREES WITH NASA/RI REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE FOR A i/I
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-I17
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
117
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/IR PFP EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE iS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-II8
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
118
REGULATOR ASSY, HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOI_ 3/!R CRi_CALITY. SSM
AGREED TO REMOVE STATEMENT IN EFFECTS WHICH DESCRIBES 2/IR
CRITICALITY, PER IOA ISSUE.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-II9
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
119
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ P ]
IF]
[N]
C
[F]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]" [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL-LEG OPERATION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT.
w
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET l
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-120
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS .....
120
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENTz
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[p]
[ ]
B C
[P] [F]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
CP] CF] IF] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_:
IOA REC0MMENDS THAT THE B S¢_EN BE FAILED. A FAI_D CLOSED
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL-LEG OPERATION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN.
IOA ALSO RECO_NDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE PROPEL_T TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-121
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
121
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
_m
w
z c_
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL-LEG OPERATION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-122
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1101-1
NASA D_ATA_:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
122
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGRE_ TO ADD TH_S REGULATOR BQ_Y TO TH_ ITEM_LIST...... ON
THIS FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE
CIL SHEET PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE FOR A I/I '
C_ITI_ALITY?_II_i!IiI_III_ ==7_=_i_±_i_ _ _ _-/-_i_,_ =_
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-123
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
123
COUPLING-TEST PORT, VAPOR ISOLATION CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ _ IIR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-124
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
124
COUPLING-TEST PORT, VAPOR ISOLATION CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOAFAILUREMQ_ESONANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAIL, MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-125
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
125
COUPLING-TEST PORT, VAPOR ISOLATION CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NO DIFFERENCES.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-126
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1006-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
126
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ F ]
[P]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN, BASED ON_STR_CTED FLOW
FAILURE MODE. HOWEVER, IOA cONSIDERS THE FAILED OPEN FAILURE
MODE TO BE READILY DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET OMS-130.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-127
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
127
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT-.
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PFP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. WITH FAILED OPEN VAPOR ISOL
VALVE AND SERIES OXID CHECK VALVE POPPETS, THE CONTAMINATION OF
UPSTREAM COMPONENTS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY RESULTING IN INABILITY TO USE OR
DEPLETE OMS PROP, AND OXIDIZER CROSSOVER TO THE FUEL SIDE CAUSING
A POSSIBLE HYPERGOLIC REACTION IN THE LINES.
FAILURE OF ONE LEG OF REDUNDANCY (CHECK VALVE POPPET) IS NOT
DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
w
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-128
NASA _A #: 03-3-i006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
128
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/IR ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[P] [F] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_:
IOA RECOMMENDS T_T THIS ITEM ANDF_AIL_=MODEBEUpGRADEDITOIA
3/iR PFP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. WITH INTERNALLY LEAKING VAPOR
ISOL VALVE AND SERIES OXID CHECK VALVE POPPETS, THE CONTAMINATION
OF UPSTREAM COMPONENTS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY RESULT--ING IN INABILITY TO
USE OR DEPLETE OMS PROP, AND OXIDIZER CROSSOVER TO THE FUEL SIDE
CAUSING A POSSIBLE HYPERGOLIC REACTION IN THE LINES- _
FAILURE OF ONE LEG OF REDUNDANCY (CHECK VALVE POPPET) IS NOT
DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
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D
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-129
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
129
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
STREET, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
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am
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-130
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1006-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
130
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED
FLOW). HOWEVER, NASA/RI ADDED-"RESTRICTEDFLOW =" TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON 03-3-1006-2 (FAILS CLOSED), AND CHANGED THE B SCREEN TO
"FAIL".
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF THE PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT.
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mmm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-131
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
OMS
131
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION). IOA
AGREES WITH NASA/RI THAT THIS FAILURE MODE NEED NOT BE ADDED TO
THE FMEA/CIL. WORST CASE OF "DELAYED OPERATION" IS COVERED BY
"FAILS TO OPEN".
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
0MS-132
03-3-1007-2
OMS
132
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
....NO DIFFERENCES_
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-133
03-3-1007-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
133
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES, FUEL
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PFP AND PLACED ON THE CIL (SEPARATE FROM THE OXIDIZER ASSY).
WITH FAILED OPEN FUEL CHECK VALVE POPPETS, THE CONTAMINATION OF
UPSTREAM COMPONENTS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
USE OR DEPLETE OMS PROP, AND FUEL CROSSOVER TO THE OXID SIDE
CAUSING A POSSIBLE HYPERGOLIC REACTION IN THE LINES.
FAILURE OF ONE POPPET IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT (FAIL B
SCREEN).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-134
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1007-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
134
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES, OXIDIZER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPG_DED TO A
3/IR PFP _D P_CED ON THE CIL (SEPARATE FROM THE FUEL ASSY).
WITH FAILED OPEN OXID CHECK VALVE POPPETS AND VAPOR ISOL VALVE,
THE CONTAMINATION OF UPSTREAM COMPONENTS BY PROP OR
PROP VAPORS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF PROP TANK RE__PRESS CAPABILITY
RESULTING IN INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE OMS PROP, AND OXID
CROSSOVER TO THE FUEL SIDE CAUSING A POSSIBLE HYPERGOLIC REACTION
IN THE LINES_!_i_]i:!IIIiI_ _< _ _i_ ............ 7 ...._..... _"_ < .....
FAILURE OF ONE POPPET'_iS NOg_DET_CTABLED_ING _FLIGHT (FAIL B
SCREEN).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-135
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1101-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
135
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS, AND
ABOUT POSSIBLE PROP OR PROP VAPOR LEAKAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
w
w
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-136
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1007-3
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 136
ITEM: VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED
FLOW OF SINGLE INLET FILTER). NASA/RI AG_ED TO_AbD THIS NEW
FMEA (03-3-1007-3) TO COVER THIS I/I FAILURE, PER IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-137
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
137
COUPLING-TEST PORT, QUAD CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-138
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 138
ITEM: .... COUPLING-TEST PORT, _QUAD CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MgDESONTH__EA_ THESE=ARE C_DIBLEFAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-139
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
139
COUPLING-TEST PORT, QUAD CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-140
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 140
ITEM: LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
B_C_E", _: _ :_ ......
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFO_TION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 3/3 EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE _A/CIL, BUT DoEs NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-141
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1009-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
141
VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ X ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NO LONGER CONSIDERS RELIEF VALVE TO BE AN EMERGENCY SYSTEM,
AND CONCURS WITH NASA/RI CRITICALITY AND SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-14 IA
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1009-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
141
VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B _ C _
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
[ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NO LONGER CONSIDERS RELIEF VALVE TO BE AN EMERGENCY SYSTEM,
ANDCONCURS WITH NASA/RI CRITICALITY AND SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-142
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1009-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
142
VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
LEAKAGE OF PROP OR PROP VAPORS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-143
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
03-3-1009-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
143
VALVE-PRESSURE BELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BURST DISK
INTERNAL LEAKAGE). NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD "INTERNAL LEA_GE" _O
THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-3-1009-3 (BURST DISK PREMATURE RUPTURE),
PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. BURST DISK LEAK IS
NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-144
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1009-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
144
VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NO LONGER CONSIDERS RELIEF VALVE TO BE AN EMERGENCY SYSTEM,
AND CONCURS WITH NASA/RI CRITICALITY AND SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS.
NASA/RIORIGINALLY PASSED B SCREEN, HOWEVER HAS RECLASSIFIED B
SCREEN AS "NA" PER IOA ISSUE.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
OMS-145 BASELINE [ ]
03-3-1009-1 NEW [ X ]
OMS
145
VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
........._D_UKTE _[ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SSM REMOVED FAILURE MODE STATEMENT WHICH DESCRIBE "DIAPHRAGM ,
LEAK", PER IOA ISSUE. A BURST DISK LEAK IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS
i
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FAILURE TO OCCUR.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE
LEAKAGE OF PROP OR PROP VAPORS RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD
AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-145A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
145
VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS, AND
ABOUT POSSIBLE LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN CORROSION, FIRE,
EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-146
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 146
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
NEW [ X ]
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] "
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IO_A;_A_REESo_ I_URE _F _A SC_EN_I_BASE_, ON INABILITY T_ __?Y
CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)!' BE ADDED
_A FAILURE MODE_0NTHIS FMEA'__Is_A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-147
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
147
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-148
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 148
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
NASA DATA:
_SELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAIL, TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED F_W".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-149
NASA FME #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
OMS
149
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RES_ICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN I/i EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
=
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-150
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
150
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
[ ]
REMARKS : _ _: ,_.....
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD405, 406, 505,
506) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
!OA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLED. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A_FAILURE MQDE_ _ THIS FME--A. THIS-_A_DIBLE:FA_LURE- MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS. ......
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ORBITER ENTRY _SS PROPERT_E-S-C_T_INTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE RESULTING
IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-151
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
151
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD405, 406, 505,
506) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-3, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-152
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
152
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ................
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD405, 406, 505,
506) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-2, PER IOA ISSUE. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-153
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
153
VALVE-GROUND, MANUAL ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN).
IOA NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE
QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE,
BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-154
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1008-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
154
VALVE-GROUND, MANUAL ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-155
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
155
VALVE-GROUND, MANUAL ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS, AND
ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE,
EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-59
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: oMs-156
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASADATA: :
BASELINE [ _ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 156
ITEM: COUPLING-TANK VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT: u
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] _[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) i_: ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS"
NASA/RIORIGINALLYPASSED A SCREEN. HOWEVER, DURING MEETING
BETWEEN IOA AND SSM, IT WAS AGRE_D_THATT_A SC_EN SHOULD BE
FAILED FOR ALL QD COUPLINGS BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. _....
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECb_NDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND ORBITER
MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY, AND ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF
EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-157
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-3
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 157
ITEM: COUPLING-TANK VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-158
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 158
ITEM: COUPLING-TANK VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA: :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IO_FAILUREMODESQN_ALYSISSHEETSHOULD NOT INCLUDE.FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-159
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
sUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
OMS
159
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN I/I EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-160
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2601-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 160
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
NASA DATA: _:__
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] IX]*
] IX]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE
CAUSES ON THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE. THE RETE_NT_ION RATIONALE ON
THE CIL SHEET SHOULD ADDRESS THIS NEW CAUSE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT "BINDING/JAMMING OF LINE BELLOWS" BE ADDED AS A
CAUSE ON THIS FMEA."
m
m
im
I
im
I
m
m
I
j
_I
im
m
Z
I
i
I
I
N
I
I
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-64 _ _
I
mm
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-161
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 161
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE INCLUDED
AS A CAUSE ON LINE AND BELLOWS RUPTURE FMEAS.
w
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-162
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 162
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT CO_RTHIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOn-
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
OMS-163
03-3-2002-1
OMS
163
PROPELLANT TANK
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [
[ ] [
[ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [x] *
] [x]
] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[- ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-164
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 164
ITEM: PROPELLANT TANK
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT CONSIDER INDIVIDUAL T_K SEAL FAILURES. !OA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI REEVALUATION AND RATIONA_ FOR 2/IR PFP ASSIGNMENT.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS
DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-165
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
165
COUPLING-PROP TANK, HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD479, 480, 579,
580) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESS_NT ID: 0MS-166
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
166
COUPLING-PROP TANK, HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3./3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES 0NANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER,-THE REF DES N![MBERS FOR T-HIS _OU_L_G_(_479/ 480, 579,
580) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-3, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS=QD_COUP_4"_E_ _ z_ _
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: 0MS-167
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
167
COUPLING-PROPTANK, HORIZONTALDRAIN PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
E
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD479, 480, 579,
580) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-2.
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-168
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS _
168
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/R! DID N0_APP_AR TO COV_-R THIS CO_LI_G 0RIGINALLY--_ ;_
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD426, 427, 526,
527) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP_. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAIL_OD_ ON THIS_4EA. THIS IS A C@.EbIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE RESULTING
IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND
CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-169
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
169
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ j [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD426, 427, 526,
527) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-3, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-170
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
03-3-2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS _
170
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] C ] [ ] C ] *
C ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILSTO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID N_T A2P_EAR TO CO_R THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD426, 427, 526,
527) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-2, PER IOA ISSUE. :
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-171
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
171
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD421, 422, 521,
522) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLED. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE RESULTING
IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND
CREWS.
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-172
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
OMS _ _
172
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA _ FAILURE MODES Q_N_A_AL¥$ISSHEETSHQULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".- ................................
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD421, 422, 521,
522) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 0313-2001-3, PER IOA ISSUE.d_i_i_i iiii_i_
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-173
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
173
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
=
l
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD421, 422, 521,
522) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-2, PER IOA ISSUE.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-i74
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS _
174
COUPLING-PROPELLANT, TANK TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOTA_KR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD416, 417, 516,
517) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF a SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTA££ED. IOA ALSO ....
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED 0NRCS QD COUPLIN--G ?MEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE RESULTING
IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND
CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-175
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
175
COUPLING-PROPELLANT, TANK TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD416, 417, 516,
517) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03"3-2001-3, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
AssEsS_NT ID: OMS-176
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-2
NASA DATA:
_BASELINE_[ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
176
COUPLING-PROPEL_T, TANK TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ _ [ ] C ] [ ]
C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOUL_O_ INCLUDE *'FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD416, 417, 516,
517) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-2, PER IOA ISSUE.
m
mm
z
mm
mm
mm
i
mm
g
m
mm
mm
g
u
l
m
M
m
m
I
i
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-80
iAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-177
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
177
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA ANALYZED FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-178
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
178
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA ANALYZED FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
m
m
mm
mm
m
g
i
m
B
I
I
l
I
l
B
m
mm
m
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-82
I
E_
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-179
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
179
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE. THIS FAILURE MODE,
"ERRATIC OPERATION", IS CONSIDERED BY IOA TO BE ADEQUATELY
COVERED UNDER THE NASA/RI FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS
INDICATION, LOSS OF OUTPUT" (03-3-3202-1). THE EFFECTS OF THESE
TWO FAILURE MODES ARE THE SAME. IOA ANALYZED FORWARD AND AFT
PROBES SEPARATELY.
u
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-180
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS _ _
180
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARTMENT, FUEL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C_<_
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (GLASS FRACTURE). IOA
RECO_NDS ADDIN_ THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CAUSE ON THE FORWARD
PROBE "ERRONEOUS INDICATION" FMEA (03-3-3202-1). A _TE FMEA
IS NOT REQUI_D .................... _
FAILURE HISTORY OF PROBE INCLUDES THIS FAILURE. I0A ANALYZED
FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-181
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
181
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NASA/RI LISTS "PROP INTERNAL LEAKAGE" AS CAUSE
ON "ERRONEOUS INDICATION, LOSS OF OUTPUT" FMEA. IOA ANALYZED
FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-182
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
182
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
m
m
[]
mm
R
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
NO DIFFERENCES, IOA _COMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
AFTER LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT PROBE. IOA ANALYZED FORWARD AND
AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-182A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3202-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
182
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA ANALYZED FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT _DATE : 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-183
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3202-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [.... ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS _
183
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] C ] [ ] C ]
C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
• NOD_FFE_NCES. IOA ANALYZED FORWAR D AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-183A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
183
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L_
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDITION OF FOLLOWING INFORMATION
TO EFFECTS: FALSE INDICATION OF COMMUNICATION SCREEN FAILURE
(LESS THAN FULL AFT COMPARTMENT READING WITH PROP REMAINING IN
FORWARD COMPARTMENT) MAY RESULT IN PERFORMANCE OF SETTLING BURNS
PRIOR TO OMS BURNS AND LOSS OF ONORBIT INTERCONNECT. IOA
ANALYZED FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-184
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASADATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
OMS
184
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE. THIS FAILURE MODE,
"ERRATIC OPERATION", IS CONSIDERED BY IOA TO BE ADEQUATELY
COVERED BY THE NASA/RI FMEA WITH THE FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS
INDICATION, LOSS OF OUTPUT" (03-3-3202-1). THE EFFECTS OF THESE
TWO FAILURE MODES ARE THE SAME. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENT
TO EFFECTS R?.GARDING THE INABILITY TO DETECT A FAILURE OF THE
CO_ICATION SCREEN AFTER LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT PROBE. IOA
ANALYZED FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
OMS-185 BASELINE [
NONE NEW [
OMS
185
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT, FUEL
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (GLASS FRACTURE). IOA
RECOMMENDS ADDING THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CAUSE ON THE AFT PROBE
"ERRONEOUS INDICATION" FMEA (03-3-3202-1). A SEPARATE FMEA IS
NOT REQUIRED.
FAILURE HISTORY OF PROBE INCLUDES THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA
ANALYZED FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-186
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
186
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ....
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)=±i_ _+_ _, _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS"
NO DIFFERENCES. NASA/RI LIST "PROP INTERNAL _A_GE" AS CAUSE ON
"ERRONEOUS INDICATION, LOSS OF OUTPUT" FMEA. IOAANALYZED
FORWARD AND AFT PROBES SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-187
03-3-3284-1
OMS
187
TOTALIZER
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
7
W
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO EFFECTS
ADDRESSING LOSS OF LOW PROP QUANTITY WARNING AND INABILITY TO
DETECT COMMUNICATION SCREEN FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-188
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 188
ITEM: TOTALIZER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO N0T qO_yER=THIS FAILU_ MODE t_ THIS FAILURE MODE,
"ERRONEOUS INDICAT!ON",IS CONSIDERED BY IOA TO BE ADEQUATELY
COVERED BY THE NASA/RI FMEA WITH THE FAILURE MODE "ERRATIC
OPERATION" (03-3-3284-1). IOA RECQ_ENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO
EFFECTS WHICH ADDRESS FALSE INDICATIONS OF PROP LOW QUANTITY
WARNING AND COMMUNICATION SCREEN FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-189
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-3284-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 189
ITEM: TOTALIZER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
1
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO EFFECTS
ADDRESSING LOSS OF LOW PROP QUANTITY WARNING AND INABILITY TO
DETECT COMMUNICATION SCREEN FAILURE.
1
1
1
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-190
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2006-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
190
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ ........._:_
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA/RI 1/l CRIT ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-191
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2006-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
191
COMMUNICATIONSCREEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA/RI i/i CRIT ASSIGNMENT. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE 3/2R EFFECTS OF A LESS SEVERE SCREEN FAILURE
(WHICH ONLY ALLOWS SOME HELIUM TO PASS INTO THE AFT COMPARTMENT)
ALSO BE INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA. IOA CONSIDERS THIS DEGREE
OF FAILURE TO BE MORE CREDIBLE THAN A TOTAL (i/i) SCREEN FAILURE.
U
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-192
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2005-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 192
ITEM: GALLERY LEGS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NODIFFE_NCES' IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING PoSSIB_SSO_O_bM_E_GINE _R__USTERS AS A
RESULT OF THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY. ENGINE AND TANK ASSEMBLY
IN OTHER POD NOT CONSIDERED BY IOA TO BE REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-193
03-3-2004-1
OMS
193
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE FOR 2/2
CRITICALITY. STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF DEVICE MAY ALLOW HELIUM TO
BYPASS GALLERY LEGS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-194
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2101-1
NASA _ATA:
BA SELIq_E [ ]
NEW [ X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
OMS
194
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S: _:_i_i_:_ _ _ _...... _ .... _ _ _ _
NASA/RI ADDED "FAILED CLOSEDACMVRELIEF DEVICE"TO THE CAUSES ON
THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE. THE RETENTION RATIONALE ON THE CIL
SHEET SHOULD ADDRESS THIS NEW CAUSE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT "BINDING/JAMMING OF LINE BELLOWS" BE ADDED AS A
CAUSE ON THIS FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-194A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2102-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
OMS
194
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ADDED "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE CAUSES ON
THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE. THE RETENTION RATIONALE ON THE CIL
SHEET SHOULD ADDRESS THIS NEW CAUSE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-195
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2601-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 195
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] C ] [ ] [ ] C x ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ADDED. '_A!LED CLOSED A_ _LIEF DEVICE" TO THE CAUSES ON
THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE. THE RETENTION RATIONALE ON THE CIL
SHEET SHOULD ADDRESS THIS NEW CAUSE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
EXPOSUREOF E#A  LSo
RECOMMENDS THAT "BINDING/JAMMING OF LINE BELLOWS" BE ADDED AS A
CAUSE ON THIS FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-196
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 196
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
mmm
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE INCLUDED
AS A CAUSE ON LINE AND BELLOWS RUPTURE FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-197
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 197
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NO_oVE-R - THI'S FAILu_MODEqREST_R-icTED_W)."_IOA!
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RES_i__N A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT _G_D T.E ABSENCE OF THIS FAIL_
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-198
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2007-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
198
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERS A FAILED CLOSED VALVE TO BE READILY DETECTABLE
DURING FLIGHT (PASS B SCREEN). HOWEVER IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE
NASA/RI B SCREEN FAILURE (WHICH IS BASED ON RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILURE MODE). SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-203.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF THE PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-199
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2007-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
199
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE REGARDING 2/IR
PNP ASSIGNMENT. _ °
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-200
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
200
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THESE FAILURE MODES
BE ADDED TO 03-3-2007-2, HOWEVER FMEA/CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT
THESE ADDITIONS. THE EFFECTS OF THESE FAILURE MODES ARE COVERED
03-3-2007-2.
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-201
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2007-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
201
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
NASA
IOA
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: _ _
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI REEVALUATIONANDRAT_ONALE FOR 2/IR PNP
ASSIGNMENT_R INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-202
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
202
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE. NASA/RI ALSO ADDED "FAILED CLOSED ACMV
RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE CAUSES ON THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-202A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2007-3
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: AC VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C :
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" BE ADDED
AS A CAUSE ON THIS_EA,: HO_ _-_iS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROPELLANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-203
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2007-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
2O3
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
CX]*
IX]
[ ]
w
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED
FLOW). NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD "RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON 03-3-2007-2 (FAILS CLOSED), PER IOA ISSUE. NASA/RI ALSO
CHANGED THE B SCREEN ON 03-3-2007-2 TO "FAIL" FOR RESTRICTED
FLOW, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF THE PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINT.
L_
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-204
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
204
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 3/3 VALVES _ OPEN DURING
ALL PHASES OF FLIGHT. VALVES _: VER_iED 6PEN _BEFORE BURN
ATTEMPTED. IOA 3/2R BASED ON VALVE IN GPC POSITION IS INCORRECT.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION). THIS
FAILURE MODE NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE FMEA/CIL. THE WORST CASE
EFFECTS-OF "DELAYED oPERATION" ARE cO'RED BY "FAILS CLOSED" (03-
3-2007-2).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
0MS-205
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
OMS
205
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO RELIEVE) ON A SEPARATE FMEA. HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE MODE
IS LISTED AS A CAUSE ON PROP LINE AND GIMBAL BELLOWS EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE FMEAS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE BE ADDRESSED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO ENSURE THAT IT GETS THE PROPER AMOUNT OF
ATTENTION, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS RECOMMENDATION TO BE AN OPEN
ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-206
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
206
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
u
(If different from NASA)RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS_I_ ....._ ........................
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER _ J
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING).SUCH=_ OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/IR EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIQNABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
i
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DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILUP_EBE ADDRESSED ON _EFMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-207
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
2O7
COUPLING - PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD469, 470, 569,
570) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESS_NT ID: OMS-208
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
208
COUPLING - PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
1
m
1
i
[]
1
1
1
[]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW"_ :_-_-_II:....i _i_! _ _ _ _ o _i .......
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, "THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD469, 470, 569,
570) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-3, PER IOA ISSUE ....
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-209
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
209
COUPLING - PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
h I
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD469, 470, 569,
570) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-2.
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i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-210
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
210
COUPLING-OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
....... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED A SCREEN. HOWEVER, DURING MEETING
BETWEEN iOA AND SSM, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE A SCRE_ _SHOULD BE
FAILED FOR ALL QD COUPLINGS BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE _OF BSC_EN, .....
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)'; BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREW DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-211
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
211
COUPLING-OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
i
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-212
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
212
COUPLING-OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE M_DES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RES_ICTED FLOW". _
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-213
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
213
COUPLING - PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
u
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD461, 462, 561,
562) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-214
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYST_:
MDAC ID:
IT_:
OMS _'_o
214
COUPLING - PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE
LEAD _ALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY RED_D_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
COMP_ [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE z_Op_S ON_ALyS!$ SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
_D "_STRI_ED F_W_ ........ _ _! __i!_=_==_ _ ........_
NASA/RI DID NOT APPE_ TO CO_ THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HO_VERL THE _F DES _BERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD461, 462, 561,
562) _ BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-3, PER IOA ISSUE. _.........._
IOA RECO_NDS T_T "FAILS C_SED" _D "RESTRI_ED F_W" BE ADDED
TO THE FAIL_MODES ON THI S _A. THESE _ C_DIBLE FAILURE
MODES _D _ ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING _EAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-215
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
215
COUPLING - PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
AssEsSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD461, 462, 561,
562) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-2.
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J
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-216
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-20010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
216
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
, ICAUSESON
THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECO_NDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE O_ EVA AND GROUNDC_WS_ IO_ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT "BINDING/J_ING OF LI_E_BE_WS " BE_ADDED ASiA
CAUSE ON THIS FMEA.
I
mm
B
i
g
I
mm
mm
I
ug
m
[]
m |
I!
= =
m !
I !
mm
[]
m
i
m
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-124 _
m
R
-- !
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
r_
w
m
w
w
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-217
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
217
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION). IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CAUSE
ON CROSSFEED LINE AND BELLOWS RUPTURE FMEAs.
w
w
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESS_NT ID: OMS-218
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
218
CROSSFEEDGIMBAL JOINT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NASA/RIDONOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (_RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED,
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-219
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-20011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
219
FLEXIBLE LINE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ADDED "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE CAUSES ON
THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
h
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-220
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT_
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
OMS
220
FLEXIBLE LINE ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_:.5_:_5 ::2 ............ _ _:_ : _ ....... _(Z_ : _ _i _
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RE S?RICTED FLOW)I _ ;PA_
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED F[_OW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE_ .......IOADOES NOT_G_D THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-221
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FITTINGS
OMS
221
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
. (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 3/2R EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOESNOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ......
mB
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-222
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FITTINGS
OMS _......
222
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC B C
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
CI/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _= _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: =
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOC_GE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOWIN a SEG_NTQF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING).=_S_UfH_Og_NgEqQVLD
RESULT IN i/i EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBIL__IT:YOF_SUC_ _
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONT_INATION WOULD _LOWTQ__
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IoA _CO_NDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-223
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2008-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 223
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
l
i
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE REGARDING 3/IR
CRITICALITY. NASA/RI DELETED THE i/I ABORT CRITICALITY BASED ON
S/W CHANGES WHICH WILL HAVE BOTH XFEED VALVE SWITCHES IN THE GPC
POSITION FOR LAUNCH BEGINNING WITH STS-26.
E :
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-224
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2008-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 224
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE REGARDING 3/2R
CRITICALITY. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-225
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 225
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
u
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MIDTRAVEL).
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO 03-3-2008-2,
HOWEVER FMEA/CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
OF THIS FAILURE MODE ARE COVERED ON 03-3-2008-2.
IOA
THE EFFECTS
m
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
z
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS-226
03-3-2008-1
OMS
226
VALVE-CROSSFEED
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELI_ [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
[P] [ ]*
C ] C ]
[N] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONAI._ FOR 3/2R C_R!_TI_CALITY
ASSIGNMENT. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS _CONCERN _ARDING
DETECTABILITY OF INTERNAL LEAKAGE D_INGFLIGHT. _ IO_ AccEPTS SSM
POSITION THAT A LEAKAGE LARGE ENOUGH TO CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS WOULD
BE DETECTABLE. LEAKAGES TOO SMALL TO DETECT ARE OF NO
CONSEQUENCE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-227
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2101-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 227
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] E J [ J [ _ _ X _ *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE. NASA/RI ALSO ADDED "FAILED CLOSED ACMV
RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE CAUSES ON THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ms
R
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-227A
03-3-2008-3
OMS
227
AC VALVE
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] C ] C ] C ]
ms
m
mm
z
I
i[]
.... !
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" BE ADDED
AS A CAUSE ON _FM_, HOWEVER _AiS AD_ATE WITHOUT THIS_
ADDITION.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING_A ST_ATE_MEN_ TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROPELLANT.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
0MS-228
03-3-2008-2
OMS
228
VALVE-CROSSFEED
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[ F ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
ClL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED
FLOW). NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD "RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON 03-3-2008-2 (FAILS CLOSED), PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PPP CRIT ASSIGNMENT.
IOA B SCREEN FAILURE WAS BASED ON THE USE OF BOTH XFEED VALVES
FOR OMS XFEED OPS. HOWEVER, OMS XFEED IS A CONTINGENCY
OPERATION. OMS/RCS INTERCONNECT NOMINALLY USES ONLY ONE OMS
XFEED VALVE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-229
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
229
VALVE-CROSSFEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
]
]
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION). _
THIS FAILURE MODE NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE FMEA/CIL. = WORST CASE
EFFECTS OF "DELAYED OPERATION" ARE COVERED BY THE "FAILS CLOSED"
FMEA (03-3-2008-2).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
OMS-230
NONE
OMS
230
VALVE-CROSSFEED
C.D. PRUST
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
w
=
w
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO RELIEVE) ON A SEPARATE FMEA. HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE MODE
IS LISTED AS A CAUSE ON CROSSFEED PROP LINE AND GIMBAL BELLOWS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEAS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE BE ADDRESSED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO ENSURE THAT IT GETS THE PROPER AMOUNT OF
ATTENTION, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS RECOMMENDATION TO BE AN OPEN
ISSUE.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-231
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
231
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD667, 668) HAVE
BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFy_ CONDITION OF CAP SEAL_A_ER_P INSTALLED. !OA ALSO
AGREES WITH NAS_A/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. ......................
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROp TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE RESULTING
IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND
CREWS.
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W
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-232
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
OMS
232
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD667, 668) HAVE
BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-3, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-233
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 233
ITEM: COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTEDFLOW". _
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD667, 668) HAVE
BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-2, PER IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-234
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
234
COUPLING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD673, 674, 679,
686) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-1, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-143
APPENDIX C
ASSESSME_-WORKSHEET: --_ 1
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-235
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
235
COUPLING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA: 'i !; i;_ ;
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: ............................
IOA FAILURE MODES ON _ALYS!S SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND ,,_STRICgED_°_FLO_ .......
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD673, 674, 679,
686) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO_3U20Dg_3;PERqOATSSUE. _!!_ ='_
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO-THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. TH--ES_J_DIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING _AS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-236
03-3-2009-2
OMS
236
COUPLING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ ] .[ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
° NEW [ X ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND"RESTRICTED FLOW".
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD673, 674, 679,
686) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-2.
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-237
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
OMS
237
PROPEL_ LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] .[ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ] _
REMARKS .......................... _ _
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/R_ _NO2 COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A S_GMENT O_F_IN_DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATiON=(_C-RIMPING). SUCH AN OC-_NCE COULD
RESULT IN 3/3 EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. _ANY C0NT_AMINAT_ON WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE•
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-238
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
OMS
238
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/IR EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-147
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET Z
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-239
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2601-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 239
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOa [ 1 /i ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
] [ ] [
] C ] [
] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] IX]*
] IX]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE
CAUSES ON THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE. THE RETENTION RATIONALE ON
THE CIL SHEET SHOULD ADDRESS THIS NEW CAUSE.
IOARECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND ExPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND C_WS, IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT "BINDING/JAMMING OF LINE BELLOWS" BE ADDED AS A
CAUSE ON THIS FMEA .......
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-240
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 240
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAiLURE MODE (NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION). IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CAUSE
ON LINE AND BELLOWS RUPTURE FMEAS.
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-241
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 241
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDiBILITY OF _ICTED FLOW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-242
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2601-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 242
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]r [ ] [ ] ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE
CAUSES ON THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE. THE RETENTION RATIONALE ON
THE CIL SHEET SHOULD ADDRESS THIS NEW CAUSE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT "BINDING/JAMMING OF LINE BELLOWS" BE ADDED AS A
CAUSE ON THIS FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-243
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 243
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION). IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CAUSE
ON LINE AND BELLOWS RUPTURE FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-244
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 244
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-245
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2602-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 245
ITEM: ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
mm
b
mm
|
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE
CAUSES ON THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE. THE RETENTION RATIONALE ON
THE CIL SHEET SHOULD ADDRESS THIS NEW CAUSE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT "BINDING/JAMMING OF LINE BELLOWS" BE ADDED AS A
CAUSE ON THIS FMEA.
REDUNDANCY SCREENS SHOULD BE BLANK PER NSTS 22206.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-246
NONE
OMS
246
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
C ] C ] C ] [ N ]
W "
r
i
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION). IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CAUSE
ON LINE AND BELLOWS RUPTURE FMEAS.
u
i
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-155
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESS_NT ID: 0MS'247
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 247
ITEM: ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A
]
]
B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
HOW _-D_RS _THE CREDIBILfTY -OF _STRICTED F_W I_ _)__- TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-248
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
248
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE MODE AS A I/i SINCE IT CAN CAUSE
A CATASTROPHIC ENGINE FAILURE. CONTAMINATION OF ENGINE INJECTOR
ORIFICES OR COOLING CHANNELS COULD RESULT IN COMBUSTION CHAMBER
BURN-THROUGH.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/I AND
PLACED ON THE CIL.
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-249
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
249
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [.2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .............
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR PASSAGE OF B SCREEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-250
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4601-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 250
ITEM: BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" BE ADDED
TO THE CAUSES ON THIS FMEA WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION
RATIONALE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROPELLANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-251
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 251
ITEM: BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
]
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTIoN)-dN_A SEPARATE _A. _OA_COMMENDS ADDIN_THIS
FAILURE MODE AS A CAUSE ON ALL PROP LINE AND BELLOWS EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE FMEAS. A SEPARATE FMEA IS NOT REQUIRED.
THE PROPOSED IOA CAUSE IS ALREKDYADDRESSEDDNFMEA 03-3-4601-1,
WHICH LISTS "EXCESS GIMBALLING TORQUE" AS A CAUSE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-252
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 252
ITEM: BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
i
=
n
r _
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-253
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
253
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RIFAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAIL UREOFBSCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS
DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-254
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
254
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-255
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
255
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C- ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) __ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REdS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAi_ TO
OPEN" _D _"RESTRICTED Y_W".
NO DIFFERENCES.
m
B
!
i
[]
mm
Z
m
I
[]
i
!
m |
!
m
i
m
l
B
g
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-164
J
I
[]
wAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
u
m
w
u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-256
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
256
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE
"RESTRICTED FLOW". THE EFFECTS OF "RESTRICTED FLOW" ARE COVERED
BY THE ENGINE INLET FILTER (03-3-4002-1), AND THE BIPROP VLV ASSY
(o3-3-4ooi-3).
NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA REC0_NDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-257
03-3-4001-i
OMS
257
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS
INCLUDED ONe'THIS FMEA_ SEP_ED ONTO INDIVID_L FMEAS TO
PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE
ASSEMBLY.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROPELLANTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-258
03-3-4001-3
OMS
258
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL) FOR THE BIPROPELLANT VALVE. NASA/RI NOW COVERS THIS
FAILURE MODE ON 03-3-4001-3.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-259
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
259
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ X ] *
IOA [ X ]
COMPARE [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
[ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ F ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
..... AD QUAT [ J
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI QRiGINALLY_ P_ASSED _B__SC_EN FOR "!NTERNA__ _AKA__GE_'_,. FAILURE
MODE. HOWEVER, NASA/RI CHANGED B SCREEN TO "FAIL", PER IOA
ISSUE. LEAKAGE PAST UPSTREAM BALL VALVE IS UNDETECTABLE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO_YFE_L_TS, _ _i .........
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTQ INDIVIDUAL _AS TO PROVIDEBETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-260
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
260
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
r
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE. NASA/RI ALSO ADDED "FAILED CLOSED ACMV
RELIEF DEVICE" TO THE CAUSES ON THIS FMEA, PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-261
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
261
VALVE - BIPROPELLANTVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/R!QR_GINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED
OPERATION). NASA/RI NOW COVERS THIS FAILURE MODE 0N_03-3-4001-3.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON i/I FMEAS (03-3-4004-1 AND 03-3-4004-2),
HOWEVER THE SSM STATES THAT THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT A CAUSE FOR
THE I/1 EFFECTS ON THESE FMEAS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-262
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM. •
OMS
262
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/i] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RELIEF VALVE FAILS
CLOSED) AS A I/i SINCE IT COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF
THE BIPROP VALVE HOUSING AND LEAKAGE OF PROPELLANTS.
THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE ARE CURRENTLY ONLY ADDRESSED AS A
CAUSE ON 03-3-4001-6. IOA RECOMMENDS A NEW I/i FMEA FOR THIS
ITEM AND FAILURE MODE TO ENSURE THAT THEY RECEIVE ADEQUATE
ATTENTION.
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AssEssMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-263
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
263
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .............+:_
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA Now CLASSIFIES THIS ITEM AND FAIL_ MODE CRELIEF VALVE FAILS
OPEN) AS A 2/iR PFP. IOA DID NoT CONSIDER DO.STREAM BIPROP
VALVE TO BE REDUNDANT TO RELIEF VALVE IN ORiGiNAL ANALYSiS. THIS
ITEM AND FAILURE MODE ARE CURRENTLY ADDRESSED ONLY AS A CAUSE ON
03-3-400i-6. -+ IOA _coMMTENDS-=A-NEW 2/IR PFP FMEA FOR THIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE TO ENSURE THAT THEY RECEIVE ADEQUATE ATTENTION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-264
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
264
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ p ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fro m NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE). HOWEVER, NASA/RI NOW COVERS THIS FAILURE MODE ON 03-3-
4001-6, BOTH AS A FAILURE MODE AND A CAUSE.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 2/IR PFP ASSIGNMENT.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT i_: OMS-265
NASA FMEA # : NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
265
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[I/i] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
........ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
NASA/RI DO NOTCOVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, _ OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THIS VALVE HOUSING ON THE FMEA/CIL. IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THIS VALVE HOUSING BE ADDED TO THE OTHER VALVE HOUSINGS
COVERED ON 03-3-2101-1 WITH CO_SPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-266
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
266
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (OPERATES AT LOWER THAN
NORMAL PSID). THE PROPOSED IOA FAILURE MODE IS ADEQUATELY
COVERED BY THE "FAILS OPEN" FAILURE MODE. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET
OMS-263.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-267
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
267
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOAAGREES wITH NASA/R_I FAILURE_F A SCRE_EN BASED .QN INABILitY To
VE I FY tONDITiON = I0A  ArS 0
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILUq_E-_B_._ /...... _ ......
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE AgD_ED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO _CO_ENDS ADDING A sTATE_NT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS
DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-268
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
268
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-269
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
269
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ,_=.
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ i /1 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-270
03-3-4003-1
OMS
270
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ x] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILED CLOSED ACMV RELIEF DEVICE" AND
"BINDING/JAMMING OF LINE BELLOWS" BE ADDED AS CAUSES ON THIS
FMEA.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROPELLANT LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-271
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
271
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ...............................
NASA/RI _ NOT COVER THIS FAILURE _ MODE (NO BELLOWS ANGULAR _ _
DEFLECTION). IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CAUSE
ON LINE AND BELLOWS RUPTURE FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-272
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
272
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
IT BE ADDRESSED.
m.-
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-273
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
273
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IN] IN] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS. "
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ F ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILU_ OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP f_TA_LATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS
DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-274
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
274
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
i
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-275
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
275
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S_ .....
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NO DIFFERENCES.
i
im
i
i
m
u
i
i
II
H
mm
i '
-- 7
u l
i
H •
W
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-184
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
u
r
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-276
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
OMS
276
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/IR EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-277
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
OMS
277
COUPLING-OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
_= _,t _ _J i : .... i £_
AND iS ADDRESSED oN RCS QD _0UI___S
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS
DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-278
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
278
COUPLING-OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
z
i_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT iD: 0MS-279
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
279
COUPLING-OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IO_A FAIL_ MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". ....
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-280
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
280
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
i
w
= =
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-281
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
281
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-282
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4004-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
282
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI i/I CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. FAILURE COULD LEAD TO ENGINE
BURN-THROUGH. NASA/RI CHANGED "BLOCKAGE OF ENGINE INLET FILTER"
TO "STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF ENGINE INLET FILTER" AS A CAUSE, PER
IOA ISSUE.
w
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
O_'283
03-3-4005-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 283
ITEM: COMBUSTION CHAMBER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
•(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES IOA RECOMMENDS T_T THE CAUSES ON THIS FMEA ......
INCLUDE "BIPROP VALVE IMPROPER TIMING OR FAILS MID-TRAVEL".
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-284
03-3-4005-2
OMS
284
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] C ] C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: iIf different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE CAUSES ON THIS FMEA
INCLUDE "BIPROP VALVE IMPROPER TIMING OR FAILS MID-TRAVEL".
w
w
w
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS-285
03-3-4006-1
OMS
285
NOZZLE EXTENSION
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..............
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-285A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4005-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 285
ITEM: NOZZLE EXTENSION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA ANALYZED COMBUSTION CHAMBER-TO-NOZZLE EXTENSION FLANGE
LEAKAGE AS A NOZZLE FAILURE. NASA/RI ANALYZED IT AS A COMBUSTION
CHAMBER FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-286
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4006-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 286
ITEM: NOZZLE EXTENSION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[i/i] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-287
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4502-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
287
COUPLING-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
r
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED A SCREEN. HOWEVER, DURING MEETING
BETWEEN IOA AND SSM, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE A SCREEN SHOULD BE
FAILED FOR ALL QD COUPLINGS BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE AND
IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-288
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4502-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
288
COUPLING-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
A
[
[
[
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[313
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOAFAILURE MODE_S ON_NALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
_/_D-"RES-TRICTED FLOW". .........................................................
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING _AS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-289
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4502-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
289
COUPLING-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-290
NASA FMEA #. 03-3-4510-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
290
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI 2/IR PPP, I/i ABORTA$SIGNMEN_f. !QA _ALYZED
INDIVIDUAL_LINE SEGMENTS SEPARATELY IN ORiGZNAL ANALY_.
NASA/RI FMEA INCLUDES ALL GN2 LINE S_GM_NTS. IOA_ONSiD_RS
LEAKAGE OF THIS SEGMENT TO BE A 3/IR PFP.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-291
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
291
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
T
= .
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 3/3 EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER ORCOMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
w
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-292
03-3-4511-2
OMS
292
VALVE-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
Co D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
B
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] ] [ ] *
[ ] ] [ ]
C
C
C
C[ ] ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES, _ _ _ _i .....::::_: ::::::: _ ::_
FAILURE:MODES_SIGNED BY IOA ON ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-292 APPLY
TO GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY. "FAILS OPEN" DURING FLIGHT IS
ADDRESSED BY ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-294.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-293
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4510-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
293
VALVE-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
n
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI 2/IR PPP, i/i ABORT ASSIGNMENT.
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) BUT AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE
BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE.
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-294
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4511-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
294
VALVE-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA-
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
IOA AGNES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE REDUNDANCY STR_NG_LIST_D_UNDE_ _E"_ _i_
EFFECTS BE REVISED. IOA CONSIDERS THE STRING TO INCLUDE ONLY THE
FILL/VENT COUPLING SEAL AND CAP, ACCUMULATOR, AND OTHER ENGINE.
THERE ARE NO ADDITIONAL REDUNDANT VALVES OR COUPLINGS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-295
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4501-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 295
ITEM: TANK-GN2 STORAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA CONSIDERS SHRAPNEL TO BE A POSSIBLE EFFECT WHICH SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED PER NSTS 22206.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-296
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4501-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 296
ITEM: TANK-GN2 STORAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA
IOA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [x]*
[P] [P] [ ]
[I/I] [ ]
[3/IR] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI i/I ASSIGNMENT. IOA DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN
VEHICLE DAMAGE EFFECT_ (ill), _D EXTERNALLE_GE (3/iR)
EFFECTS. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (3/IR) EFFECTS
ALSO BE INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-297
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4510-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
297
PNEUMATIC PACK ASSEMBLY HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
u
w
n
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI 2/IR PPP, i/I ABORT ASSIGNMENT.
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS MECHANICAL CONNECTION TO THE ITEM LIST
ON THIS FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE
CIL SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE.
b
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-298
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS
298
PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .....
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) z
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
B_C_KAGE". - ........................
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING) . SUCHAN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/IR EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-299
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4503-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
299
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
i
z
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE (FAILS CLOSED) AS A CRIT 1 DURING
A TAL ABORT, BASED ON INABILITY TO COMPLETE ALL ENGINE STARTS AND
PURGES WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED DURING A TAL ABORT.
NASA/RI AGREED TO MAKE THIS FMEA AN ABORT CRIT i, PER IOA ISSUE.
SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-303.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE "E" EFFECTS BE REVISED. THE DOWNSTREAM
REGULATOR IS NOT REDUNDANT FOR A FAILED CLOSED ISOL VALVE.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-300
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4503-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
300
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASa [ 3 /IR 3 [ P J _ F 3 [ P J [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE__
NASA/RI FAI_BSCREEN 0N_O3-3-4593-I BECAUSEOF "INTERNAL
LEAKAGE" FAILURE MODE ISSUE. (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-301).
"FAILS OPEN" MODE IS DETECTABLE VIA CRT DISPLAY "GNC SYS SUMM 2".
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-301
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4503-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
301
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
n
nm_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW FAILS B SCREEN.
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED B SCREEN, HOWEVER CHANGED B SCREEN TO
"FAIL" FOR THE "INTERNAL LEAKAGE" FAILURE MODE, PER IOA ISSUE.
LEAKAGE IS UNDETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT SINCE REG GOES TO LOCKUP
AFTER EVERY BURN.
w
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-302
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4510-1
NASA pATA: _ _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
302
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCESS NASA/RI 2/IR PPP, I/! A_OR2 A$8!__, _' _ _
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS_FAI£_M6_E_(_TRUCTU_L
FAILURE, RU_, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE), BUT AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE
BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON _IS FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING
RE-TEN#IOK RKT-I0_ Td_THE_CiL SH-EET,_ER IOA =ISSUE' _ii
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-303
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4503-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
OMS
303
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w-
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] i P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED
FLOW), BUT ADDED IT TO 03-3-4503-2, PER IOA ISSUE. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED FLOW" (ONLY) BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR
PFP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON A SEPARATE FMEA.
THE INABILITY TO DETECT A FLOW RESTRICTION THROUGH THE VALVE
UNTIL THE ACCUMULATOR HAS BEEN DEPLETED AND CANNOT BE REPLENISHED
MAKE THE EFFECTS OF THIS FAILURE THE SAME AS 03-3-4505-2 (2/IR
PFP, I/i ABORT). SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-305.
THIS SINGLE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF ONE OMS ENGINE. THE
"FAILED CLOSED" MODE IS DETECTABLE AND THE REMAINING ENGINE START
CAN BE SAVED (3/IR PPP, i/I ABORT). THE DOWNSTREAM REGULATOR AND
ACCUMULATOR ARE NOT REDUNDANT FOR THE "RESTRICTED FLOW" MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-304
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
OMS
304
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ].
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NoT cOVER THIS FAILURE_MODE(DELAyED OPERATION). THIS
FAILURE MODE NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE FMEA/CIL. THE WORST CASE
EFFECTS OF "DELAYED OPERATION" ARE COVERED BY THE "FAILS CLOSED"
FMEA (03-3-4503-2). SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-299.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-305
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4505-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
305
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
?
w
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS TO OPEN)
AS A 3/IR PPP. HOWEVER, NASA/RI UPGRADED TO 2/IR PFP, i/i ABORT
PER IOA ISSUE. CREW MAY NOT HAVE TIME FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION
(INHIBIT PURGE) DURING SHORT OMS BURN. FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. FAILURE DURING TAL ABORT RESULTS
IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE ALL NECESSARY ENGINE STARTS AND PURGES.
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-306
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4505-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
306
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
-HDW/_C a B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NOT i2f DURal-G-TAt-ABORT SI_E-_60 ' P_-_FT IN_ST-0_G_ TANK AND
ACCUMULATOR. INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THIS IS ENOUGH TO
PERFORM A START-PURGE-START CYCLE REQUIRED DURING TAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-307
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4510-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
307
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI 2/IR PPP, i/I ABORT ASSIGNMENT.
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE), BUT AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE
BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT fD:: 0MS-308
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4505-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
308
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW FAI_B$CR_N. _ _ ...._ _ .... _ _
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED THIS FAILURE MODE (LOW OUTPUT) AS A
3/1R PPP. HOWEVER, NASA/RI UPGRADED TO 2/IR PPP, i/i ABORT PER
IOA ISSUE. CREW MAY NOT HAVE TIME FORCORRECTIVE ACTION (INHIBIT
PURGE/D_UR_G S_=HORT OMS B_, _S_TFAILURECOULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF_EENG!NE, __AILUREDUR_NG TAD ABO_RT RESULTS IN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE ALL NECESSARY ENGINE STARTS AND PURGES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-309
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4505-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
309
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW)
AS A 3/IR PPP. HOWEVER, NASA/RI UPGRADED TO 2/IR PFP, I/i ABORT
PER IOA ISSUE. CREW MAY NOT HAVE TIME FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION
(INHIBIT PURGE) DURING SHORT OMS BURN. FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. FAILURE DURING TAL ABORT RESULTS
IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE ALL NECESSARY ENGINE STARTS AND PURGES.
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ASSESSMENT DAT_ii201/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-310
NASA n_A #: 03-3-4510-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
310
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
%
[ ]
[ ]
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI 2/IR PPP, 1/1 ABORT ASSIGNMENT. IOA ANALYZED
INDIVIDUAL LINE SEGMENTS SEPARATELY IN ORIGINAL ANALYSIS. NASA
FMEA INCLUDES ALL GN2 LINE SEGMENTS. IOA CONSIDERS LEAKAGE OF
THIS SEGMENT TO BE A 3/IR PPP. .....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-311
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC _D:
ITEM:
OMS
311
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 3/3 EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
OMS-312
03-3-4506-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
312
COUPLING, GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[F] IF]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[m]
[A]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [- P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFYCONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS _EAL, THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE
AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-313
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4506-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
313
COUPLING, GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 Z3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS CLOSED"
AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILS CLOSED" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW" BE ADDED
TO THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA. THESE ARE CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES AND ARE ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-314
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4506-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
314
COUPLING, GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IgA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS TO
OPEN" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-315
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-45011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
315
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
L
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES B SCREEN AS "NA".
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS CLOSED) AS
A 3/3, BASED ON TEST DATA WHICH SHOWED THAT DOWNSTREAM LINES
COULD WITHSTAND HIGH PRESSURE. HOWEVER, NASA/RI UPGRADED CRIT TO
3/IR PNP BASED ON IOA ISSUE WITH USING TEST DATA IN CRITICALITY
DETERMINATION.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-225
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-316
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-45011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 316
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE _[ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT _CLASSIFY THIS FMEA AS AN ABORT CRIT I,
HOWEVER NASA/Ri UPGRADED THIS_ TO A CRIT ! FOR A TAL ABORT
PER IOA ISSUE ON THE "INTERNAL LEAKAGE", AND "LOW OUTPUT" FAILURE
MODES (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEETS OMS-317 AND 318).
IOA DOES NOT =CQNS!DER THE"POPPETDOES NOT RE SEAT"FAILURE MODE
TO BE AN ABORT CRIT 1 SINCE A PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO
CAUSE OVERPRESSURIZATION. IOA CONSIDERS THE CORRECT CRIT FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE 3/IR PNP.
HOWEVER, IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI CRIT ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-317
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-45011-1
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
317
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT CLASSIFY THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE) AS ABORT CRIT i. HOWEVER, NASA/RI UPGRADED TO AN ABORT
CRIT i, PER IOA ISSUE. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
COMPLETE ALL ENGINE STARTS AND PURGES REQUIRED DURING A TAL
ABORT.
k
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-318
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-45011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
318
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT CLASSIFY THIS FAILURE MODE (LOW
OUTPUT) AS AN ABORT CRIT i. HOWEVER, NASA/RI UPGRADED TO AN
ABORT CRIT I, PER IOA ISSUE. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN INABILITY
TO COMPLETE ALL ENGINE STARTS AND PURGES REQUIRED DURING A TAL
ABORT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-319
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4551-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 319
ITEM: CHECK VALVE-GN2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "RESTRICTED
FLOW".
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED B SCREEN, AND DID NOT CLASSIFY THIS
FAILURE MODE (FAILS CLOSED) AS AN ABORT CRIT i. HOWEVER, NASA/RI
CHANGED B SCREEN TO "FAIL", AND UPGRADED TO AN ABORT CRIT i, PER
IOA ISSUE. FIRST FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ONE OMS ENGINE
AND IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE ALL ENGINE STARTS AND PURGES
REQUIRED DURING A TAL ABORT.
b
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
AssEsSMENT ID: OM_-320
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4551-1
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 320
ITEM: CHECK VALVE-GN2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _,
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-321
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4551-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 321
ITEM: CHECK VALVE-GN2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
Ix]
[ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-322
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4552-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 322
ITEM: GN2 ACCUMULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RUPTURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A I/I AND
PLACED ON A NEW FMEA, SEPARATE FROM THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE
MODE. NSTS 22206 REQUIRES THAT POTENTIAL SHRAPNEL EFFECTS BE
INCLUDED IN THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT FOR RUPTURE OF NON-
FILAMENT-WOUND PRESSURE VESSELS. SHRAPNEL COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE
TO VEHICLE, TPS, OMS ENGINE, AND PROP LINES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-323
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4552-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 323
ITEM: GN2 ACCUMULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES FOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET OMS-322.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-324
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
03-3-4510-1
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
324
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REdS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-325
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
325
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/IR EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-326
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
326
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] c ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES ....... _ ..........
IOA RECO_NDS A SEP_TE _AFOR THIS ITEM SIN_E IT IS NOT
MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE BIPROP VALVES.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO I_DIVIDUAL FMEAS TO_R_VIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-327
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 327
ITEM: VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[p] [p] [p] ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] i ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
IOA RECOMMENDS A SEPARATE FMEA FOR THIS ITEM SINCE IT IS NOT
MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE BIPROP VALVES.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROPELLANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-328
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
328
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
I
I
B
l
mm
m
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES ....
IOAREC--0MMEND z -sTHAT THE SUBASSEMBLY coMPONENTS INC_LUDED ON _ THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
IOA RECOMMENDS A SEPARATE FMEA FOR THIS ITEM SINCE IT IS NOT
MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE BIPROP VALVES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-329
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4510-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
329
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS
FMEA, AND TO ADD CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL
SHEET, PER IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-330
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
330
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] CP]
ON] IN] CN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REmu_I(s:
NASA/RI _ NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE CONTROL VALVE AS A
FAILURE MODE O){A_. ...........
03-3-4001-2 DOES INCLUDE "CONTAMINATION" AND "PLUGGED OPENING
ORIFICE" AS CAUSES, HOWEVER IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A NEW 2/IR PPP,
I/i ABORT FMEA B_. GENERATED FOR THI=S ITEM AND FAILURE MODE. IOA
CONSIDERS RESTRICTED FLOW TO BE A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE FOR
COMPONENTS WITH INLET FILTERS OR ORIFICES. THIS ITEM IS NOT
MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE BIPROP VALVES AND SHOULD NOT BE
INCLUDED ON THE "FAILS CLOSED" BIPROP VALVE FMEA (03-3-4001-2).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-331
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
331
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
i
u
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED
OPERATION) AS A 3/3. HOWEVER, NASA/RI HAS UPGRADED TO A 2/IR
PFP, I/i ABORT, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B
SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
IOA RECOMMENDS A SEPARATE FMEA FOR THIS ITEM SINCE IT IS NOT
MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE BIPROP VALVES. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON SEVERAL I/i FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-332
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS ......
332
ORIFICE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE INLET
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
THIS ITEM AND FAI£_ MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW) _ ADEQUATEDY !i_;i_
COVERED ON 03"3-400i_'2, WHICH L_STS "PLUGGED 09EN!NG_ORIFICE '' AS
a CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO OPEN. AN ADDITIONAL FMEA AT THE SUB-
COMPONENT LE_L IS NOT REQUIRED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-333
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
333
ORIFICE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW) ARE ADEQUATELY
COVERED ON 03-3-4001-1, WHICH LISTS "FAILS TO VENT" AS A CAUSE
FOR FAILED OPEN CONTROL VALVE. AN ADDITIONAL FMEA AT THE SUB-
COMPONENT LEVEL IS NOT REQUIRED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-334
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA_DATA;j_< .... =
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
334
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C=_
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (FAILS CLOSED) ARE ADEQUATELY COVERED
ON 03-3-4001-1, WHICH LISTS "FAILS TO VENT" AS A CAUSE FOR A
FAILED OPEN CONTROL VALVE. A SEPARATE FMEA AT THE SUB-COMPONENT
LEVEL IS NOT REQUIRED. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-335
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM'.
OMS
335
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (FAILS OPEN) BE
ADDED AS A CAUSE ON FMEA 03-3-4001-2. AN ADDITIONAL FMEA AT THE
SUB-COMPONENT LEVEL IS UNNECESSARY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-336
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS
336
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CQNTROL VALVE VENT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
BE ADDED AS A CAUSE ON _ 03L3"4001-2. _ADDITIONAL FMEA AT
THE SUB-COMPONENT LEVEL IS UNNECESSARY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-337
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 337
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ p] [ p] [ p] IX] *
[p] [p] [p] [x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] c ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-338
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 338
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES_
IOA RECOMMENDS T_T THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONE_S INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
IoA A_O RECO_NDS ADDING STATE_NTS TO_[E E_S REG_DI_
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROPELLANT.
m
ms
m
m
m
[]
m
mm
=
i
mm
i '
mm
I
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-248
I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
w
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-339
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-3
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 339
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL) AS A 3/3. HOWEVER, NASA/RI HAS UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PFP,
i/i ABORT, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B
SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS LISTED AS A CAUSE ON SEVERAL i/I FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-340
NASA n_A #: 03-3-4001-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 340
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C _!
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RIIIIDO NOTCOyE_ R PISTON ISEAL LEAKAGE AS A FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DO LIST PISTON SEAL LEAKAGE AE L_USE FOR A FAILED CLOSED
ACTUATOR ON FMEA 03-3-4001-2. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ACCEPTABLE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE FOR 2/IR PPP, 1/1
ABORT CRIT ASSIGNMENT. IOA _LUD_REDUNDANTPISTON SEAL-IN
IOA RECOMM_NDS?_TTHE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL_AS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE_AILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-341
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-5
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 341
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED SHRAPNEL EFFECTS OF ACTUATOR RUPTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SHRAPNEL EFFECTS BE CONSIDERED BUT DOES NOT
CONSIDER THIS RECOMMENDATION TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT CRIT ASSIGNMENT.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-342
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
342
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA NOW FAI_ B SCREEN. ........ =_ __
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (PROP LEAKAGE OR MIXING
DUE TO SEAL FAILURES). LEAKAGE OF PROP PAST BALL VALVE SEALS AND
ACTUATOR SEALS COULD RESULT IN MIXING OF HYPERGOLIC PROPS IN
AC_ATOR cAViTIES_ OR-LEAKAGE INTO _THE _POD CAUSING POSSIBLE
CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
IOA -RECO_NDS THAT A 3/IR P?__°_DDED F_ _OP _AKAGE
PAST SEALS INTO THE ACTUATOR CAVITIES. SEAL FAILURES NOT
DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-343
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-5
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 343
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESS_NT _DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-344
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-3
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: "344
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED
OPERATION). HOWEVER, NASA/RI HAS ADDED THIS FAILURE MODE TO 03-
3-4001-3. IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEP_TEDONTOINDIVIDUALFMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-345
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
345
COUPLING, VENT PORT ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
i
-:__£
i
L
if.
I
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAKAGE OF THESE COUPLINGS (CP001, CP002, CP005, CP006, CP007,
CP008) DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT LEAKAGE OF ALL ENGINE TEST PORTS BE ADDRESSED
ON THE FMEA/CIL AND/OR THE OMRSD. LEAKAGE OF THESE PORTS WOULD
EXPOSE THE BIPROP VALVE ASSEMBLY INTERNAL PARTS TO AMBIENT, AND
COULD LEAD TO CONTAMINATION OF THE ASSEMBLY.
HOWEVER, LEAKAGE BY ITSELF IS NO EFFECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-346
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
346
COUPLING, VENT PORT ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF THESE COUPLINGS (CP001, CP002, CP005, CP006[ CP007,
CP008) TO COUP_ DO_ NoT APPEAR TO BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FAILURE TO COUPLE OF ALL ENGINE TEST PORTS BE
ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL AND/OR THE OMRSD. FAILURE HAS NO
EFFECT, _ ......... _....... _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-347
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
347
COUPLING, VENT PORT ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
z
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THESE FAILURES (FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE) FOR THESE
COUPLINGS (CPO01, CP002, CP005, CP006, CP007, CP008) DO NOT
APPEAR TO BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THESE FAILURE FOR ALL ENGINE TEST PORTS BE
ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CILAND/OR THE OMRSD. FAILURES HAVE NO
EFFECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-348
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 348
ITEM: PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
T_AD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DET._TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES WITH "FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-348A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
348
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
AS S ES SMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
c ,,
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES WITH "FAILS OPEN" FAILURE MODE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROPELLANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-349
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
349
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DI?FERENCES. .................
NASA/RI LIST BROKEN GEARS, TEETH, OR SHAFT AS CAUSE FOR FAILURE
OF GEAR DRIVE ASSEMBLY ON 03-3-4001-2. A SEPARATE GEAR ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE FMEA IS UNNECESSARY.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-350
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
350
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
- -
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CAUSES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FILTER
BLOCKAGE".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 3/3, i/I ABORT EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH
AN OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-261
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-351
N_A _ #: 03-3-4508-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 351
ITEM: VAL_-GN2 P_GE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY RED_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUA_ [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S: ....
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI _TIONALE _GARDING 3/3, i/i ABORT ....
CRITI_LITY. _O DUAL-ENGINE OMS B_S WITHIN i0 MI_TES IS NON-
CREDIBLE.
_!---:_ _ ! iii_ :_¸,II •_i¸ _¸ • ii ii _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-352
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4508-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 352
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
STATUS OF PURGE VALVE POSITION IS TELEMETERED TO GROUND AND IS
NOT AVAILABLE TO CREW. THEREFORE, PER NSTS 22206, NASA/RI IS
CORRECT IN FAILING B SCREEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-353
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4508-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 353
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ F ]
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-354
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4510-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 354
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE
,'(DOWNSTREAM OF FIRST VALVE)".
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 2/IR PPP, 1/1 ABORT
CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT.
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE) FOR THIS ITEM. HOWEVER, NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS
VALVE BODY TO THE ITEM LIST ON THIS FMEA, AND TO ADD
CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE TO THE CIL SHEET, PER IOA
ISSUE.
A FAILURE OF THE HOUSING NEAR THE INTERNAL CHECK VALVE COULD
RESULT IN PROP LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-355
03-3-4508-2
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS
355
VALVE-GN2 PURGE
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) _
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT ORIGINALLY COVER THiS FAILUREMODE (_STRiCTEDI
FLOW). HOWEVER, - NAS-A/RI ADDED _STRICTEDFLOW_S A ?AILUREMODE
ON THIS FMEA.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/3, 1/1 ABORT CRITICALITY
ASSIGn. :_ _:!i_i_ :_ .!_ _ - -_ =_ =
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-356
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
356
VALVE-GN2 PURGE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
h]ASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
E ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION).
THIS FAILURE MODE NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE FMEA/CIL. THE WORST
CASE EFFECTS OF "DELAYED OPERATION" ARE COVERED BY THE "FAILS
CLOSED" FMEA (03-3-4508-2).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC iD:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS-357
03-3-4508-2
OMS
357
CHECK VALVE-GN2 PURGE
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/3, 1/!ABORT CRITICALITY
ASSIGNMENT. NASA/RI ADDED CHECK VALVET-OPURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY
FMEA (03-3-4508-2) DURING REEVALUATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-358
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4508-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
358
CHECK VALVE-GN2 PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ p ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NASA/RI ADDED CHECK VALVE TO PURGE VALVE
ASSEMBLY FMEA (03-3-4508-1) DURING REEVALUATION.
E_
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-359
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4508-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
359
CHECK VALVE-GN2 PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NASA/RI ADDED CHECK VALVE TO PURGE VALVE
ASSEMBLY FMEA (03-3-4508-1) DURING REEVALUATION. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-360
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4508-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 36O
ITEM: ORIFICE-GN2 PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/3, i/I ABORT CRITICALITY
ASSIGNMENT. NASA/RI ADDED ORIFICE TO PURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY FMEA
(03-3-4508-2) DURING REEVALUATION.
w
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-361
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4508-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
361
GN2 PURGE VALVES TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] CP] CP] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / J c c J c ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI 0RIGINALLYDIDNO T COVER THIS ITEM (CP010) AND FAILURE
MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). HOWEVER, NASA/RI ADDED THE TEST PORT TO
THE PURGE VALVE _As (03-3-4508).
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/3, i/i ABORT CRITICALITY
ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-362
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6408-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 362
ITEM: GIMBAL RING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ i /Z J { 1 [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C
[
[
CIL
ITEM
1 [ x J *
] [x]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-363
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6409-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 363
ITEM: BEARING-GIMBAL RING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS".
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMEND$ THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPG_DED TO A
2/IR PPP, i/I ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS
WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-364
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-64011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
364
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-365
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6401-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 365
ITEM: MOTOR-GIMBAL DRIVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
_s:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-366
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 366
ITEM: MOTOR-GIMBAL DRIVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC
OPERATION).
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO 03-3-6401-1 AND
THAT "MOTOR SYNCHRO ARMATURE ROTATION" BE ADDED AS A CAUSE. THE
FAILURE HISTORY OF THIS ITEM INCLUDES THIS FAILURE MODE AND THIS
CAUSE. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
n
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-367
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 367
ITEM: ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/:IR PPP, i2-iA_T. ....THE IN_REASED_CS_ACT_VITY REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS
WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT. Ii_I_i_I!III_I_I__ _
03--_3_6402-2 COVERS THE "GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE ASSEMBLY".
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON
THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER
INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-368
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 368
ITEM: ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: _
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR I/I CRIT ASSIGNMENT.
6402-1 COVERS THE "GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE ASSEMBLY". THE SSM
REVISED THE EFFECTS PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS ON THIS FMEA BE
SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT INTO
THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
03-3-
w
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-369
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 369
ITEM: REDUCTION GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM OR FAILURE MODE _(BINDING/JAMMING).
IOA RECO_NDS TF_AT THIS ITEM AND-FA_LUi_MODE BE_DDRESS_ __
THE FMEA/CiL. THE REDUCTION GE_-IS-A MO-VING_ LOA-_D-B_EARiNG
COMPONENT WHOSE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF A CHANNEL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-370
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 370
ITEM: REDUCTION GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM OR FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL
FAILURE).
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON
THE FMEA/CIL. THE REDUCTION GEAR IS A MOVING, LOAD-BEARING
COMPONENT WHOSE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF A CHANNEL.
r_
w
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-281
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
if
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-371
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6403-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 371
ITEM: ANTIBACK DEVICE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DI__ _ !_: ..... ,- _....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-372
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 372
ITEM: ANTIBACK DEVICE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS TO STOP ROTATION OF
UNUSED CHANNEL).
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL. A STRUCTURAL FAILURE CAUSING THE INABILITY TO STOP
ROTATION OF THE UNUSED CHANNEL WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE
CHANNEL.
THE SSM AGREED THAT "STRUCTURAL FAILURE" SHOULD BE ADDED AS A
CAUSE ON 03-3-6403-1. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-373.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-373
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 373
ITEM: ANTIBACK DEVICE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE)_ _
IOA RECO_NDSTKAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED _THE _
FMEA/CIL WITH A 2/IR PPP, i/i ABORT CRIT. A STRUCTURAL FAILURE
OF THE ANTI-BACK DEVICE CAUSING THE INABILITY TO TRANSMIT TORQUE
AND STOP ROTATION OF° _U_SED C_EL CAUSE_ _SS OF THE
ACTUATOR AND LOSS OF TVC FOR ONE ENGINE. THE INCREASED RCS
ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-
MECO_O-ENGINE OMS OPS WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED 0UT OF _OSITION
MAY CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
THE SSM AGREED THAT "STRUCTURAL FAILURE" SHOULD BE ADDED AS A
FAILURE MODE ON 03-3-6403-1, HOWEVER THIS IS A 3/IR PPP.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-374
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
374
BEARING-GIMBAL THRUST DRIVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE).
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL WITH A 2/IR PPP, i/I ABORT CRITICALITY. A STRUCTURAL
FAILURE OF THIS BEARING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ACTUATOR DUE TO
BINDING OF THE GIMBAL DRIVE OR LOSS OF MESHING BETWEEN THE GIMBAL
DRIVE AND ONE CHANNEL. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS
WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-375
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6404-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
375
BEARING-GIMBAL THRUST DRIVE
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION AND QUANTITy NEED TO BE CQ_CTED TO
ACCOUNT_FO_ THE_CONDARYDR_E_ BE_INGS, WHICH°_SSM SAYS
ARE THRUST BEARINGS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-376
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
376
BEARING-SPHERICAL ROD END
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PPP, i/i ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS
WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
03-3-6402-2 COVERS THE "GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE ASSEMBLY".
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON
THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER
INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ID:
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC
ITEM:
OMS-377
03-3-6402-1
OMS
377
BEARING-SPHERICAL ROD END
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI=_TIONAL E FOR i/i CRIT ASSIGNMENT.
6402-i COVERS THE "GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE A SSE_LY".THE BSM
03-3-
REVISED THE EFFECTS PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS=QN THIS FMEA BE
SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL _AS TO-PROVIDEBET_ER INSIGHT INTO
THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-378
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6406-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
378
MECHANICAL STOP-SNUBBER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SSM STATES THAT CRIT WAS DOWNGRADED FROM 2/IR TO 3/3 AS A RESULT
OF A REVIEW WITH THE VENDOR. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT AND PLACED ON
THE CIL.
IOA MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF A SNUBBER
FAILURE COULD BE BINDING OR JAMMING OF THE GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE
ASSEMBLY OR INCORRECT TVC RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE AFFECTED
ENGINE. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE
CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS WITH ONE ENGINE
FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED TO COMPLETE
THE ABORT.
REDUNDANCY SCREENS SHOULD BE BLANK PER NSTS 22206.
w
L,
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:..... OMS-3 79
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
NASA DATA:
B_SELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
379
BEARING-NUT TUBE/OUTPUT SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] .[ P ] "[ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: .........
IOA_COMMENDS A 2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT FOR B!NDING/JAMMING_THESE
BEARINGS, _ICH ALLOW THE DRIVE _S_T_T0 ROTATE WITH_ THE ;_'_
SURROUNDING TUBULAR HOUSING. THE INCREASED RCS ACTiV_TY REQUIRED
TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS
OPS WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED 0uT 10F POSITION MAY CONS_ RCS PROP
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (BINDING/JAMMING) ARE APPARENTLY
INCLUDED ON 03-3-6402-2, _CH COVERS THE "GIMBAL O_ DRIVE
ASSEMBLY" ' _ T_;........ _ ...................
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE
SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT INTO
THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-380
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
OMS
380
BEARING-NUT TUBE/OUTPUT SHAFT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "STRUCTURAL FAILURE" OF THESE BEARINGS
(BETWEEN THE DRIVE SHAFT AND THE SURROUNDING TUBULAR HOUSING) BE
ADDED AS A CAUSE ON 03-3-6402-2 (GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE ASSEMBLY,
BINDING JAMMING). SUCH A FAILURE WOULD CAUSE BINDING OF THESE
BEARINGS, AND LOSS OF THE ACTUATOR. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET oms-
379.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT IDi 0MS-381
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 381
ITEM: OUTPUT SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
03-3-6402-1 COVERS THE "GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE ASSEMBLY". THE SSM
RE_I_E_THEEFFECTS PER 10A ISSUE: :ii_i I i_ ii_ _ .......
IOA _¢O_NDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLy COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL_AS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY. r
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-382
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-64071-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
382
GIMBAL ACTUATOR CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-383
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-64071-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD  ALYST:
OMS
383
GIMBAL ACTUATOR CONTROLLER
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
 m aS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20001X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 20001
ITEM: GN2 FILTER.
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
NASA/RI DELETED THE FMEA FOR THIS GN2 FILTER (03-3-4504-2) PER
IOA ISSUE. THE GN2 FILTER IS A SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENT AND IS
ADEQUATELY COVERED UNDER THE ANALYSIS OF THE GN2 REGULATOR.
w
w
w
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
AssEsSMENT ID: OMS-20002X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
_BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATTACHMENT
OMS
20002
GIMBAL RING BEARING, GIMBAL RING/MOUNTING PAD
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _ _ ...._ ........_.........._=:
IOA DID NOT ANALYZE THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAIrLURE OF A
GIMBAL RING BEARING) IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS. NASA/RI DO NOT
CURRENTLY ADDRESS THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE FMEA/CIL (BINDING OF
THIS BEARING iS COVE=RED ON 03"3-6409-i).
IOA REC0_NDS THAT A NEW 1/1 FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE. A STRUCTU_ FAILURE OF THIS BEARING COULD RESULT
IN DISATTACHMENT BETWEEN THE ENGINE AND GIMBAL RING OR GIMBAL
RING AND VEHICLE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF ENGINE RESTRAINT AND
POSSIBLE VEHICLE DAMAGE OR PROP LINE BREAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20003X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20003
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED
OPERATION). HOWEVER, NASA/RI NOW ADDRESS THIS FAILURE MODE ON
03-3-4001-3. IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS"
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20004X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1009-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20004
VALVE - PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /iR ]
[P] [NA] [P] [ ]*
[P] [NA] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOAAND NASA/_= ORIGINALLY DID NoT-_OVERTHIS FAILURE MO_E
(RESTRICTED FLOW). HOWEVER, NASA/RI AGREED TO ADD THIS FAILURE
MODE TO 03-3-1009-4, PER IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20005X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20005
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_T
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW) IN THE
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS. NASA/RI DO NOT CURRENTLY ADDRESS THIS FAILURE
MODE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A
NEW I/i FMEA. THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF
THE BIPROP VALVE HOUSING AND LEAKAGE OF PROP. THE BIPROP VALVE
HOUSING COULD FAIL BEFORE THE BALL VALVE SEALS FAIL AND RELIEVE
PRESSURE. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET 0MS-262. IOA CONSIDERS
RESTRICTED FLOW TO BE A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE FOR ALL COMPONENTS
WITH INTEGRAL FILTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-299
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20006X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20006
PINION GEAR & DRIVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGIN-ALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILU_ MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL). HOWEVER, NASA/RI NOW A_ THIS FAI_MODE ON 03-3-
4001-3. IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONT0 INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20007X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6404-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20007
BEARING - SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE QUANTITY AND FUNCTION DESCRIPTION BE
CORRECTED TO INCLUDE THE BEARINGS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE SECONDARY
DRIVE GEAR. IOA WAS NOT ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THESE BEARINGS WERE
THRUST BEARINGS, HOWEVER THE SSM STATES THAT THESE ARE THRUST
BEARINGS AND ARE COVERED BY 03-3-6404-1.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20008X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20008
BEARING - SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI _ NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUC_L FAILURE). ....IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESEE_ ON THE
FMEA/CIL WITH A 2/IR PPP, i/I ABORT CRIT. STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF
THESE BEARINGS COULD CAUSE BINDING OF THE GIMBAL DRIVE AND LOSS
OF TVC FOR THE AFFECTED ENGINE. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY
REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-
ENGINE OMS OPS WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME
RCS PROP NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
THE SSM_STATE_THAT THESE BEARINGS (ON EITHER SIDE OF THE
SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR) ARE THRUST BEARINGS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20009X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20009
DRIVE GEARS, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE SSM STATES THAT THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
DRIVE GEARS) IS COVERED BY 03-3-6402-2 (GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE
ASSEMBLY, BINDING/JAMMING).
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT
INTO THE FAILURE MODES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE CLASSIFIED AS A
2/IR PPP, i/I ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS
WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP
REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20010X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HARDWARE
LEAD ANALYST:
OMS
20010
ENGINE/ACTUATORAND ACTUATOR/VEHICLE ATTACH
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:_ _ _ :
IOA _CO_NDS THAT "IMPROPER ASSEMBLYi'BEADDED AS A CAUSE ON
THIS FMEA/CIL.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON
THIS FleA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER
INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURE MODES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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n
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20011X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
OMS
20011
BEARING - ACTUATOR/VEHICLE ATTACHMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
n
u.-
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PPP,
i/I ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN
VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS WITH ONE
ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED TO
COMPLETE THE ABORT.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON
THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER
INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURE MODES POSSIBLE IN THE ASSEMBLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20OI2X
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
03-3-45011-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
20012
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR AND PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENTt
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C_
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS
(SIMULTANEOUS REG FAIL OPEN AND RELIEF VALVE FAIL CLOSED).
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20013X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1004-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20013
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C I C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(if applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
w
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I
l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20OI4X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
_SELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
OMS
20014
VALVE - PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3/IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE FAILS
CLOSED). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A 3/IR PNP ?MEA BE GENERATED FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE. FAILURE OF PARALLEL DEVICES COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES. A
PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVES WILL BE CLOSED.
FAILURE MODE IS LISTED AS A CAUSE ON PROP LINE RUPTURE FMEA (03-
3-2101-1), AND ADDRESSED ON RCS FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20015X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 20015
ITEM: VALVE - CROSSFEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE FAILS
CLOSED). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A 3/IR PNP FMEA BE GENERATED FOR
THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANT DEVICES
COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF CROSSFEED
LINES.
FAILURE IS LISTED AS A CAUSE ON CROSSFEED LINE RUPTURE FMEA (03-
3-2102-1), AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS FMEAS.
=
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
0MS-384
05-6L-2176-I
OMS
384
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-385
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
385
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ]
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-386
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
386
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
0MS-387
05-6L-2176-2
OMS
387
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
C P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEw[x]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-388
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
388
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPA_ [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RYe:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-389
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
389
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[p] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
Z
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-390
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
390
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-391
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
391
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
r
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-392
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
392
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-393
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
393
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
w
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-319
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-394
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
394
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT'.
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(Ifapplicable) .........
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-395
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
395
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-396
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
396
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER"
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
U
m
l
I
=_
m
I
mm
i
m
m
mm
mm
u
mm
m
m
D
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 c-_22. .... .........
m
i
I
u
I
U
m
wT _
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-397
05-6L-2176-2
OMS
397
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER"
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
w
i
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-398
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
398
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER"
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
0MS-399
05-6L-2176-2
OMS
399
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER"
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[F]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
m
i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN. THIS FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTABLE UNTIL THE ASSOCIATED SWITCH IS PUT IN OPEN POSITION,
BUT THIS CAUSES VALVE TO BE STUCK OPEN. IF THE CREW HAD KNOWN
ABOUT THE FAILURE, THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE THROWN THE SWITCH INTO
OPEN, TO AVOID STICKING THE VALVE OPEN. THEREFORE, FAILURE IS
DETECTED BUT DETECTED TOO LATE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-400
05-6L-2251-I
OMS
4OO
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-401
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 401
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
IF] [F]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-402
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 402
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)!_i _i_ _,!_i_?_i_
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
]
]
I
z
i
U
m
I
mm
mm
[]
iJ
mm
j
W+
mm
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-403
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 403
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[ N ]
z
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
t:
?
W
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-404
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 404
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS" o
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
mm
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g
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-405
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-406
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 406
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
CP] [P]
CP] [P]
[ ] C ]
C
CP]
CP]
C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
m
m
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g
mm
z
mm
mm
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-407
05-6L-2251-2
OMS
407
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[F] [F]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]° [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-408
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 408
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
mm
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-409
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 409
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
IF] [F]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS. • (If different from NASA)
[ 2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
=
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-410
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2252-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 410
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-411
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2252-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 411
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-412
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC I D: 412
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-413
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 413
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
]
]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-414
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 414
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-415
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2252-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 415
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-416
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-I
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 416
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY RED_DANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-417
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 417
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA )
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-418
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 418
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A _ B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] • [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] E ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _z _ _
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGNES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
u
n
l
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w
l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-419
05-6L-2251-2
OMS
419
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[ F ]
[ F ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-420
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2201-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 420
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES .....
mm
mm
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-421
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2201-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 421
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-422
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 422
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[p] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-423
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2201-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 423
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
=
n
m
=
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
OMS-424
05-6L-2001-I
OMS
424
FUSE, IA
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C I ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NO DIFFERENCES.
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
z
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-425
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 425
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
m
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS. "
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
u
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-426
05-6L-2077-I
OMS
426
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
NASA DATA: .....
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .................
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REds:
NO DIFFE_NCES.
C ]
C ]
m
m
[]
m
i
m
i
m
I
ms
B
z
i
mm
g
mm
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-352
mm
mm
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-427
NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2077-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID:- 427
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-428
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2076-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 428
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
OMS-429
05-6L-2076-I
OMS
429
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
C
C
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
R_:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
z
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: _ 0MS-430
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2076-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 430
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A _ B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IoA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
B_ELINZ [ ]
NEW[X]
]
]
]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
!
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-431
05-6L-2076-I
OMS
431
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
F
i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-432
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2077-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 432
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-433
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2077-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 433
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
E"
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS" o
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-G
C-359
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-434
05-6L-2076-I
OMS
434
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) o
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
OMS-435
05-6L-2076-I
OMS
435
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
i
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-436
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2076-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
436
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-437
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2076-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 437
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-438
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
_ELINE_ [ : ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
A
OMS
438
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_ :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT NASA GENERATE A FMEA WITH THIS "STUCK IN OPEN
POSITION (BOTH CONTACT SETS)" FAILURE MODE. THE CLOSEST EXISTING
MAT_ AVAI_BLE IS NASA'S FMEA 05-6L-2026-I WITH A "FAILS TO
TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO Co_bUCT (ONE CONTACT SET)"
FAILURE MODE, WHICH IS ALREADY MATCHED TO MDAC-440 AND 443.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-439
NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
A
OMS
439
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[p] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
m
n
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-365
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-440
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
A
OMS
440
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-441
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
B
OMS
441
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOAAGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-442
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
B
OMS
442
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT NASA GENERATE A FMEA WITH THIS "STUCK IN OPEN
POSITION (BOTH CONTACT SETS)" FAILURE MODE. THE CLOSEST EXISTING
MATCHAVAILAB_ IS NASA'S _ 05-6L-2026-I WITH A "FAILS TO
TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO CONDUCT (ONE CONTACT SET)"
FAILURE MODE, WHICH IS ALREADY MATCHED TO MDAC-440 AND 443.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-443
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
B
OMS
443
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV
_D _ALYST: W.A. _UFLER
ASSESSMENT".
NASA
IOA
COMP_
REDUND_CY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
[ 3 /IR ] C P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
i
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-444
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2153-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
444
METER, OMS PRESSURE N2/HE TANK
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
• INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA DOES, BUT NASA DOES NOT, IMPLY THAT CRTDISPLAYS AN D MISSION
CONTROL CE_NTER_E REDUNDANT TO ITEM TO GET NITROGEN AND HELIUM
PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS. LOSS OF FUNCTION CAN LEAD TO FALSELY
FAILING ONE OMS HE TANK OR TWO OMS GN2 TANKS, AND THUS LOSS OF
T
MISSION OR AN ATO.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS-445
03-3-1801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
445
SENSOR PRESSURE. HE TANK NO.I
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
E ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN RESULT IN FALSELY FAILING THEHEL!UM
TANK DURING ASCENT REQUIRING AN ATO BE CALLED, SINCE THERE M_Y
NOT BE ENOUGH TIME TO VERIFY THE FAILURE.
SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-1.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-446
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
446
SENSOR PRESSURE, HE TANK NO.2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN RESULT IN FALSELY FAILING THE HELIUM
TANK DURING KSCENT REQUIRING __ BE CALLED, SINCE _ _Y
NOT BE ENOUGH TIME TO VERIFY THE FAILURE.
SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-1.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-447
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1802-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
447
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OMS HE TANK UPPER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN RESULT IN FALSELY FAILING THE HELIUM
TANK DURING ASCENT REQUIRING AN ATO BE CALLED, SINCE THERE MAY
NOT BE ENOUGH TIME TO VERIFY THE FAILURE.
SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-1.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-448
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1802-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
448
SENSOR TEMP, OX/HE TEST PORT FITTING TEMP 1 &
TEMP 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
/ ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALEi (If_applicable)--
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :!__ _ - _ _
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-449
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2033-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
449
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS N2/HE PRESSURE DISPLAY SELECT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [_ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES, BUT NASA DOES NOT, IMPLY THAT CRT DISPLAYS AND MISSION
CONTROL CENTER ARE REDUNDANT TO ITEM TO GET NITROGEN AND HELIUM
PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS. LOSS OF FUNCTION CAN LEAD TO FALSELY
FAILING ONE OMS HE TANK OR TWO OMS GN2 TANKS, AND THUS LOSS OF
MISSION OR AN ATO.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-450
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253A-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
M
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/IR IS DRIVEN BY OMSHARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2007-1, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES TANK ISOL VALVE TO
FAIL OPEN. ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY,
THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA
ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS TO A NON-CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253B-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...........
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA .........
[ ]
[ ]
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF RELAY
POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW. THEREFORE,
"CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT
CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED OPEN DIODE ARE NOT DETECTABLE AND THE
FAILED DIODE IS NOT DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450D
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ X ]
A
[p]
[ F ]
[N]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....... _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA'S CRITICALITY OF 3/IR IS DBIVENBY OMS HARDWARE_oFMEA 03.3--
2007-1, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES TANK ISOL VALVE TO FAIL OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450E
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2255-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N [X]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANO_qER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. _ BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTTHE EX_OSiq_G -ELEC_ICAL .....
COMPONENTS AND VALVE-_(bTOR TO PROPELLANT I_S-S_I6-U_S,-NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR -TS C6NTINUOUSL_Y 0N _ HOT. THAT IS, _ THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SiGNi_FIC-ANTLY-_IBUTE TO _ BELI_OWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMDRE, THE_VALVES ARE PROTECTED FR_ CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
OMS-450F
05-6L-2256-I
OMS
450
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
B_ELiNE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
IF] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ].
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) i........_ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _ _ _÷_ _ _
I0_ _C0_ENDS _T BELLOWS FAIL_ SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE_
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON _E ASSOCIATED VALVE (S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RU_E IS
.... ÷ :
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE _DoEs NoT SIGNIFiC_TL_CoNTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
• POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE ....
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO TH_PEC--S,_ "_ _
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3,2.1.2.11.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-451
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 451
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-451A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 451
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. ACCORDING TO THE
LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW
NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS
TO A NON-CIL, AND IOA TENTATIVELY CONCURS. IOA BELIEVES THIS
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT, SINCE ONLY A MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXER
(MDM) IS BEHIND THE "GPC CLOSE" DIODES, AND THAT IS WELL
PROTECTED INTERNALLY FROM REVERSE CURRENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSME_ ID: OMS-451B
N_A _ #: 05-6L-2253B-2
NAS A DATA:
_ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYST_: OMS
MDAC ID: 451
ITS: DIODE
_D ANALYST: W.A. _UFT._R
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMP_ [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] C ]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONA_: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
IOA AGNES WI_ _IS NASA _A.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-451C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256B-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 451
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-387
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[ F ]
[ N ]
B
[p]
[P]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253A-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /IR]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/IR IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2007-1, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES TANK ISOL VALVE TO
FAIL OPEN. ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY,
THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA
ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS TO A NON-CIL.
L-
L.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-452B
05-6L-2253B-I
OMS
452
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DAT_"
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[p]
IF]
[N]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ / ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
n
z
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF RELAY
POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW. THEREFORE,
"CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT
CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED OpEN DIODE ARE NOT DETECTABLE AND THE
FAILED DIODE IS NOT DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
r
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
OMS-452D
05-6L-2253D-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S CRITICALITY OF 3/1R IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-
2007-1, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES TANK ISOL VALVE TO FAIL OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452E
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2255-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 13 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET []
ASSESS_mNTDATE: 1/Ol/88
ASSES_NT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
OMS-452F
05-6L-2256-I
OMS
452
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
IF] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ -]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA _CO_NDS THATBELLOWS FAILURE sHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGHTHIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND_ MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS_IOUS, NOT JUST
W'H_}_T_E VALVE M__ CO_TINUOUSLY__ F[OT. T_T IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES I_O_IGNIFIC_ CONTRIBUTE TO-THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-453
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IoA " [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
05-6L-2253-2
OMS
453
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
IF]
[N]
B C
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x] _
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-453A
NASA FME #: 05-6L-2253A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 453
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. ACCORDING TO THE
LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW
NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMESTHAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS
TO A NON-CIL, AND IOA TENTATIVELY CONCURS. IOA BELIEVES THIS
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT, SINCE ONLY A MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXER
(MDM) IS BEHIND THE "GPC CLOSE" DIODES, AND THAT IS WELL
PROTECTED INTERNALLY FROM REVERSE CURRENT.
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-453B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253B-2
NASA DATA:
B_E LINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 453
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
_OA AGNES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-453C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 453
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS- e
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
?OWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:i/0i/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-454
NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2257-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
B
[P]
[p]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CP]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] .
IX]
IN]
[A]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS- i
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS INDIRECTLY DRIVEN BY OMS
HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES
CROSSFEED VALVE TO FAIL CLOSED. IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B
SCREEN SINCE THE M_STATU$ OF _LAY POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY
ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW. THEREFORE, "C_SE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT
OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED
OPEN DIODE ARE NOT DETECTABI_ AND SO THE FAILED DIODE IS NOT
DETECTABLE INFLIGHT. _ ............
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257A-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[x]
[ ]
i
||||
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_S:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE CROSSFEED VALVE
TO FAIL CLOSED. ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA
CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST BUT IS
NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS TO A NON-CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454B
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
Io-A _ [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
05-6L-2257B-I
OMS
454
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
A
[P]
[F]
[N]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-454C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF RELAY
POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW. THEREFORE,
"CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT
CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED OPEN DIODE ARE NOT DETECTABLE AND THE
FAILED DIODE IS NOT DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
w
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454D
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257D-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[p]
[F]
CN]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[p] [p]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454E
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2258-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
T_AD ANALYST: W.A. _UFT._R
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
Ix]
[ ]
i
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DET._TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
u
z
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l
M
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454F
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2259-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT-.
NASA DATA-
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [n]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES a "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCEN_I0 WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BEL_WS RU_RE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
_-_VALVE MO_IS-_ONTI_OUSLY ON_-_ _HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOTEIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE ....TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE......... FURTHERMO__RE, _E VALVES _. PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWE R BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF _DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
u
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES _ PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454H
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : -
IOA REC_-_NDS T_AT B_WS FAILURE _HOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED _AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
C0ULD_:CAU_SE C0NTI_OUS_POWER _::_N_TH-E ASSOCIATED VALVE,S), S_NcE
THE SIGNAL T_0UGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING oR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
scENARIO WITH ANOTHER FA=ILU_ ¢ONSISTIN_G___WS RU_ IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILU_ _-_E_ NOTS IGN_?ICq_rLY _CONTRI BUTE TO _E BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454I
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-455
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 455
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS- e
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE CROSSFEED VALVE
TO FAIL CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-455A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC "ID: 455
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[313 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. ACCORDING TO THE
LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW
NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS
TO A NON-CIL, AND IOA TENTATIVELY CONCURS. IOA BELIEVES THIS
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT, SINCE ONLY A MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXER
(MDM) IS BEHIND THE "GPC CLOSE" DIODES, AND THAT IS WELL
PROTECTED INTERNALLY FROM REVERSE CURRENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-455B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 455
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
IX ]
IN]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[F] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
RE__S:
IOA AGREES WIS"__"TS__:_ __ NASA FMEA. _ :_:_:_ ...... :_ : :_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
i
L_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS INDIRECTLY DRIVEN BY OMS
HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES
CROSSFEED VALVE TO FAIL CLOSED. IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B
SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF RELAY POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY
ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW. THEREFORE, "CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT
OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED
OPEN DIODE ARE NOT DETECTABLE AND SO THE FAILED DIODE IS NOT
DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
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R
ASSESSMENT.... DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257A-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. •
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3"2008-2, SINCE _IS FAILURE CAUSES-THE CROSSFEED VALVE
TO FAIL CLOSED. ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA
CRITICALITY, TH!$ _?MEA SHO_LDBE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST BUT IS
NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NA-SA DOWNGRADED THIS TO A NON-CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[ F ]
[ N ]
B
[p]
[P]
[ ]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
L
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-456C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF-_RELAY
POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW. THEREFORE,
"CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT
CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED OPEN DIODE ARE NOT DETECTABLE AND THE
FAILED DIODE IS NOT DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456D
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257D-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[ P ]
[ F ]
[N]
B C
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESS_NT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456E
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
05-6L-2258-I
OMS
456
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
ix]
[ ]
I
i
mm
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J
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) : _
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456F
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULDCAUSE CONTINUDUSq_ER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
T_ _SiGNAL THROUG-H-THIS -__T_M WOULD Iq_HIBIT_CLOSiNG OR O_NG
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL tLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RU_ ANYTiME_XPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYST_: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHQULDNOT BE CONSIDERED AND
cRITIcALITY THUS _DUCED, SINCEIT cONSTI_TES A "_LTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THATCHES _AILURE?
COULD CAusE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE!
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THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCEN_IQ_ W!T_ANO2H_ER FAIL_. CONSIST_ ING OZ_BEL_WS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE _
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456H
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[313 ] [ ] [ ] i ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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R
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456I
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260B-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3/3 ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _-
[ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA RECO_NDS TIcIAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE _ONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER r NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE C_ONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES-_T_°SIGNIFIC_TT.Y Co_IBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F._D, ACCORDING TO-THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-457
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 457
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F J [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE CROSSFEED VALVE
TO FAIL CLOSED.
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g
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-457A
05-6L-2257A-2
OMS
457
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC .......A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [. F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECO_NDS REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. ACCORDING TO THE
LAST AVAILABLE NASX _ITICAtIT_, _S_ SHOUT.D BE _IN THE-NEW
NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS
TO A NON-CIL, AND IOA TENTATIVELY CONCURS. IOA BELIEVES THIS
?AILURE HAS NO EFFECT, siNtEb_LY A MULTIPLEXER'DEMULTIPLEXER
(MDM) IS BEHIND THE "GPC CLOSE" DIODES, AND THAT IS WELL
PROTECTED INTERNALLY FROM REVERSE CURRENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-457B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257B-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 457
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-458
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 458
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] C N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LosS_°O_F_AiL--_REDUNbANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGH! IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-459
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 459
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-460
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 460
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSED ANDREDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSIQN. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY_
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND ....._ .......
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-461
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 461
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FA_LED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-462
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2204-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 462
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
WORST CASE IS VALVE_ DECKED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED 'To _COMP_TE CROSSFEED. .....LOS--_-SOF ALL RE_CY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VAL%+E POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION _IS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-463
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2204-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 463
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ].
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-464
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 464
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE I_ VALV E DECLARED FAI_D C_SED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. _SS OF ALLREDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TODE--TERMINE VALVE PO-dSITI0_. BUT FLIGHT AND _
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-465
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2204-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 465
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANTVALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEEDSYS_ RESULTING°IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED RED_DANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT M_ION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALEBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-466
05-6L-2202-I
OMS
466
DRIVER, HYBRID
W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSZD_ E_TIONS:_ _.-=-_ ...... __.
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT i? SENSORS CAN BEUSED (_DUND_ TO _
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS. PHYSICALLY CANNOT _: _7
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE
THERE IS NO FLUID MOVEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-467
05-6L-2202-2
OMS
467
DRIVER, HYBRID
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[. ]
[ ]
B
[ ] [
[ ] [
[ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] C ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS •
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-435
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
0MS-468
05-6L-2202-I
OMS
468
DRIVER, HYBRID
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _: _
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-469
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 469
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ 3
[ ]
w
==
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS.
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED (REDUNDANTLY TO
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS. PHYSICALLY CANNOT
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE
THERE IS NO FLUID MOVEMENT.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-470
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
470
DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ....
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS_Q_ALLREDUNDANCy WOULD RESULT _N LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR S
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS _ ........... _i_ _ -_
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN _ BE USED (_DUND_LY TO
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT_0sE THESE TALKBACKS. pHYSICA£LY CANNOT .....
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCE_ DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE
THERE IS NO FLUID MOVEMENT.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-471
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2202-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 471
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / • ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE) "
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
= :
w
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-472
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2202-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 472
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-473
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2202-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 473
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS.
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED (REDUNDANTLY TO
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS. PHYSICALLY CANNOT
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE
THERE IS NO FLUID MOVEMENT.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-474
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 474
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE ......
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NST$ 22206- NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE _'
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
i
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WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH _OTHER ?AILURE CON$IST I_NG_ O[BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPT_ ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILL_ DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY C_IBUTE TO _ BEL_WS RU_RE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
PO_R BYAN ELE_RI_CAL THERMAL S_TOFFDEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION-MEC_ISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-475
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2004-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 475
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-476
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 476
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA--_co_NDS T_T_BELLO_W_S_ILURE SHOULDNOT BE CONSIDERED AND_
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE _'_
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERpTRETAT!ONOF NST_222006. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FA!L_
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINC_>
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITHANOTHER FAILURE CQN$ISTIN_QFBELLOWS RU_RE IS _:_:
IRRELEVANT._K _BELLOWS _ SING_ICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DO--_NOTS_IGNi?I_Y _ONTRI_TO_BELLOWS RUPTURE_
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTI_OUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMA_LSHUTQFFDEVIC_ WITHIN THE VAL_ .....
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, ,THE_
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MEC_ISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-477
NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 477
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ]COMPARE [ /N ] [N]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-478
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 478
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
[3/IR] [P]
[3/IR] [P]
B C
[NA] [P]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] IN] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _..........:....
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA. _ : _ ........
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-479
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 479
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-480
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2002-I
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 480
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-.
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-481
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 481
ITEM_ FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELIN_E [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-482
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 482
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A : B C _ :_
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ]
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-483
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2131-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 483
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
OMS-484
05-6L-2130-I
OMS
484
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-485
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 485
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
OMS-486
05-6L-2130-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 486
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
[ 3/1R] [P]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
C /N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[p]
CF]
IN]
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
z
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-487
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2131-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 487
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
[P] [x]*
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-488
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 488
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
IOA A_G_REES WIT}{ THIS NASA _Ao
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-489
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 489
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE _ITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-490
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 490
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REM_ :
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
B
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-491
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 491
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASAIS CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA
IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE
ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430 SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-492
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 492
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONAl: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN. THESE RELAYS ARE NOT
STANDBY RED_DANT TO ANY OTHER ITEMS SINCE THEY ARE NORMALLY
OPERATIONAL. SOME OF THESE RELAYS FAILING HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS SIGNALS WHICH
ARE NOT READILY USED BY THE C_. _ _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-493
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 493
ITEM: RELAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA
IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE
ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F. IOA'S
CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2007-1.
SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430 SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-494
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 494
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[p] [p]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AG.REES WITH THIS NASA FMEA._ _ .....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-495
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 495
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
r
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA
IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE
ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430 SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-463
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
B
l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-496
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 496
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA_COMMENDS FAILING _B S_EN. _ESE RELAYS _ NOT
STANDBY_b_ND_T TO _Y OTHER ITEMS SINCE _Y _ NORMALLY
OPERATIONAL. SOME OF THESE RELAYS FAILING HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS SIGNALS WHICH
ARE NOT _DiLY USED BY-THE_. .... -_
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-497
NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2126-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID:- 497
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
z: :
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA
IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE
ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F. IOA'S
CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2007-1.
SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430 SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-498
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
-MDAC ID: 498
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES, _ _ _ _=
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS-499
05-6L-2131-2
OMS
499
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[N]
w
u
L_
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-500
NASA FMEA #: 0S-6L-2130-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 500
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 501
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-469
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
J
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 502
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
IX]
IN]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
z
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2131-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 503
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
z
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASAIS
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RU_ IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 504
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
ix]
[ ]
I
mm
m
m
mm
I
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :-
IOA _GREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 505
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
i
m
m
w..
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 506
ITEM: RELAY
_D ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C -_:_
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 507
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA
IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE
ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430 SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11.
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z
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 508
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN. THESE RELAYS ARE NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT TO ANY OTHER ITEMS SINCE THEY ARE NORMALLY
OPERATIONAL. SOME OF THESE RELAYS FAILING HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS SIGNALS WHICH
ARE NOT READILY USED BY THE CREW.
ms
I
m
I
im
I
-- z
ms
I
i
i
B
i
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-476
= _
w
i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 509
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
=
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA
IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE
ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F. IOA'S
CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2007-1.
SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430 SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 510
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] C ] [ ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASAIS CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA
IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD_CAUSE CONTINUOUS PQWER ON THE _
ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICEo_WITHIN THEVA - LVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F. IOA'S
CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE _A 03-3-2007-1.
SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430 SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11.
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-511
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 511
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C N ] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[ N ]
L
b
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
=
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS- 512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 512
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
I0A _6N_S WITH NASA'SCRITS AND SCREENS, BUT iOA RECO_NDS
THAT BELLOWS ?AILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA
IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE
ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWE_R x NA=$A'_ SCENARI_O__QTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRE_F_IWT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY,ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430 SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9,
3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 513
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ I [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /1R ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [k]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN. THESE RELAYS ARE NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT TO ANY OTHER ITEMS SINCE THEY ARE NORMALLY
OPERATIONAL. SOME OF THESE RELAYS FAILING HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS SIGNALS WHICH
ARE NOT READILY USED BY THE CREW.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-514
NASA _ #: 05-6L-2083-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 514
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE coNsIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE_
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN E_CTRICAL ......THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
0MS-515
NONE
OMS
515
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-516
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 516
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 . ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
NO _DIFFERENCE_ :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
OMS-517
NONE
OMS
517
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
W.A. HAUFLER
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[N] IN]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
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J
ASSESS_ DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-518
05-6L-2082-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS
518
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
IF] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE IS:V_LVE DECLARED I_AII_ED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMP_T_OS_EED. _ OF ALL_DU_D_CY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETE_iNE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-519
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 519
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-520
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 520
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT::
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECO_NDSTHAT BELLOWS FAILURE_HQU_ NQT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD cAUSE CONTINUOUS Po-WER 0NTHE AssocIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
I_LEVANT_ A-BELLOWS RU_E ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
_R BY _ELECTRICAL THE_L SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE:SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-521
NONE
OMS
521
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS-522
05-6L-2091-I
OMS
522
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REdS :
NO DIFFERENCES. ..... _.......
[ ]
[ ]
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